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Abstract
In this dissertation, I study the origins and economic consequences of ethnolinguistic differences.
To quantify these differences, I construct a lexicostatistical measure of linguistic distance. I use
this measure to study two different outcomes: ethnic politics and cross-country idea flows. I then
take the economic importance of ethnolinguistic differences as given, and explore the geographic
foundation of these differences.
In chapter 1, I document evidence of ethnic favoritism in 35 sub-Saharan countries. I use lexi-
costatistical distance to quantify the similarity between an ethnic group and the national leader’s
ethnic identity. I find that a one standard deviation increase in similarity yields a 2 percent in-
crease in group-level GDP per capita. I then use the continuity of lexicostatistical similarity to
show that favoritism exists among groups that are not coethnic to the leader, where the mean ef-
fect of non-coethnic similarity is one quarter the size of the coethnic effect. I relate these results
to the literature on coalition building, and provide evidence that ethnicity is a guiding principle
behind high-level government appointments.
In chapter 2, I use book translations data to capture cross-country idea flows. It has been
conjectured that income gaps are smaller between ancestrally related countries because they com-
municate more ideas. I provide empirical support for this link and a deeper understanding of
the hypothesized mechanism: population differences do exhibit a negative relationship with the
diffusion of ideas, with the caveat that this negative relationship operates across linguistic lines.
After accounting for the linguistic distance between two countries, I find that dissimilar popula-
tions communicate more ideas.
In chapter 3, I study the geographic origins of ethnolinguistic differences. I construct a novel
dataset to examine the border regions of neighbouring ethnolinguistic groups, together with varia-
tion in the set of potentially cultivatable crops at the onset of the Columbian Exchange, to estimate
how agricultural diversity impacts linguistic differences between neighbouring groups. I find
that ethnic groups separated across agriculturally diverse regions are more similar in language
than groups separated across homogeneous agricultural regions. I propose that historical trade in
agriculturally diverse regions is the mechanism by which group similarities are preserved.
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Chapter 1
Ethnolinguistic Favoritism in African
Politics
1.1 Introduction
Understanding why global poverty is so concentrated in Africa remains one of the most crucial
areas of inquiry in the social sciences. One long-standing explanation is that Africa’s high level of
ethnic diversity is a major source of its underdevelopment and political instability (Easterly and
Levine, 1997; Collier and Gunning, 1999; Posner, 2004; Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005, among oth-
ers). Yet recent evidence documents that the source of underdevelopment is not ethnic diversity
per se, but rather Africa’s high degree of inequality between ethnic groups (Alesina et al., 2016).
This suggests that ethnic diversity is only an impediment to economic development when some
ethnicities prosper at the expense of others.
Ethnic inequality not only contributes to the under-provision of the overall level of public
resources (Baldwin and Huber, 2010), but it provokes discriminatory policies that advantage some
groups over others (Alesina et al., 2016). Discriminatory policies of this type are a form of ethnic
favoritism, which has been the subject of a few influential papers that document evidence of public
resource distribution across ethnic lines in Africa (Franck and Rainer, 2012; Burgess et al., 2015;
Kramon and Posner, 2016). The provision of resources on the basis of ethnicity – rather than on a
need or marginal value basis – suggests that some ethnic groups are being systematically favored
over others. Hence, a better understanding of how ethnic patronage is distributed and to whom
is important because it sheds light on the extent to which favoritism occurs and how some ethnic
groups benefit at the expense of others.
In this paper I revisit the study of ethnic favoritism with three contributions. My first contri-
bution is a novel measure of linguistic similarity that quantifies the relative similarity of all ethnic
groups to the national leader in each country, not just groups that share an ethnicity with the
leader (coethnics). Because linguistic similarity is measured on the unit interval it encompasses
the commonly used coethnic dummy variable, while extending measurement to all non-coethnic
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groups.1 This extension is beneficial because the majority of Africans are never coethnic to their
leader.2 The continuity of this new measure implies that any change in the ethnic identity of a
leader is associated with some change in the similarity of all groups in a country, an important
source of variation that is not observable using a coethnic dummy variable. This measure also
provides testable grounds for the central hypothesis of this paper: a group’s well-being is increas-
ing in their ethnic similarity to the national leader.
My second contribution relates to the evidence that ethnic favoritism is widespread through-
out sub-Saharan Africa. I use the systematic partitioning of African ethnic groups across political
borders to expand the scope of evidence relative to previous studies. In particular, I exploit the
fact that the same ethnic group is split between neighboring countries and exposed to a different
ethnic leader on each side of the border. As different ethnic leaders come and go from power,
the relative similarity of a partitioned group varies over time. This source of variation allows
for ethnicity-year fixed effects, a novel empirical specification that accounts for the long-run per-
sistence of a group’s pre-colonial history on group-level outcomes today (Gennaioli and Rainer,
2007; Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2013; Fenske, 2013). I use this variation in a triple dif-
ference set-up and document evidence of ethnic favoritism in two empirical settings: a panel of
163 ethnic groups split across 35 countries, and a repeated cross-section of individuals living in
20 groups split across 13 countries. I also use the continuity of similarity in both settings to show
that favoritism exists among groups that are not coethnic to the leader, a new finding that is a
contribution in itself. This speaks to why a continuous measure of ethnic similarity is important:
ethnic favoritism is under-reported when using a coethnic dummy variable because non-coethnic
favoritism goes undetected. In order to understand the impact of ethnic favoritism on develop-
ment, it is important to understand the extent to which it occurs.
For my third contribution I disentangle the relative importance of location-based favoritism
from individual-level favoritism. It is commonly assumed that the ethnic majority of a region
defines the ethnic identity of that region, despite the fact that not all residents belong to the domi-
nant group. While this is a reasonable assumption, it limits our understanding of how patronage is
distributed because no distinction can be made between regional transfers and targeted transfers
towards individuals. To understand who benefits from favoritism it is necessary to understand
whether the benefits of similarity are exclusive to individuals living in their ethnic homeland, or
if patronage is distributed more broadly by targeting individuals irrespective of location. To this
end, I use variation among survey respondents who identify with an ethnicity that is different
from the ethnic region in which they live.3 I find that patronage is distributed according to the
ethnic identity of a region rather than as a targeted transfer towards individuals from a particular
1People identify as coethnics because they share a common ancestry and language, hold similar cultural beliefs and
pursue related economic activities (Batibo, 2005). In this way, linguistic similarity is a good measure of ethnic proximity
because it is the most visible marker of ethnic identity.
2Using population data from the Ethnologue (16th edition), I calculate that only 34 percent of the median sub-
Saharan country’s population was ever coethnic to their leader between 1992 and 2013.
3This is analogous to Nunn and Wantchekon (2011), who use a similar source of variation to separate internal norms
of an individual from the external norms of an individual’s environment.
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ethnic group.
Throughout this empirical analysis I rely on the fact that the location of African borders are
quasi-random (Englebert et al., 2002; Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2014, 2016, among oth-
ers). The historical formation of Africa’s borders began with the Berlin Conference of 1884-1885,
where European powers divided up Africa with little regard for the spatial distribution of eth-
nic homelands (Herbst, 2000). This disregard led to the arbitrary formation of national borders,
which “did not reflect reality but helped create it” (Wesseling, 1996, p.364). One such reality was
the partitioning of approximately 200 ethnic groups throughout Africa.
In the context of this study, the quasi-random nature of African border design generates ex-
ogenous variation because the ethnic identity of a national leader varies across borders within
the same partitioned group. Because an ethnic group shares a common ancestry, and is relatively
homogeneous in terms of cultural and biological factors, the fraction of a partitioned group on
one side of the border is a suitable counterfactual observation for the other fraction of that same
group across the border. Using ethnic groups partitioned across African borders as a source of
exogenous variation is methodologically similar to Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2014).
To exploit this within-group variation I use the 16th edition of the Ethnologue language map
(Lewis, 2009). This map depicts the spatial distribution of ethnolinguistic homelands across the
world. I use these subnational groups as a spatial unit of observation in Africa. Because no income
data exists at this level of observation, I proxy an ethnic group’s economic activity using annual
satellite images of night light luminosity for the time period 1992-2013. These luminosity data are
available at a very fine spatial resolution, which I can use to construct a panel of economic activ-
ity at the country-group level. Luminosity is frequently used as a measure of economic activity
because of its strong empirical association with GDP per capita and other measures of living stan-
dards (Henderson et al., 2012; Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2013, 2014; Alesina et al., 2016,
among others). Hodler and Raschky (2014) first used luminosity in this way to study patterns of
regional favoritism.
Consider, as an example, the Jola-Fonyi language group partitioned across Gambia and Sene-
gal. In 1993, both the Gambian and Senegalese Jola-Fonyi bear little resemblance to their respec-
tive leaders. For several years little changed in Senegal as President Diouf’s reign continued. On
the contrary, much changed for the Gambian Jola-Fonyi when Yahya Jammeh, a young officer in
the National Gambian Army, overthrew President Jawara in a 1994 military coup. Jammeh was
born in Kanilai, a small village near the southern border of Gambia and home to the Jola-Fonyi
language group. Jammeh took much pride in his birth region – a “place that gained prominence
overnight in Gambia” (Mwakikagile, 2010, p. 56). Jammeh repeatedly “feathered his nest” to such
an extent that the Jola-Fonyi region surrounding Kanilai is one of few rural areas in Gambia with
“electricity, street lighting, paved roads and running water – not to mention its own zoo and game
preserve, wrestling arena, bakery and luxury hotel with a swimming pool” (Wright, 2015, p. 219).
Figure 1.1 provides visual evidence of this phenomenon. The two panels represent the same
subsection of the Jola-Fonyi language group at two points in time, with the border dividing Gam-
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Figure 1.1: Change in Night Lights Intensity from 1993-1999
This figure documents the change in night light activity in the partitioned Jola-Fonyi language group in Gambia (north
of the border) and Senegal (south of the border) between 1993 and 1999. In 1994, Yahya Jammeh assumed power of
Gambia and soon after started reallocating funds to the Jola-Fonyi. Within 5 years of presidency the Gambian Jola-
Fonyi exhibit much greater economic activity in terms of night lights than the Senegalese Jola-Fonyi on the south side
of the border, whom had no change in leadership during this period.
bia to the north and Senegal to the south. While there is no visible night light activity on either side
of the border in 1993, there is a significant increase in lights on the Gambian side only 5 years after
Jammeh assumed power. On the contrary, Diouf’s presidency continued throughout this entire
period and there is no observable change in night light activity in Senegal just south of the border.
This demonstrated change in Figure 1.1 is exactly the within-group variation that I use to estimate
the effect of similarity. In this case, the Senegalese Jola-Fonyi are the counterfactual observation
for the Gambian Jola-Fonyi, who are equally dissimilar in language to their incumbent leader in
1993, and the effect of similarity on night light activity is estimated off of the change in linguistic
similarity following Jammeh’s rise to power.
My benchmark results imply that a standard deviation increase in linguistic similarity (23 per-
cent) yields a 7 percent increase in luminosity and a 2 percent increase in group-level GDP per
capita. I also use the continuity of linguistic similarity to document evidence of non-coethnic
favoritism, where the mean non-coethnic effect is one quarter the coethnic premium. To the con-
trary I find no evidence of anticipatory effects in the data or evidence migration in response to
leadership changes. To be sure this result is not a consequence of my new measure of similarity I
construct two alternative measures: a standard binary measure of coethnicity and a discrete simi-
larity measure of the ratio of shared nodes on the Ethnologue language tree. While these alterna-
tive measures of similarity yield significant evidence of favoritism, my preferred lexicostatistical
measure of similarity is more precisely estimated and the only measure to maintain significance
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in a series of horse race regressions.
I also test for a variety of mechanisms, but find no systematic evidence of the usual channels
(e.g., democracy). However, I do find that my benchmark result is largely driven by leaders who
have held office longer than the sample median of nine years. This implies that one determinant
of favoritism is leadership tenure.
Next I turn to individual-level data from the Demographic and Health Survey (DHS). I use
survey cluster coordinates to pinpoint the location of individual respondents on the Ethnologue
map. Doing so allows me to construct a repeated cross-section of individuals living in partitioned
ethnic groups across DHS survey waves. Narrowing the focus to these individuals allows me to
exploit the same variation I use in my benchmark estimates. As an outcome I use an individual-
level measure of access to public resources and ownership of assets. I corroborate my benchmark
findings with this individual-level data, including evidence of non-coethnic favoritism. I also es-
tablish that patronage is distributed regionally and not as a targeted transfer towards individuals.
These findings speak to a sparse but growing body of evidence that ethnic favoritism is widespread
throughout sub-Saharan Africa. Franck and Rainer (2012) use a panel of ethnic groups in 18 coun-
tries to document evidence of favoritism throughout sub-Saharan Africa. What sets my paper
apart from Franck and Rainer’s (2012) is that I construct a panel of partitioned ethnic groups, so
I have a minimum of two country-group observations for any partitioned group in a year. This
feature of my data affords me ethnicity-year fixed effects. Because I can account for all observ-
able and unobservable time-varying features of an ethnic group, I am able to rule out endogeneity
concerns associated with the impact of pre-colonial group characteristics on contemporary devel-
opment (Gennaioli and Rainer, 2007; Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2013; Fenske, 2013).
More commonly researchers focus on a single patronage good in a single country. Kramon
and Posner (2016) find that Kenyans whom are coethnic to their leader attain higher levels of edu-
cation, while Burgess et al. (2015) find that Kenyan districts associated with the leader’s ethnicity
receive two times the investment in roads during periods of autocracy. At an even finer level,
Marx et al. (2015) document evidence of ethnic favoritism in housing markets within a large slum
outside of Nairobi.
The rich micro-data these studies use provide clear evidence of ethnic favoritism and the chan-
nels through which patronage is distributed. Yet generalizing these results is difficult because of
the highly localized analyses these studies employ. To this end, I exploit the systematic partition-
ing of ethnic groups in Africa to expand the scope of evidence to 35 sub-Saharan countries. In a
related manuscript, De Luca et al. (2015) document that ethnic favoritism is an axiom of politics on
a global scale and not simply an African phenomenon. As this literature continues to grow, these
localized studies coupled with the broader evidence of ethnic favoritism help to build consensus
around ethnic favoritism in Africa.4
4Yet consensus on ethnic favoritism if Africa has not been reached. Francois et al. (2015) document that leaders
only provide a small premium to their coethnics, and otherwise political power is proportional to group size in Africa.
Kasara (2007) finds that leaders are more likely to extract taxes from their own ethnic group because they have a better
understanding of internal markets in their homeland.
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The notion that ethnic favoritism drives discriminatory policies that disadvantage some groups
at the expense of others also relates this research to the literature on ethnic inequality and con-
flict. Alesina et al. (2016) document that the negative correlation between ethnic inequality and
economic development is a global phenomenon, though most pronounced in Africa. Income dif-
ferences between a country’s ethnic groups can also impact the political process: ethnic inequality
mitigates public good provision (Baldwin and Huber, 2010), diminishes the quality of governance
(Kyriacou, 2013), and provokes the “ethnification” of political parties (Huber and Suryanarayan,
2014). At the heart of this literature is the long-standing instrumentalist view that conflict over
scarce resources drives ethnic competition in Africa (Bates, 1974). Even the perception of ethnic
favoritism exacerbates already existing ethnic tensions (Bowles and Gintis, 2004), which itself can
further incite ethnic conflict (Esteban and Ray, 2011; Esteban et al., 2012; Caselli and Coleman,
2013).
I contribute to this line of research with evidence that regions, rather than individuals, tend to
be targeted, and that non-coethnic groups that are similar to the leader stand to gain from their
ethnic proximity. The fact that similar but not identical ethnic regions benefit from patronage
suggests that ethnicity is more than just a marker of identity: similarity may create affinity or
reduce coordination costs across related non-coethnic groups. This is consistent with the idea
that these broader ethnic connections may solve collective action problems (Miguel and Gugerty,
2005) and bring about greater between-group trust (Habyarimana et al., 2009). The continuity
of linguistic similarity captures these affinities that are otherwise unobservable with a coethnic
dummy variable, thus highlighting one further benefit of this new measure.
This is also in line with the idea that leaders bring elites from outside of their ethnic group
into the governing coalition in an effort to sustain power in the face of political instability (Joseph,
1987; Francois et al., 2015). In the discussion section of this paper I provide evidence that leaders
appoint similar but not identical ethnic elites to high-level government positions for this purpose.
In doing so, non-coethnic groups gain coethnic representation in government, where representa-
tives speak on their behalf and channel resources to them (Arriola, 2009). Although my focus is
Africa, this deeper understanding of where favoritism is expected to take place has implications
for distributive politics more broadly: it contributes to our knowledge of how targeted transfers
can potentially magnify inequality between groups and thus is informative of a determining factor
of comparative economic development
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 1.2 describes how I identify language
group partitions and measure linguistic similarity. This section also documents patterns in the
data. Section 1.3 outlines the empirical model and identification strategy, and Section 1.4 reports
the benchmark estimates and robustness checks. Section 1.5 disentangles the relative importance
of location-based favoritism from individual-level favoritism, and in Section 1.6 I link the findings
to the literature on ethnic favoritism and coalition building, and provide suggestive evidence that
non-coethnic favoritism works through the appointment of elites from outside of the leader’s
ethnic group. Section 1.7 concludes.
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Figure 1.2: Language Groups Figure 1.3: Language Partitions
1.2 Data
In this section I describe the main variables of interest. For a complete description of all data and
sources see Appendix B.
1.2.1 Language Group Partitions
I construct language group partitions using the 2009 Ethnologue (16th edition) mapping of lan-
guage groups from the World Language Mapping System (WLMS). These WLMS data depict the
spatial distribution of linguistic homelands at the country-language group level (Figure 1.2). I
focus on continental sub-Saharan Africa.5 In total there are 2,384 country-language group obser-
vations reflecting 1,961 unique language groups in 42 continental African countries.6
I define a partition as a set of contiguous country-language group polygons, where each poly-
gon in a set is part of the same language group but separated by a national border. I use ArcGIS
to identify these partitioned groups, excluding country-language groups with a reported Ethno-
logue population of zero. The result is 486 remaining country-language group observations, made
up of 227 language groups partitioned across 37 African countries.
5I use the United Nations classification of sub-Saharan countries. However, I include Sudan in the analysis because
it is geographically part of sub-Saharan Africa and contains a number groups partitioned between Sudan and sub-
Saharan countries.
6Because Western Sahara is a disputed territory I exclude it from this border analysis.
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1.2.2 Satellite Imagery of Night Light Luminosity
Satellite imagery of night light luminosity come from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Ad-
ministration’s (NOAA) National Geophysical Data Center. Many others have used these data
because of two features: night lights data exhibit a strong empirical relationship with GDP per
capita and other measures of living standards (Henderson et al., 2012), and because these data are
available at a spatial resolution of 30-arc seconds (approximately 1 square kilometre).7 The fine
resolution of these lights data facilitates a proxy measure of GDP per capita at any desired level
of spatial aggregation. Because I require a measure of economic activity at the country-language
group level – a level of aggregation where no official data on economic output exists – the avail-
ability of these data is indispensable to this study.
The yearly composite of night light luminosity is constructed by NOAA using daily images
taken from U.S. Department of Defense weather satellites that circle the earth 14 times a day. These
satellites observe every location on earth every night sometime between 20:30 and 22:00. Before
distributing these data publicly, NOAA scientists remove observations contaminated by strong
sources of natural light, e.g., the summer months when the sun sets late, light activity related to
the northern and southern lights, forest fires, etc. All daily images that pass this screening process
are then averaged for the entire year producing a satellite-year dataset for the time period 1992 to
2013. Light intensity receives a value of 0 to 63 at a resolution of 30-arc seconds. The result is a
measure of night light intensity that only reflects human (economic) activity.8
Using these data I construct a panel of average luminosity for each country-language group
partition. I use the Africa Albers Equal Area Conic projection to minimize distortion across the
area dimension before calculating the average light luminosity of each country-language group
polygon in each year.9 I follow Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2013, 2014) and Hodler and
Raschky (2014) in adding 0.01 to the log transformation of the lights data because roughly 40%
of these data have a value of zero in the benchmark sample. Doing so helps correct for the non-
normal nature of the data and preserves sample size, and allows for a (near) semi-elasticity inter-
pretation of the benchmark empirical model.
1.2.3 Assignment of a Leader’s Ethnolinguistic Identity
There are 106 leaders to assign an ethnolinguistic identity for my sample of 35 countries between
1992-2013. The challenge of mapping ethnicity to language is that, in some instances, a single
ethnic group speaks many languages. Because African language groups are often resident of
well-defined territories (Lewis, 2009), an ethnolinguistic identity is typically attached to a person’s
7Hodler and Raschky (2014) also show there is a strong empirical relationship between these night lights data and
GDP at the subnational administrative region. Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2014) further validate the use of
night lights in Africa as a proxy measure of development with evidence that light intensity correlates strongly with
individual-level data on electrification, presence of sewage systems, access to piped water and education.
8Henderson et al. (2012, p. 998) provide a thorough introduction to the NOAA night lights data.
9In some years data is available for two separate satellite, and in all such cases the correlation between the two is
greater than 99 percent in my sample. To remove choice on the matter I use an average of both.
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birthplace (Batibo, 2005). As a first step towards assignment I locate the birthplace of a leader and
collect latitude and longitude coordinates for each birthplace from www.latlong.net. I project these
coordinates onto the Ethnologue map of Africa to back out the language group associated with
each leader’s birthplace.10 I exclude leaders born abroad (4 leaders) since their ethnolinguistic
group is not home to the country they govern.11 Second, I identify a leader’s ethnic identity using
data from Dreher et al. (2015) and Francois et al. (2015), and in the few instances where neither
source reports the ethnicity of a leader I fill in the gap using a country’s Historical Dictionary.
Finally, I take the following steps to assign a leader’s ethnolinguistic identity using these data:
Step 1: I compare the birthplace linguistic identity with the ethnic identity for each of the
102 leaders. In 56.9 percent of the sample the name of the birth language and ethnic identity are
equivalent (58 leaders). For these leaders the assignment is unambiguous.
Step 2: For the remaining sample of unmatched leaders, I check if the birthplace language
is a language spoken by the leader’s ethnic group. In 12.7 percent of the sample this is true (13
leaders); I assign the birthplace language as the leader’s ethnolinguistic identity.
Step 3: For the remaining 30.4 percent of unmatched leaders (31 leaders), the birthplace iden-
tity does not correspond to their ethnic identity. This is especially true for leaders born in a major
city. For these leaders I drop the birthplace identity and map the ethnicity of a leader to a single
language using the three-step assignment rule outlined in Appendix B.
1.2.4 Linguistic Similarity
Estimating linguistic similarity is difficult because languages can differ in a variety of ways, in-
cluding vocabulary, pronunciation, grammar, syntax, phonetics and more. One common approach
is to use a measure of the shared branches on a language tree as an approximation of linguistic
similarity. Known as cladistic similarity, this measure was introduced to economists by Fearon
and Laitin (1999), popularized by Fearon (2003) and has since become the convention.12 The idea
behind the cladistic approach is that two languages with a large number of shared nodes – and
thus a recent splitting from a common ancestor – will be similar in terms of language because
of their common ancestry. The data most commonly used is Fearon’s (2003) cladistic measure of
linguistic similarity, constructed using the Ethnologue’s phylogenetic language tree. A cladistic
measure is attractive because linguistic similarity is easily computed for any language pair, since
language trees exist for virtually all known world language families (Lewis, 2009). See Appendix
A for a formal definition of this measure.
My preferred measure is a computerized lexicostatistical measure of linguistic similarity de-
10Because most leaders enter/exit office mid-year, I assign the incumbent leader as whomever is in power on De-
cember 31st of the transition year. Hence, by assumption I drop any leader who exited office the same year she entered
office because she was neither in power the previous year or December 31st of the transition year.
11These leaders include Ian Khama (Botswana), Francois Bozize Yangouvonda (Central African Republic), Nicephore
Soglo (Benin), and Rupiah Banda (Zambia).
12For example, Guiso et al. (2009); Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009); Desmet et al. (2012); Esteban et al. (2012) and Gomes
(2014) all use a cladistic approach, among others.
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veloped by the Automatic Similarity Judgement Program (ASJP).13 As a percentage estimate of
a language pair’s cognate words (i.e., words that share a common linguistic origin), the lexico-
statistical method is a measure of the phonological similarity between two languages. Hence, a
lexicostatistical measure can be thought of as a proxy for the ancestral relationship between two
groups, or an implicit measure of the set of shared ancestral and cultural traits that are important
to group identity.
The ASJP Database (Version 16) consists of 4401 language lists, where each list contains the
same 40 implied meanings (i.e., words) for comparison across languages. The ASJP research team
has transcribed these lists into a standardized orthography called ASJPcode, a phonetic ASCII
alphabet consisting of 34 consonants and 7 vowels. A standardized alphabet restricts variation
across languages to phonological differences. Meanings are then transcribed according to pro-
nunciation before language differences are estimated.14
Then for each language pair of interest I run the Levenshtein distance algorithm on the re-
spective language lists, which calculates the minimum number of edits necessary to translate the
spelling of each word from one language to another. To correct for the fact that longer words will
demand more edits, each distance is divided by the length of the translated word. This normal-
ization yields a percentage estimate of dissimilarity, which is measured across the unit interval.
The average distance of a language pair is calculated by averaging across the distance estimates
of all 40 words. By this procedure I estimate the linguistic distance of a language pair vis-a`-vis the
vocabulary dimension.
A second normalization procedure is used to adjust for the accidental similarity of two lan-
guages (Wichmann et al., 2010). This normalization accounts for similar ordering and frequency
of characters that are the result of chance and independent of a word’s meaning. Finally, I define
the lexicostatistical similarity of a language pair as one minus this normalized distance. For a
formal definition of this measure, I direct to reader to Appendix A.
The main advantage of the lexicostatistical approach is that it measures similarity in a more
continuous way than the cladistic approach. Because the lexicostatistical method explicitly iden-
tifies the phonological differences of a language pair, there is far more observable variation in a
measure of lexicostatistical similarity than cladistic similarity. The cladistic approach is a coarse
measure of similarity because data dispersion is limited to 15 unique values, the maximum num-
ber of language family classifications in the Ethnologue.
To illustrate this point, consider language pairs that share a common parent language on the
Ethnologue language tree. Let these language pairs be known as siblings. All sibling pairs share
the maximum number of tree nodes, and have no differences in cladistic similarity between them,
but they do exhibit substantial variation in lexicostatistical similarity. To make this point clear,
13The lexicostatistical measure I use in this paper has been used to study factor flows in international trade (Is-
phording and Otten, 2013), job satisfaction of linguistically distinct migrants (Bloemen, 2013), language acquisition of
migrants (Isphording and Otten, 2014), and the role of language in the flow of ideas (Dickens, 2016b). See (Ginsburgh
and Weber, 2016) for a discussion of this and other measures of linguistic distance.
14For example, the French word for you is vous, and is encoded using ASJPcode as vu to reflect its pronunciation.
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Figure 1.4: Lexicostatistical Similarities Among Sibling Language Pairs
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This figure establishes the additional variation introduced by a lexicostatistical measure of linguistic similarity that is
not observable with a cladistic measure of similarity. The histogram plots the estimates of lexicostatistical similarity
among sibling language pairs for all of Africa (n = 1, 241). Sibling language pairs are those that share a parent language
on the Ethnologue language tree, which by definition implies that among sibling language pairs there is no observable
variation in cladistic similarity.
I plot the distribution of lexicostatistical similarities among all African sibling language pairs in
Figure 1.4. This highlights the sizeable dispersion in lexicostatistical similarities among sibling
language pairs.
Linguistic Similarity of Leaders and Language Groups
My independent variable of interest is a measure of bilateral linguistic similarity between each
country-language group partition and the ethnolinguistic identity of the country’s national leader.
Because the computerized lexicostatistical method requires a word list for each language of inter-
est, I am limited to working with languages that have lists made available by the ASJP research
team. Of the 227 language groups in the full set of partitions I match 163 in the benchmark re-
gression (72%), failing the rest either because the leader’s birth language list is unavailable or the
partition language list is unavailable. Furthermore, 11 out of the 102 leaders ethnolinguistic iden-
tities lack an ASJP language list and are excluded from the analysis. I address the possibility of
sample selection in Section 1.4. The result is an (unbalanced) panel of lexicostatistical similarity
between partitioned language groups and their national leader for the years 1992-2013.15 Figure
1.3 colour codes these groups.16
15See Appendix B for a complete list of included countries and language groups.
16The only other lexicostatistical data available for a large number of languages is from Dyen et al. (1992), which is
restricted to Indo-European languages only – none of which are native to Africa.
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Figure 1.5: Pre-Post Leadership Change
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This figure plots the before and after effects of a change in leadership on average night light luminosity. The green
solid line depicts luminosity in the 4 years leading up to a change in leadership and the 4 years following an increase in
linguistic similarity. The blue dashed line depicts the same for country-language groups that experienced a decrease in
similarity after a change in leadership. Average night light luminosity is the residual light variation net of country-year
effects to account for different years of leadership change across countries.
1.2.5 Patterns in the Data
Table 1.1 reports descriptive statistics for the night lights and language data. For completeness, I
have included a cladistic measure of similarity and a binary measure of coethnicity.17 The mean
value of lexicostatistical linguistic similarity says that country-language groups are 19.3 percent
similar to their national leader on average, and the mean value of cladistic similarity implies 40.9
percent similarity. The mean value of coethnicity says that 4.7 percent of the benchmark sample is
coethnic to their national leader.18
In Table 1.2 I preview the empirical results by splitting the sample by the median value of night
lights and test for differences in average linguistic similarity. Panel A reports mean differences in
the benchmark sample for all three similarity measures. Take, for example, the mean difference
in lexicostatistical similarity: language groups who emit night light above the median value are
on average 10.4 percent more similar to their national leader than those below the median value.
This difference is highly significant, with a reported p-value of 0.000. The same pattern is true
irrespective of the measure of linguistic similarity. These findings are consistent with my proposed
hypothesis of ethnolinguistic favoritism, where language groups are better off the more similar
17I use the term coethnicity to be consistent with the literature, but a better name would be coethnolinguists since I
define coethnicity equal to one when a leader’s ethnolinguistic identity is the same as a partitioned language group.
18Table B6 reports a complete set of descriptive statistics used throughout this analysis.
12
Table 1.1: Descriptive Statistics
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
ln(0.01 + night lights) 6,610 -3.496 1.423 -4.605 1.515
Lexicostatistical similarity 6,610 0.193 0.230 0.000 1.000
Cladistic similarity 6,610 0.409 0.330 0.000 1.000
Coethnicity 6,610 0.047 0.212 0.000 1.000
This table reports descriptive statistics for the main variables of interest used in the benchmark empirical analysis of
partitioned language groups in Africa. The unit of observation is a language group l that resides in country c in year t.
See Appendix B for a description of the data and sources.
Table 1.2: Means of Linguistic Similarity Above-Below Median Night Lights
Above Below
Median Median
Observations Luminosity Luminosity Difference
Panel A: Full Sample
Lexicostatistical similarity 6,610 0.245 0.142 0.104***
(0.005) (0.003) (0.006)
Cladistic similarity 6,610 0.478 0.341 0.137***
(0.006) (0.005) (0.008)
Coethnicity 6,610 0.078 0.016 0.062***
(0.005) (0.002) (0.005)
Panel B: Non-Coethnic Regions Only
Lexicostatistical similarity 6,298 0.182 0.125 0.057***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.004)
Cladistic similarity 6,298 0.435 0.325 0.110***
(0.006) (0.005) (0.008)
This table reports differences in means for various measures of linguistic similarity. Language groups are separated
by the median value of night lights into “above” and “below” groups for each sample. The full sample consists of
6,610 observations and the non-coethnic subsample consists of 6,298 observations. Standard errors are reported in
parentheses.
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they are to their national leader.
Panel B repeats this exercise in all non-coethnic sample observations. As stated in the introduc-
tion, if relative groups differences matter outside of coethnic relationships, then the data should
tell me that similarity matters among non-coethnics. This is exactly what I find: the average sim-
ilarity among non-coethnic language groups above and below the median night lights value is
significantly different than zero. While I reserve more conclusive statements for the regression
analysis, this suggests that linguistic similarity provides significant variation that is unobservable
in the conventional binary framework. Together these results show that night lights and linguistic
similarity are positively related, or that on average a language group is increasingly better off the
more linguistically similar they are to the birth language of their national leader. The significant
pairwise correlation of 0.30 between light intensity and lexicostatistical similarity is also sugges-
tive of this positive relationship (correlation not shown here).
I also plot average luminosity before and after a leadership change in Figure 1.5, separating
groups who experience an increase in lexicostatistical similarity from those that experience a de-
crease. I construct a “treatment” time scale that takes a value of 0 in the year of a leadership
change, and plot the residual light variation net of country-year effects to account for different
years of leadership changes. I plot these data for the 4 years leading up to a change and the 4
years following. It is reassuring for identification that there is little observed change in night light
activity in the years leading up to a change in leadership. Yet shortly after a leadership change
there is a noticeable increase in night lights in regions that experienced an increase in linguistic
similarity to the leader (solid green line), and a large drop in average night lights in regions that
experienced a decrease in similarity (dashed blue line). Hence, Figure 1.5 is a clean visualization
of favoritism across linguistic lines.19
1.3 Empirical Model
The main objective of this empirical analysis is to test the hypothesis that a language group that is
linguistically similar to the ethnolinguistic identity of the national leader will be better off than a
group whose language is relatively more distant. To do this I use a triple difference-in-differences
estimator:
yc,l,t = γc,l + λc,t + θl,t + x
′
c,l,t Φ + βLSc,l,t−1 + εc,l,t. (1.1)
The dependent variable yc,l,t is the night lights measure of economic activity for language
group l in country c in year t. As the dependent variable I follow the literature and take the
aforementioned log transformation of night lights such that yc,l,t ≡ ln (0.01 +NightLightsc,l,t).
19The number of observations used to calculate the average night lights in either group varies by years. The nature of
the data presents two challenges in constructing a standard treatment time scale. First, in some instances there is more
than one leadership change in the shown 8-year interval. Second, and in consequence of the first point, two leadership
changes over the 8-year interval do not always result in consistent positive or negative changes of similarity.
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LSc,l,t−1, the variable of interest, measures the linguistic similarity between language group
l in country c and the ethnolinguistic identity of country c’s political leader in year t − 1. I lag
linguistic similarity because of an expected delay between the decision to allocate public funds
to a region and the actual allocation of those goods (Hodler and Raschky, 2014), and an expected
delay between the actual allocation of public funds and the resulting regional increase in night
light production.
Xc,l,t is a vector of controls including the (logged) average of population density for each
country-language, and the (logged) geodesic distance between language group l and the language
group associated with the leader of country c.20 I also include a variety of geographic endowment
controls in xc,l,t: two indicator variables for the presence of oil and diamond reserves in both
the leader and language group regions, as well as the absolute difference in elevation, rugged-
ness, precipitation, average temperature and the caloric suitability index (agricultural quality).
These additional controls account for the possibility that national projects that are beneficial to the
leader’s region because of a particular geographic characteristic might also benefit other regions
of similar character.21 γc,l are country-language group fixed effects, λc,t are country-year fixed
effects and θl,t are language-year fixed effects.22 In all specifications I adjust standard errors for
clustering in country-language groups.23
1.3.1 Identification of Linguistic Similarity
In order to identify the effect of linguistic similarity it is necessary that the placement of national
borders are not the result of local economic conditions or any factor that reflects the well-being of
a language group. Indeed, national borders are a historical by-product of the Scramble for Africa.
The use of straight lines prevailed when drawing borders in Africa because the Berlin Confer-
ence of 1884-85 legitimized claims of colonial sovereignty without pre-existing territorial occupa-
tion, rendering knowledge of pre-colonial boundaries inconsequential (Englebert et al., 2002). The
result was a reluctance by colonialists to respect traditional boundaries when drawing borders
(Herbst, 2000). Evidence of this is still seen today, where group partitions do not correlate with
geography and natural resources (Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2016) and nearly 80% of all
African borders follow lines of latitude and longitude – an amount larger than any other continent
in the world (Alesina et al., 2011).24
20Population density data comes from the Gridded Population of the World. Because population density data is only
available in 5-year intervals (i.e., 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005 and 2010), I assume the density to be constant throughout the
unobserved intermediate years.
21See Appendix B for more details on data definitions and sources.
22In my benchmark sample γc,l represents 355 fixed effects, λc,t represents 691 fixed effects and θl,t represents 3044
fixed effects.
23Given that the benchmark sample has only 35 countries, I choose not to adjust standard errors for two-dimensional
clustering within language groups and countries (Cameron et al., 2011). While the benchmark results are qualitatively
similar when two-way clustering, I follow Kezdi’s (2004) rule of thumb that at least 50 clusters are needed for accurate
inference.
24See Englebert et al. (2002) and Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2014, 2016) for a detailed discussion on the arbi-
trary design of African borders.
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It is the arbitrary design of African political borders that forms the basis of my identification
strategy. The ethnolinguistic identity of a national leader varies by country, so group partitioning
generates exogenous within-group variation in terms of that group’s linguistic similarity to their
leader. This strategy is similar to Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2014), though a key differ-
ence is that I construct a panel of partitioned groups rather than a cross-section, so the relative
similarity within a partitioned group also varies over time as new leaders come to power. This is
instrumental to identification: by including the three sets of fixed effects discussed in the previous
section, I absorb all the variation in the data with the exception of time-variation at the country-
language group level. γc,l and λc,t respectively difference out time-invariant country-group trends
and country-time trends that are differentially affecting the same group on each side of the border.
The inclusion of θl,t only allows for within-group time-variation that comes from changes in lead-
ership. Hence, with my set-up in equation (1.1), I am estimating the effect of linguistic similarity
off of changes in the incoming leader’s ethnolinguistic identity.
In my benchmark sample this variation comes from 35 leadership changes: the within trans-
formation of θl,t implies that a leadership change in one country varies the mean similarity of a
partition in that country and all other fragments of that partition in neighbouring countries. In
other words, the relative similarity within a partitioned group varies with a leadership change
on either side of the border. This amounts to 485 unique relative similarities observed between
1992-2013 in my data.
1.4 Benchmark Results
Table 1.3 reports nine different estimates: three versions of equation (1.1) for each of the three
linguistic similarity measures. For each measure of similarity, I report estimates (i) without any
covariates (columns 1-3), (ii) estimates that control for log population density and the logged
geodesic distance between each partitioned group and the corresponding leader’s group (columns
4-6), and (iii) the full set of covariates I outlined in Section 1.3 (columns 7-9). Hereafter I will refer
to columns 7-9 as my benchmark specification.25
Consistent with my hypothesis of ethnolinguistic favoritism, all nine coefficients are positive
and my preferred measure of lexicostatistical similarity is always statistically significant. Because
variation is coming from changes in the ethnic identity of a leader, the interpretation of these
findings is that a group’s well-being is increasing in their ethnic similarity to the leader. To give
economic meaning to these estimates, consider the benchmark estimate of lexicostatistical simi-
larity in column 7. Using the rule of thumb that the estimated elasticity of GDP per capita with
respect to night lights is 0.3 (Henderson et al., 2012), the point estimate of 0.305 implies that a stan-
dard deviation increase in linguistic similarity (23 percent change) yields a 2.1 percent increase in
regional GDP per capita, an economically significant effect.26
25See Table B9 for various other combinations of fixed effects specifications.
26The percentage change in GDP per capita ≈ percentage change in night lights × 0.3 = (β × ∆LSc,l,t−j) × 0.3 =
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Table 1.3: Benchmark Regressions Using Various Measures of Linguistic Similarity
Dependent Variable: yc,l,t = ln(0.01 + nightLightsc,l,t)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Lexicostatistical similarityt−1 0.244** 0.297** 0.305***
(0.112) (0.120) (0.116)
Cladistic similarityt−1 0.221** 0.219** 0.185*
(0.104) (0.102) (0.103)
Coethnict−1 0.130 0.139 0.168*
(0.099) (0.098) (0.094)
Geographic controls No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes
Distance & population density No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Language-year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-language fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clusters 355 355 355 355 355 355 355 355 355
Countries 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35
Language groups 163 163 163 163 163 163 163 163 163
Adjusted R2 0.925 0.925 0.925 0.925 0.925 0.925 0.926 0.925 0.925
Observations 6,610 6,610 6,610 6,610 6,610 6,610 6,610 6,610 6,610
This table reports benchmark estimates associating each measure of linguistic similarity with night light luminosity for the years t = 1992 − 2013. Average night
light luminosity is measured in language group l of country c in year t, and linguistic similarity measures the similarity between each language group and the
ethnolinguistic identity of country c’s leader in year t − 1. Lexicostatistical similarity is a continuous measure of a language pair’s phonological similarity and is
measured on the unit interval. Cladistic similarity is a discrete measure of similarity representing a language pair’s ratio of shared branches on the Ethnologue
language tree. Coethnic is binary measure of linguistic similarity that takes a value of 1 when language group l is also the ethnolinguistic identity of country c’s
leader. Distance & population density measure the log distance between each country-language group and the leader’s ethnolinguistic group, and the log population
density of a country-language group, respectively. The geographic controls include the absolute difference in elevation, ruggedness, precipitation, temperature and
the caloric suitability index between leader and country-language group regions, in addition to two dummy variables indicating if both region contains diamond
and oil deposits. Standard errors are clustered at the country-language group level and are reported in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
I also provide estimates for cladistic similarity and coethnicity to see how these alternative
measures compare to lexicostatistical similarity. For my benchmark estimates both coefficients are
positive and statistically significant, albeit only at the 10 percent level. Notice that in all iterations
of equation (1.1), the magnitude and precision of the estimate is monotonically increasing in the
measured continuity of linguistic similarity. This suggests that the observable variation among
non-coethnic groups assists in identifying patterns of ethnic favoritism in Africa, and thus speaks
the virtue of the lexicostatistical measure.
In Table 1.4 I report estimates from a series of horse race regressions. With these estimates
I show that the lexicostatistical measure is better at identifying patterns of favoritism than the
alternative measures of similarity. In columns 1-4, I report estimates for all possible pairings of
the three measures of similarity. Because all three measures of similarity are highly correlated
with each other, and for coethnic observations are equivalent, the effect of lexicostatistical and
cladistic similarity are estimated off of the additional variation these measures provide among
non-coethnics. In all pairings the additional lexicostatistical variation is estimated to be statisti-
cally significant, despite the fact that the effect of coethnicity is not identifiable in these regressions.
In column 3, cladistic similarity outperforms coethnicity in magnitude and precision, reaffirming
the value of the addition variation it provides over a coethnic indicator, but is not estimated to be
significantly different than zero.
To disentangle the effect of coethnicity from the benefits of similarity among non-coethnics, I
define non-coethnic lexicostatistical similarity as (1−coethnict−1)× lexicostatistical similarity, and
equivalently for non-coethnic cladistic similarity. In other words, these non-coethnic similarity
measures are equal to zero when the observed language group is coethnic to their national leader,
and otherwise equivalent to the respective measure of similarity. Combined with the coethnic
measure, I can exploit the same variation I identify off of in columns 2 and 3 but load the effect of
coethnicity onto the coethnic dummy variable.
Because it is intuitive that a leader is more inclined to favor her coethnics, I expect to see a
strong significant effect of coethnicity beyond the effect found among non-coethnic groups. In-
deed, column 5 indicates that coethnics are most favored with an estimated increase of 0.260 in
average night light luminosity. While there is still an observable benefit from similarity among
non-coethnics, the magnitude of the effect is roughly one quarter the size of the coethnic effect on
average. With a sample mean of 0.146, non-coethnic lexicostatistical similarity yields an average
increase of 0.069 (= 0.146× 0.473) in night light luminosity.27
I repeat this exercise with non-coethnic cladistic similarity and report the estimates in column
(6). Once again I find the corresponding estimate for cladistic similarity from column (3) but can
now identify the effect of coethnicity. The estimated coefficient for coethnicity is quite similar
to the coethnic effect found in column (5), only now the additional variation coming from the
0.305× 0.230× 0.3 = 2.1%, assuming that ln(0.01 + nightLights
c,l,t
) ≈ ln(nightLights
c,l,t
).
27By these estimates the threshold value of non-coethnic similarity is 0.550, above which would imply non-coethnics
are better off than coethnics. The likelihood of measurement error in linguistic similarity implies this is a rather “fuzzy”
threshold, and with only 2 percent of the benchmark sample above this threshold I find this result to be reassuring.
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Table 1.4: Horse Race Regressions: Contrasting the Different Measures of Linguistic Similarity
Dependent Variable: yc,l,t = ln(0.01 +NightLightsc,l,t)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Lexicostatistical similarityt−1 0.345** 0.473** 0.591**
(0.165) (0.227) (0.291)
Cladistic similarityt−1 -0.046 0.151 -0.102
(0.146) (0.125) (0.150)
Coethnict−1 -0.213 0.080 -0.249 0.260** 0.230**
(0.202) (0.114) (0.211) (0.106) (0.110)
Non-coethnic lexicostatistical similarityt−1 0.473**
(0.227)
Non-coethnic cladistic similarityt−1 0.151
(0.125)
Geographic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Distance & population density Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Language-year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-language fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clusters 355 355 355 355 355 355
Countries 35 35 35 35 35 35
Language groups 163 163 163 163 163 163
Adjusted R2 0.926 0.926 0.925 0.926 0.926 0.925
Observations 6,610 6,610 6,610 6,610 6,610 6,610
This table reports horse race regressions comparing each measure of linguistic similarity. Average night light luminosity is measured in language group l of coun-
try c in year t, and linguistic similarity measures the similarity between each language group and the ethnolinguistic identity of country c’s leader in year t − 1.
Lexicostatistical similarity is a continuous measure of a language pair’s phonological similarity and is measured on the unit interval. Cladistic similarity is a dis-
crete measure of similarity representing a language pair’s ratio of shared branches on the Ethnologue language tree. Coethnic is binary measure of linguistic
similarity that takes a value of 1 when language group l is also the ethnolinguistic identity of country c’s leader. Non-coethnic lexicostatistical similarity and
Non-coethnic cladistic similarity are constructed by interacting a dummy variable for non-coethnicity with Lexicostatistical similarity and Cladistic similarity, re-
spectively. All control variables are described in Table 1.3. Standard errors are clustered at the country-language group level and are reported in parentheses. * p <
0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
cladistic measure is not enough to identify the effect of similarity among non-coethnic groups.
Taken together the results of Table 1.3 and Table 1.4 indicate that favoritism is most prominent
among coethnics but also to a lesser extent among non-coethnics. These results also indicate that
a continuous measure of lexicostatistical similarity provides valuable information that is not ob-
servable with a coethnic indicator variable. For the remainder of this section I proceed to test the
robustness of the benchmark lexicostatistical estimate.
Anticipatory Effects
In this section I run of a series of tests of the identifying assumptions underlying my benchmark
estimates. Column (1) of Table 1.5 reproduces the benchmark estimate of lexicostatistical similarity
for comparison. In column (2) I show that the lagged measure of lexicostatistical similarity is not
essential to my findings; contemporaneous lexicostatistical similarity is estimated to be positive
and significant at the 5 percent level.
In column (3) I report an estimate of lexicostatistical similarity measured in period t + 1. In
this specification I’m estimating the effect of linguistic similarity off of the change in an incoming
leader’s ethnolinguistic group in the period before that leader comes to power. Should there be
any pre-trends in the incoming leader’s group, then this lead measure of lexicostatistical similarity
should be estimated significantly different than zero. I find no evidence of a pre-trend, which is
reassuring for identification that the common trends assumption is satisfied. In column (4)-(6) I
report estimates from horse race regressions between lead, contemporaneous and lagged lexico-
statistical similarity. Again I find no evidence of a pre-trend in the lead variable. Together these
findings confirm there are no anticipatory changes in night lights preceding a change in leader-
ship, an observation consistent with Figure 1.5. Column (6) also indicates that lagged lexicostatis-
tical similarity is a better predictor of favoritism than contemporaneous similarity, a finding that
supports my decision to lag lexicostatistical similarity.
Next I re-estimate equation (1.1) with a lagged dependent variable. Identification rests on the
assumption that leaders are not endogenously elected because of the economic success of their
ethnolinguistic group prior to an election. I find no evidence of this as indicated by column (7)
and (8). Lexicostatistical similarity is estimated to be positive and significant at the 5 percent level,
albeit with a reduced magnitude. Hence, these results are reassuring that my benchmark estimates
are not an outcome of any pre-transition changes in economic activity in a leader’s ethnolinguistic
group.
Migration
One additional concern with my identification strategy is cross-border migration. Suppose indi-
viduals who live near the border become coethnics of the neighboring country’s leader. These
individuals may choose to migrate in response to this spatial disequilibrium of similarity. While
the cultural affinity of partitioned groups might ease the migration process, Oucho (2006) points
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Table 1.5: Testing for Anticipatory Effects: Estimates Using Leads and Lags
Dependent Variable: yc,l,t = ln(0.01 +NightLightsc,l,t)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Lexicostatistical similarityt−1 0.305*** 0.299*** 0.249** 0.170** 0.131**
(0.116) (0.110) (0.101) (0.067) (0.062)
Lexicostatistical similarityt 0.495** 0.406** 0.242 0.214
(0.204) (0.205) (0.183) (0.134)
Lexicostatistical similarityt+1 0.170 0.134 0.059 0.067 0.021
(0.117) (0.107) (0.096) (0.096) (0.070)
Night lightst−1 0.521*** 0.506***
(0.050) (0.055)
Geographic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Distance & population density Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Language-year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-language fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clusters 355 355 355 355 355 355 355 351
Countries 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35
Language groups 163 163 163 163 163 163 163 161
Adjusted R2 0.926 0.926 0.930 0.930 0.930 0.930 0.947 0.950
Observations 6,610 6,474 6,121 6,121 6,084 6,084 6,315 5,785
This table reports a series of tests for anticipatory effects in the benchmark estimates. Average night light intensity is measured in language group l of country c
in year t, and Lexicostatistical similarity is a continuous measure of language group l’s phonological similarity to the national leader and is measured on the unit
interval. The same log transformation of the dependent variable is used for the lagged value of night lights, i.e., ln(0.01 +NightLightsc,l,t−1). All control variables
are described in Table 1.3. Standard errors are clustered at the country-language group level and are reported in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
out that migration restrictions throughout sub-Saharan Africa make this unlikely in a formal ca-
pacity, so this might only be an issue among undocumented migrants. Not only do undocumented
migrants make up a small percentage of total migrants but those that do migrate tend to do so to
trade and are temporary by definition (Oucho, 2006). To corroborate this anecdotal evidence, I
also regress log population density on linguistic similarity in period t− 1 and report the estimates
in Table 1.6. If people are in fact migrating in response to leadership changes, I should observe
corresponding changes in population density. These estimates also account for the possibility of
within-country migration. In all specifications, the various measures of similarity are insignifi-
cant. Overall these estimates imply that changes in night lights within a partitioned group cannot
be explained by movements of people to regions that are similar to the leader in terms of ethno-
linguistic identity.
Sample Selection
My inability to observe the lexicostatistical similarity of the 64 language groups without an ASJP
language list raises the question whether these unobserved groups are systematically different
than those in my benchmark sample. To address this concern I test for mean differences in key
observables and report these differences in Table 1.7.
First I show that there is no difference in the average night light luminosity between in- and
out-of-sample partitioned language groups. I also show that there is no difference between the
cladistic similarity of in- and out-of-sample groups. These two results are reassuring that both
sets of partitioned groups are comparable in terms of economic activity and proximity to their
leader.
To the contrary, I show that in-sample groups reside in countries that are, on average, more
democratic, more competitive politically, have more constraints on the executive, and are more
open and competitive in the recruitment of executives. Should there be an in-sample selection
bias, these institutional mean differences suggest that my estimates would be biased towards zero,
given the evidence that a well-functioning democracy mitigates the extent of ethnic favoritism
(Burgess et al., 2015) and regional favoritism (Hodler and Raschky, 2014)
Robustness Checks
I also show that the results are robust to a variety of specifications and estimators. I report and
discuss each robustness check in Appendix B. In particular, I show that the results are similar
when:
• I reproduce my benchmark estimates with additional controls for malaria and land suitabil-
ity for agriculture. Because these data are only available at a 0.5◦ × 0.5◦ spatial resolution
(approx. 111 km × 111 km), I exclude them from my benchmark estimates to avoid losing
observations where a pixel is larger than a language group partition (Table B10).
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Table 1.6: Test for Migration Following Leadership Changes
Dependent Variable: ln(Population Densityc,l,t)
(1) (2) (3)
Lexicostatistical similarityt−1 0.001
(0.019)
Cladistic similarityt−1 -0.027
(0.031)
Coethnict−1 0.010
(0.016)
Country-language fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Language-year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Country-year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Clusters 355 355 355
Countries 35 35 35
Language groups 163 163 163
Adjusted R2 0.999 0.999 0.999
Observations 6,610 6,610 6,610
This table reports estimates associating population density with linguistics similarity as a test for changes in population
density following a change in a leader’s ethnolinguistic identity. Lexicostatistical similarity is a continuous measure of a
language pair’s phonological similarity and is measured on the unit interval. Cladistic similarity is a discrete measure
of similarity representing a language pair’s ratio of shared branches on the Ethnologue language tree. Coethnic is
binary measure of linguistic similarity that takes a value of 1 when language group l is also the ethnolinguistic identity
of country c’s leader. Standard errors are clustered at the country-language group level and are reported in parentheses.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
• I check that measurement error coming from ambiguous assignment of a leader’s ethno-
linguistic identity does not explain my benchmark results, particularly the finding that fa-
voritism exists among non-coethnics (Table B11).
• I reproduce my benchmark estimates on a balanced panel of 84 ethnolinguistic groups par-
titioned across 23 countries (Table B12).
• I re-estimate equation (1.1) and weight the estimates by the Ethnologue population of each
language group (Table B13). The idea here is to correct for possible heteroskedasticity: the
measure of night light intensity is an average within each country-language group, and it is
likely to have more variance in places where the population is small.
• I also provide estimates with two alternative transformations of the night lights data to show
that my benchmark lexicostatistical estimate is not an outcome of the aforementioned log
transformation (Table B14).
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Table 1.7: Selection into Lexicostatistical Language Lists
Partitioned Language Groups
Benchmark Out of
Observations Sample Mean Sample Mean Difference
ln(0.01 + night lights) 11,869 -3.487 -3.505 0.018
(0.018) (0.022) (0.028)
Cladistic similarity 11,869 0.276 0.272 0.004
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Level of democracy (Polity2) 11,822 0.677 0.319 0.358***
(0.059) (0.062) (0.086)
Political competition 10,854 6.180 5.940 0.239***
(0.032) (0.033) (0.046)
Executive constraints 10,854 3.634 3.368 0.266***
(0.022) (0.022) (0.032)
Openness of executive 10,854 2.756 2.556 0.200***
recruitment (0.024) (0.028) (0.036)
Competitiveness of executive 10,854 1.283 1.208 0.075***
recruitment (0.014) (0.015) (0.021)
This table tests for selection into the available language lists in the ASJP database. The full sample of partitioned
language groups are separated by those that I observe in my benchmark dataset and those that I do not because of
missing ASJP language lists. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
1.4.1 What Drives Favoritism?
In this section I test for heterogeneity across a variety of potential channels to better understand
what drives favoritism. In Table 1.8 I study the dynamics of my benchmark findings by account
for the possibility that the extent of favoritism is a function of the time a leader has held office. In
column 1, I report estimates of an augmented equation (1.1) that includes an interaction between
linguistic similarity and a count of the years a leader has held office. The interaction term enters
positive and statistically significant, indicating that favoritism is an increasing function of the
years a leader has held office.
I also construct a set of indicator variables at 5-year intervals to explore the non-linearities
further. Column 2 reports these estimates. All coefficients are positive and the magnitude of effect
is increasing in the length of tenure, however there is no significant effect associated with the first
five leaders of leadership. Taken together, Table 1.8 indicates that the extent of ethnolinguistic
favoritism is an increasing function of a leader’s incumbency. In a continent where multi-decade
presidencies are not uncommon (e.g., Jose Eduardo dos Santos in Angola or Robert Mugabe in
Zimbabwe), it should come as no surprise that favoritism is so rampant.
I also check for heterogeneous effects across seven other measures: the level of democracy
(Padro´ i Miquel, 2007; Burgess et al., 2015), language group Ethnologue population shares (Fran-
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cois et al., 2015), distance to the capital from a group’s centroid (Michalopoulos and Papaioannou,
2014), distance to the nearest coast from a group’s centroid (Nunn, 2008; Nunn and Wantchekon,
2011), presence of an oil reserve and diamond mine within the territory of the country-language
group (Jensen and Wantchekon, 2004). Table 1.9 reports these estimates.
The analysis reveals little evidence of heterogeneity. One explanation for a lack of heterogene-
ity is that these different channels are only relevant in some countries and do not generalize to the
35-country sample I use here. Another possible explanation is that the rich set of fixed effects in
each regression absorb much of the important variation. For example, in column (1), I find that
democracy has a mitigating effect on the extent of observed favoritism, but this effect is not statis-
tically significant. While the intuition is consistent with Burgess et al. (2015), the lack of precision
likely comes from the fact that country-year fixed effects account for the level effect of democracy,
and the residual variation is not significant enough to identify any meaningful effect. A similar
explanation applies to the remaining variables, where country-language fixed effects absorb the
level effect for each because of the time invariance of these group-level measures.
However, there is some evidence of heterogeneity in terms of a diamond mine being present
within a country-language group. The negative coefficient implies favoritism is less prevalent in
regions where diamond mines exist. On interpretation is that the presence of diamonds creates
wealth, and the resulting development may reduce the material importance of patronage to the
region. Yet the lack of heterogeneity in oil reserves does not corroborate this story, so I leave a
more concrete analysis of why diamond mines might constrain favoritism to future research.
1.5 How Is Patronage Distributed?
In this section I develop a within-group set-up similar to the previous section using individual-
level data from the Demographic and Health Survey (DHS). Exploiting the same source of varia-
tion with different data serves as an additional robustness check of my benchmark analysis. The
DHS data also allows me to explore how patronage is distributed. In particular, I use data on
an individual’s location and ethnolinguistic identity to construct two measures of lexicostatistical
similarity: locational and individual similarity. I define individual similarity as the lexicostatis-
tical similarity of the leader to each respondent’s ethnolinguistic identity. To assign a locational
language I use the Ethnologue language map and individual location coordinates to determine the
language group associated with an individual’s location. I define locational similarity as the lexi-
costatistical similarity of a leader to the respondent’s locational language. Because these measures
do not always coincide, I can jointly estimate both channels to determine the relative importance
of being similar to the leader versus living in a location with an attached identity similar to the
leader.
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Table 1.8: The Dynamics of Ethnolinguistic Favoritism
Dependent Variable: yc,l,t = ln(0.01 + nightLightsc,l,t)
(1) (2)
Lexicostatistical similarityt−1 0.072
(0.160)
Lexicostatistical similarityt−1 0.027*
× Years in officet−1 (0.016)
Lexicostatistical similarityt−1 0.118
× 1(Years in officet−1 ≤ 5) (0.129)
Lexicostatistical similarityt−1 0.325*
× 1(5 < Years in officet−1 ≤ 10) (0.170)
Lexicostatistical similarityt−1 0.561***
× 1(10 < Years in officet−1 ≤ 15) (0.197)
Lexicostatistical similarityt−1 0.555**
× 1(15 < Years in officet−1 ≤ 20) (0.233)
Lexicostatistical similarityt−1 0.689**
× 1(20 < Years in officet−1) (0.347)
Geographic controls Yes Yes
Distance & population density Yes Yes
Language-year fixed effects Yes Yes
Country-language fixed effects Yes Yes
Country-year fixed effects Yes Yes
Clusters 355 355
Countries 35 35
Language groups 163 163
Adjusted R2 0.926 0.926
Observations 6,610 6,610
This table reports estimates of the dynamics of ethnolinguistic favoritism. The unit of observation is a language group
l in country c in the specified year. Average night light intensity is measured in language group l of country c in
year t, and Lexicostatistical similarity is a continuous measure of language group l’s phonological similarity to the
ethnolinguistic identity of the national leader. Current years in office is a count variable of the years the incumbent
leader has been in power, and total years in office measures the total years the incumbent leader will remain in power.
Quartile measures relate to current years in office. All control variables are described in Table 1.3. Standard errors are
clustered at the country-language group level and are reported in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 1.9: Benchmark Regressions with Heterogeneous Effects
Dependent Variable: yc,l,t = ln(0.01 +NightLightsc,l,t)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Lexicostatistical similarityt−1 0.298** 0.407** 0.379** 0.327* 0.305*** 0.397***
(0.127) (0.161) (0.174) (0.190) (0.116) (0.135)
Lexicostatistical similarityt−1 -0.005
× Democracyt−1 (0.020)
Lexicostatistical similarityt−1 -0.610
× Population share (0.533)
Lexicostatistical similarityt−1 -0.000
× Distance to the capital (0.000)
Lexicostatistical similarityt−1 -0.000
× Distance to the coast (0.000)
Lexicostatistical similarityt−1 0.232
× Oil reserve (1.140)
Lexicostatistical similarityt−1 -0.336*
× Diamond mine (0.190)
Language-year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-language fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Baseline controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clusters 355 355 355 355 355 355
Countries 35 35 35 35 35 35
Language groups 163 163 163 163 163 163
Adjusted R2 0.927 0.926 0.926 0.926 0.926 0.926
Observations 6,540 6,610 6,610 6,610 6,610 6,610
This table reports a series of tests for heterogeneous effects in the benchmark estimates. Average night light intensity is measured in language group l of country
c in year t, and lexicostatistical similarity is a continuous measure of language group l’s phonological similarity to the national leader and is measured on the unit
interval. All control variables are described in Table 1.3. Democracy is the polity2 score of democracy for the country in which a group resides, geodesic distances
are measured in kilometres from a group’s centroid to the capital city and the nearest coast, oil reserve and diamond mine represent indicators variables at the group
level. Standard errors are clustered at the country-language group level and are reported in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
1.5.1 DHS Individual-Level Data
I collect data from the Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) for 13 African countries.28 For
each country I pool both the male and female samples for each wave, and when separately pro-
vided, I merge the wealth index dataset for that year. To replicate the same variation I use in my
benchmark estimates, I choose DHS countries and survey waves as follows:
(1) I identify all DHS country-waves that include latitude and longitude coordinates for each
survey cluster as well as information on a respondent’s home language and/or ethnic iden-
tity.
(2) I identify all language groups that are partitioned across contiguous country pairs in the
DHS database that also possess the necessary information noted in (1).
(3) For each partitioned language group identified in (2) I keep those that possess at least 2
consecutive surveys from the same set of DHS waves.
Next I project the latitude and longitude coordinates for each survey cluster onto the Ethno-
logue language map and back out the language group associated with that location.29 I assign
this language as the locational language for that cluster and construct a measure of locational
similarity as the lexicostatistical similarity of that region to the incumbent leader.
To measure individual similarity I use data on the language a respondent speaks at home,
and when not available data on their ethnicity. I describe the mapping between ethnicity and
language in detail in Appendix B. I construct a measure of individual similarity as the lexicosta-
tistical similarity between the home language of an individual and the ethnolinguistic identity
of their national leader. To be consistent with my benchmark model, I measure locational and
individual linguistic similarity to the national leader in year t− 1.
The result is 33 DHS country-waves, 13 countries and 11 country pairs, with 20 partitioned lan-
guage groups. Having at least 2 consecutive survey waves for each partitioned group allows for a
set-up similar to my benchmark model, where within-group time variation comes from leadership
changes across waves. One important difference from my benchmark set-up is that for 3 countries
I only observe a single partitioned language group, meaning that country-location-language fixed
effects are not applicable in this context.
Among the 56,455 respondents for whom I successfully match both locational and individual
languages, I find that 55.9 percent reside in their ethnolinguistic homeland.30 This finding corrob-
orates the implicit assumption made in the regional-level analysis that the majority of a language
region’s inhabitants are native to that region. At the same time, having 44.1 percent of respondents
28See Appendix B for a list of countries and a detailed discussion of all DHS data.
29In instances of overlapping language groups, I assign the largest group in terms of population
30Nunn and Wantchekon (2011) also find that 55 percent of respondents in the 2005 Afrobarometer reside in their
ethnolinguistic homeland. The consistency across datasets is quite remarkable since only 7 out of the 13 countries used
in this paper overlap with the Afrobarometer data in Nunn and Wantchekon (2011).
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Figure 1.6: DHS Clusters Across Waves in the Kuranko Language Group Partition
This figure documents the spatial distribution of DHS enumeration clusters in the partitioned Kuranko language group
in Sierra Leone (west of the border) and Guinea (east of the border). Variation between individual and locational lexi-
costatistical similarity comes from the 40 percent of respondents who identify with an ethnolinguistic group different
than the Kuranko.
be non-native to their location allows me to exploit variation in individual and location similarity
to separately estimate the two effects off of leadership changes.31
Consider, as an example, the Kuranko language group partitioned across Guinea and Sierra
Leone. Figure 1.6 depicts the spatial distribution of Kuranko survey clusters by wave. For each
survey respondent living in one of these clusters I assign the Kuranko language as their locational
language, despite the fact that only 60.1 percent of respondents report Kuranko as their ethnolin-
guistic identity. Among the remaining 39.9 percent of respondents in the Kuranko region there
are 9 other reported ethnolinguistic identities. Take the 117 Sierra Leoneans living in the Kuranko
region who identify as Themne – the ethnicity/language of president Ernest Bai Koroma. The in-
clusion of individual similarity allows me to ask if Themne respondents benefit from coethnicity
– and similarity more generally – irrespective of where they live.
1.5.2 Locational and Individual Similarity Estimates
I test the general importance of locational and individual similarity vis-a`-vis changes in the DHS
wealth index – a composite measure of cumulative living conditions for a household. The index
is constructed using data on a household ownership of assets (e.g., television, refrigerator, tele-
phone, etc.) and access to public resources (e.g., water, electricity, sanitation facility, etc.). Since
variation in linguistic similarity comes from leadership changes, a positive estimate for either mea-
sure implies better access to public resources and more acquired assets because of an individual’s
31The use of non-natives in this way is methodologically similar to Nunn and Wantchekon (2011) and Michalopoulos
et al. (2016), who also use variation within non-native Africans to disentangle regional effects from individual-level
effects.
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similarity across the significant dimension.
In every specification I include country-wave fixed effects, locational language-wave fixed
effects and individual language-wave fixed effects. As previously mentioned I do not include
country-language fixed effects because in some instances I only observe a single language for a
country. Unlike estimating equation (1.1), I include individual language-wave fixed effects be-
cause 45 percent of respondents’ home language is different than their locational language.
I report these estimates in Table 1.10. In column 1 the estimate for lexicostatistical locational
similarity is positive and significant at the 1 percent level. This point estimate of 0.540 is equivalent
to 0.35 of a standard deviation increase in the wealth index. In column 2 I report the estimate
for individual similarity. While the estimate has the expected positive sign, the coefficient is not
precisely estimated. This suggests that changes in the individual-level wealth index are coming
from transfers based on the ethnic identity of a region. Indeed, when I run a horse race between the
two, I find that locational similarity is significantly different than zero while individual similarity
remains insignificant. 32
Overall, these estimates indicate that favoritism operates through regional transfers, which
suggests that favoritism is beneficial to all inhabits of a region regardless of their background.
This finding is consistent with the evidence that Kenyan leaders invest twice as much in roads
(Burgess et al., 2015), and disproportionately target school construction in their coethnic districts
(Kramon and Posner, 2016). In a case study of Congo-Brazzaville, Franck and Rainer (2012) simi-
larly find that ethnic divisions impact the patterns of regional school construction. However, this
case study also points to anecdotal evidence of the individual-level channel, where coethnic indi-
viduals benefit from preferential access to education and civil servant jobs irrespective of where
they live. Kramon and Posner (2016) similarity posit the existence of this preferential access chan-
nel. To the contrary, I find that an individual’s similarity to her leader does not afford her any
luxuries beyond the location effect.
Finally, to show that the locational mechanism is not only driven by the coethnic effect, I
separately estimate locational coethnicity and non-coethnic locational similarity. I do this in the
same way I did in the regional-level analysis: I define non-coethnic locational similarity as (1 −
coethnicity) × locational similarity. Column 4 of Table 1.10 reports this estimate. I find that both
the coethnic and non-coethnic effect are positive and strongly significant. These estimates sug-
gest that the average level of non-coethnic locational similarity (0.164) yields an increase of 0.122
(= 0.164× 0.742) in the wealth index – roughly one fourth the coethnic effect.
1.6 Discussion: Coalition Building
The results of this paper indicate that ethnic favoritism is widespread throughout Africa, and that
patronage is distributed to both the ethnic region of the leader and to related but non-coethnic
regions. But what mechanism drives these regional transfers? Why might we expect to see fa-
32See Appendix B for the unconditional estimates.
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Table 1.10: Individual-Level Regressions: Locational and Individual Similarity
Dependent Variable: DHS Wealth Index
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Locational similarityt−1 0.540*** 0.541***
(0.128) (0.128)
Individual similarityt−1 0.239 0.240
(0.216) (0.216)
Locational coethnicityt−1 0.501***
(0.133)
Non-coethnic locational similarityt−1 0.742***
(0.148)
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Distance controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-wave fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Locational language-wave fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual language-wave fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clusters 88 88 88 88
Countries 13 13 13 13
Language groups 20 20 20 20
Adjusted R2 0.605 0.605 0.605 0.605
Observations 56,455 56,455 56,455 56,455
This table reports estimates that test for favoritism outside of coethnic language partitions. The unit of observation is
an individual. The rural indicator is equal to 1 if a respondent lives in a rural location. The individual set of control
variables include age, age squared, rural indicator variable, a gender indicator variable and an indicator for respondents
living in the capital city. Distance to the coast and border are in kilometers. Standard errors are in parentheses and
adjusted for clustering at the country-language-wave level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
voritism outside of the leader’s ethnic region?
I offer an explanation that relates to the literature on coalition building. Central to this litera-
ture is the idea that leaders respond to political instability by co-opting elites from outside of their
ethnic group into high-level government positions to pacify unrest and to maintain control of the
state (Joseph, 1987; Arriola, 2009; Francois et al., 2015). The fact that similar but not identical eth-
nic regions benefits from patronage suggests that ethnicity is more than just a marker of identity:
similarity may capture affinity between related non-coethnic groups. It is intuitive that the “close-
ness” of a group to the leader would predict their share in the governing coalition for reasons
related to trust (Habyarimana et al., 2009), reduced costs of coordination (Miguel and Gugerty,
31
2005), clientelistic networks (Wantchekon, 2003) and more. Because leaders share power with eth-
nic groups other than their own to make credible their promise of patronage (Arriola, 2009), any
evidence that leaders appoint closely related groups is an indication that coalition building is one
mechanism underlying this paper’s findings.
An insightful paper by Francois et al. (2015) provides theoretical and empirical support for
the claim that ethnic group representation in the governing coalition is proportional to a group’s
share of the national population. The logic of this theory runs contrary to ethnic favoritism: their
proposed mechanism underlying coalition building is group size. Yet these authors still find that a
leader’s ethnic group receives a premium in government appointments over and above the effect
of group size. While it is beyond the scope of this paper to take a stance on the relative importance
of these channels, what is important is that they are not mutually exclusive to each other.
To shed light on this interesting area of research I document that the similarity of an ethnic
group to the leader correlates with an ethnic group’s representation in government conditional
on group size. I use yearly data from Francois et al. (2015) on the share of an ethnic group’s
representation in the governing coalition for 15 African countries between 1992 and 2004.33 The
majority of Ethnologue groups are defined as Others in Francois et al.’s (2015) data, which severely
limits the observable number of group partitions. Consequently, it is not possible to use the same
source of within-group variation employed elsewhere in this paper. Instead I use an identical
set-up to Francois et al. (2015), but augment their empirical model with an indicator variable for
similar but not identical ethnic groups:
yc,e,t = α coethnicc,e,t + β similarc,e,t + f
(
groupsizec,e
)
+ δc + γt + c,e,t. (1.2)
The outcome variable yc,e,t is ethnic group e’s share of cabinet positions in country c in year t.
In addition to the usual coethnicc,e,t indicator variable, I include an indicator equal to one when
a non-coethnic group’s linguistic similarity is greater than a defined threshold of “closeness” (i.e.,
similarc,e,t). Francois et al. (2015) find that groupsizec,e – the population share of ethnic group e
in country c – is concave in its relationship with a group’s share of cabinet positions, so I include
groupsizec,e and its polynomial in all regressions. δc and γt capture unobserved time-invariant
country effects and time trends. I follow Francois et al. (2015) and cluster standard errors at the
country level.
I exploit a range of thresholds to let the data inform me of the relevant threshold of closeness.
My preferred approach is to split the distribution of linguistic similarity for non-coethnics into
deciles. I assign the threshold for closeness as any non-coethnic observation with similarity to the
leader that is equal to or greater than a defined decile of the distribution. Hence, these thresholds
are cumulative, where similarc,e,t is equal to one when a non-coethnic group’s linguistic similarity
is equal to or greater than the decile cut-off.34
33See Appendix B for details on the construction of this dataset.
34In Appendix B, I replicate Table III from Francois et al. (2015) and include the more general specification of lexico-
statistical similarity in place of coethnicity.
32
Figure 1.7: Ethnic Favoritism and Coalition Building
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Estimates of Ethnic Closeness at Various Thresholds
This figure plots point estimates of the similarc,e,t indicator variable in equation (1.2) at nine different closeness thresh-
olds. Thresholds are set according to deciles of the distribution for non-coethnic similarity. These thresholds are cumu-
lative, where similarc,e,t is equal to one when a non-coethnic group’s linguistic similarity is equal to or greater than the
decile threshold. Each estimate reflects the additional share of cabinet positions a similar non-coethnic group receives
relative to non-similar non-coethnics. Intervals reflect 99% confidence levels.
I plot the point estimates of β in Figure 1.7 for various thresholds, where the intervals reflect
99 percent confidence levels. The figure clearly documents non-coethnic favoritism in coalition
building, at least among the stricter definitions of closeness. Because I include coethnicc,e,t and
similarc,e,t in each regression, the estimate of β reflects the additional share of cabinet positions a
similar non-coethnic group receives relative to other non-coethnics that do not satisfy the threshold
level of similarity.
To assess the economic meaning of these estimates, I can compare the difference in a group’s
predicted outcome conditional on mean group size, after turning β on and off. Let the closeness
threshold be the most stringent threshold at the 90th percentile of the distribution. I find that a
non-coethnic group’s share in the governing coalition jumps from 5.1 to 7.4 percent when β is
included – a 45 percent increase.35 The resulting share is almost 2 percentage points larger than
the sample average share of 5.6 percent.
But how similar are these “close” groups? Consider the Gbe ethnolinguistic family, where
three of the most widely spoken languages include Fon, Ewe and Gen. For the three possible
pairings of these languages, the average lexicostatistical similarity is 46.8 percent. The mean sim-
ilarity among non-coethnic groups in the 90th percentile of the distribution is 45.7 percent. This
35The point estimate for similarc,e,t = 0.023, while the point estimates for group size and its polynomial are 1.225
and -1.795. For the mean non-coethnic group, the effect of group size is 5.1 = 1.225 × 0.052 − 1.795 × 0.007, and 7.4
when adding the similarc,e,t premium.
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suggests that leaders appoint elites from outside of their immediate ethnic group that are part of
the same family cluster. In other words, the affinity that similarity captures is reflective of the
shared ancestry in a group’s larger ethnic network.
Overall, these findings suggest that leaders are inclined to make ethnicity-based decisions
when appointing ministers from outside their own ethnic group. While the estimates of equa-
tion (1.2) cannot necessarily be taken as causal, they are informative of the mechanism through
which public resources are allocated to non-coethnic regions. The tendency of ministers to redi-
rect funds to their coethnics explains why non-coethnic groups with representation in government
receive patronage (Arriola, 2009).
1.7 Concluding Remarks
Ethnic favoritism is often thought to be endemic to African politics, yet the empirical basis for this
claim is largely founded on single-country case studies. In this paper, I document evidence that
ethnic favoritism is widespread throughout Africa using data for 35 sub-Saharan countries. I also
introduce a novel measure of linguistic similarity that contributes to this literature in three ways:
(i) it better predicts patterns of ethnic favoritism with added variation in measured similarity, (ii)
the continuity of the measure enables the study of favoritism among groups that are not coethnic
to the leader, and (iii) it informs our understanding of a new mechanism related to the ethnic
affinity between similar but non-coethnic groups. This deepens our understanding of the extent of
favoritism – evidence of favoritism among non-coethnics normally goes undetected when using
a coethnic dummy variable. I also show that patronage tends to be distributed at a regional level
rather than as targeted transfers towards individuals. I interpret these results through the lens
of coalition building and find that ethnicity is one of the guiding principles behind high-level
government appointments.
These observations inform policy in a number of new ways. In particular, my findings are
informative of both the extent of favoritism and where it is expected to take place. This can be
used for many purposes, one of which is to enhance monitoring of foreign aid. There is a growing
body of evidence that links the misuse of foreign aid to ethnic patronage in Africa (Briggs, 2014;
Jablonski, 2014). Greater oversight is achieved through a deeper understanding of where patron-
age is expected to flow. My findings suggest aid donors should not only worry about patronage
directed toward the leader’s ethnic group but also toward other related groups. The benefits of
oversight are evident when comparing the non-interference aid policy of China with conditional
transfers from the World Bank. Dreher et al. (2015) find little evidence that World Bank aid is used
for patronage purposes in contrast to the evidence that China’s non-interference policy engenders
resource allocation across ethnic lines rather than on a basis of need.
More generally, my findings speak to the value of nation-building policies that promote di-
versity in a Pan-Africanist tradition. Tanzania is a good example of a country that has stressed
a sense of unity and shared history in its national policies. One nation-building tool of this type
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that is particularly relevant to this paper is Tanzania’s national language policy (Miguel, 2004). In
the mid-1960s, the Tanzanian government changed the official language of the country to Swahili.
The extent to which Swahili is found in other countries and commonly used as a lingua franca
speaks to the ethnic neutrality of the language. Within only a few years of its implementation, the
official status granted to Swahili was described as a “linguistic revolution” for its ability to help
shape a national consciousness that runs contrary to ethnic identity (Harries, 1969, p. 277). The
Tanzania example is a model to be replicated elsewhere, given the evidence that ethnic favoritism
is so widespread throughout Africa. This is not to imply that national language policies are the
only means to pacify existing ethnic tensions: the lesson here is that national policies must be de-
signed to engender acceptance of diversity through unity. For example, education is an effective
way to build a national culture that actively values diversity and differences in experience and
background.
Lastly, the findings of this paper call for future work. The evidence that favoritism is not sim-
ply a coethnic phenomenon demands a deeper understanding of what it means to be “close” to
the ruling ethnic group. The taxonomy of linguistic and ethnic clusters provide an opportunity
to study this notion of closeness in the same vein as Desmet et al. (2012). Linking the extent of
favoritism to the impact it has on ethnic inequality is an important next step in this line of re-
search. The Tanzania example also suggests ethnic favoritism is not an unavoidable consequence
of a country’s high level of diversity, an observation that is consistent with the literature on ethnic
inequality. Why then do we observe favoritism in some countries and not others? Geographic
segregation is linked to ethnic favoritism in Africa (Ejdemyr et al., 2014), while geographic en-
dowments are linked to ethnic inequality (Alesina et al., 2016), which suggests an answer to this
question lies at the intersection of these two areas of research.
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Chapter 2
Population Relatedness and
Cross-Country Idea Flows
2.1 Introduction
Recent research documents a link between the ancestral relationship of two countries and their
current difference in income (Spolaore and Wacziarg, 2009, 2013a). This link is interpreted as re-
flecting an indirect causal effect: income gaps are smaller between related populations because
they are more likely to communicate and adopt similar ideas. By this interpretation the proba-
bility of an idea flowing between two countries is the indirect causal link, and this probability is
smaller in more distant relationships. At the same time, dissimilarity could theoretically provide
incentive for idea flows if a wider spectrum of non-overlapping traits increase the likelihood of
two populations having complementary ideas. This notion of a diversity-driven incentive for idea
flows suggests a possible counterbalancing force to the lower probability of communication when
two countries are ancestrally distant. This hypothesis is similar in spirit to the theory of Ashraf
and Galor (2013) and Ashraf et al. (2014, 2015), who document empirical evidence of opposing
forces of relatedness on income per capita within a country.
The purpose of this research is then two-fold: can the degree of relatedness between countries
explain the cross-country flow of ideas, and if so, do we observe interplay between two opposing
forces of population relatedness? I find that the degree of relatedness can explain these flows,
and that measuring relatedness across linguistic and genetic dimensions yields robust empirical
evidence of two opposing forces on the cross-country flow of ideas.
I follow the literature in using genetic distance as a measure of population relatedness, and use
data on book translations to capture bilateral flows of information. Consistent with the suggested
mechanism of Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009), I find that unconditional genetic distance negatively
correlates with book translations. However, after isolating variation in population differences spe-
cific to language and geography, the residual variation indicates book translations are increasing
in genetic distance. This is consistent with the proposed diversity-driven communication incen-
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tive. The observed negative correlation of unconditional genetic distance captures a cost specific
to language that I account for when linguistic distance is jointly estimated. The result is two mea-
sures of relatedness capturing opposing forces: language differences impose a cost on idea flows
while population differences yield a communication incentive.
I also find that linguistic distance reflects a stronger relationship with book translations (in
absolute terms) than genetic distance. This evidence reconciles my findings with the intuition
of Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009), where unconditional genetic distance is expected to exhibit a
negative relationship with book translations. One reason genetic distance has received so much
attention in the literature is because it captures a variety of intergenerationally transmitted traits
– notably language (Spolaore and Wacziarg, 2015). As a summary measure it is then intuitive
that unconditional genetic distance absorbs the overarching cost of language differences and neg-
atively correlates with book translations. The stable and positive relationship between genetic
distance and book translations is observable only after separating out linguistic and geographic
variation from genetic distance.
Conversely the estimated coefficient for linguistic distance is stable in significance and mag-
nitude with or without conditioning on genetic distance. The stability of the estimate has two
implications: that linguistic distance is not a latent measure of genetic distance and that language
constrains the flow of ideas.
Book translations are an appealing measure of idea flows since by definition they require a
bilateral exchange in terms of language and often location. This feature lends itself to bilateral
comparisons of population relatedness. The bilateral nature of book translations also makes them
suitable for study within a gravity model, the empirical model most frequently used in studies of
genetic and linguistic differences. Book translations are also a recognized measure of international
idea flows (Abramitzky and Sin, 2014), and satisfy the necessary properties of an idea because they
are non-rival and disembodied.1
But more than this a book can convey an idea or tell a story that reflects a different set of
values and cultural norms, or draw analogy as a form of commentary about the state of society.
The breadth of ideas that a book can capture make translations an appealing measure of idea
flows because of a book’s capacity to influence human behaviour. Rodrik (2014) argues ideas are
not only relevant as technical innovations, but also shape our preferences and how we think the
world works, and at times “can unlock what otherwise might seem like the iron grip of vested
interests” (p. 194). This behavioural influence of an idea resonates with a long history of books
and their influence over society.2
Using an empirical gravity model of translation flows, I estimate that a one standard deviation
increase in linguistic distance yields 12 percent fewer book translations. This distance is roughly
1A printed copy of a translated text is a rival good because my purchasing of that book inhibits another’s purchase of
it. But the translation itself is non-rival because my purchase of the book does not diminish the use of that translation for
future copies of the book. This also implies a translation is disembodied in the sense that it is not physically contained
as a tangible good.
2The empirical evidence that television affects social capital (Olken, 2009), fertility decisions (La Ferrara et al., 2012),
and the status of women (Jensen and Oster, 2009) suggests books can also influence human behaviour.
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equivalent to how much more Romanian differs from English than German. This result is highly
significant and robust to a range of controls, including per capita income and population, political
rights, and other covariates measuring bilateral differences in geography and colonial history.
Estimates also hold in magnitude and significance when disaggregating the translation data by
idea type, as well as including numerous measures of human capital and bilateral trade between
country pairs. For the benchmark estimate I flexibly control for country, time and language fixed
effects, and later show that the core linguistic distance result holds even when accounting for
unobserved country-pair effects. The stability of the linguistic distance estimate in significance
and magnitude shows little evidence of a selection bias driving this benchmark result.
Similarly I estimate a significant and robust relationship between book translations and ge-
netic distance. Only now the sign is reversed, where a one standard deviation increase in genetic
distance yields an 10 percent increase in book translations. This result is again robust to a rich set
of controls and a variety of robustness checks.
To interpret these findings I argue relatedness affects both the costs and benefits of social in-
teractions overall. On the one hand, the translatability of two languages is a crucial determinant
of communication between countries. Translatability reflects the cost of capturing the original
message of a book in a translation – I use a computerized lexicostatistical measure of distance
to capture this cost. On the other hand, there is little overlap of traits and cultural norms when
ancestral relationships are distant. This wider spectrum of separate traits increase the likelihood
of complementary ideas and therefore an incentive for communication exists when groups have
more to learn from each other, possibly driving the positive relationship between genetic distance
and book translations.
It is also intuitive that we observe this positive relationship through genealogical differences.
By construction, genetic distance reflects a molecular clock that maps the time since two popula-
tions shared a common ancestor (discussed further in section 2.2.2). Although linguistic distance
reflects the time since two populations shared a common language, this does not necessarily cap-
ture the same historical relationship. For example, the Magyar invaded Hungary in the ninth
century, imposing their Uralic language on the conquered. To this day Hungarians exhibit a gene
distribution similar to the rest of Central Europe, but continue to speak a Uralic language unlike
the Latin-based languages of their neighbours (Cavalli-Sforza, 2000). A similar pattern exists in
many regions of the transatlantic slave trade, where colonizers imposed their own language on
the colonized with little genetic mixing (Phillipson, 1992). Such historical events create a wedge
between the co-evolution of language and genetics. In this sense genetic distance is a better sum-
mary measure of the time since two populations separated, and thus the extent of dissimilar ideas,
beliefs and cultural norms. Figure 2.1 depicts this argument schematically.
The principal contribution of this paper is the evidence that population relatedness confers
both social costs and benefits on the flow of ideas. Ashraf and Galor (2013) document a trade-
off between the costs and benefits of diversity on productivity within a country.3 While I am
3Ashraf et al. (2014, 2015) also document a trade-off between the costs and benefits of genetic diversity on night light
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Figure 2.1: Opposing Forces of Population Relatedness on the Flow of Ideas
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concerned with idea flows, the intuition gleaned from Ashraf and Galor (2013) suggests that
the interplay between these opposing forces of relatedness also exists between countries. I doc-
ument evidence of this between-country link, which offers a deeper understanding of Spolaore
and Wacziarg’s (2009) proposed mechanism: summary population differences exhibit a negative
relationship with the diffusion of ideas, with the caveat that this negative relationship operates
along linguistic lines and that a concomitant incentive for idea flows exists along distant ancestral
lineages.
By explicitly measuring historical differences in genetics and language, this paper also speaks
to a larger literature on the deep determinants of development. Spolaore and Wacziarg (2013a)
review this literature, and provide evidence that linguistic and genetic differences can account
for the decline in fertility in Europe (Spolaore and Wacziarg, 2014), create barriers to long-run
technology diffusion (Spolaore and Wacziarg, 2013b), and the occurrence of war (Spolaore and
Wacziarg, 2016). Related to this is the evidence that the historical composition of a population
is a better predictor of its current income than the historical legacy of the geographic location
(Putterman and Weil, 2010), that patterns of technology adoption dating back to 1000 BCE persist
today and that the effects of past technology on current income is stronger when considering
the ancestral composition of a population rather than the population’s current location (Comin
et al., 2010). At the heart of this literature is the idea that history matters, and that the degree
of relatedness is the mechanism linking historical and contemporary development. This paper’s
contribution is the evidence that the degree of relatedness confers both costs and benefits on the
diffusion of knowledge.
The use of book translation data as a measure of idea flows also places this research in prox-
imity to a recent paper by Abramitzky and Sin (2014), who document the repressive nature of
communist institutions on the inflow of Western books in the Soviet Union prior to its collapse. I
luminosity at the national level and subnational national, respectively.
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account for the institutional environment of a country with a measure of political rights, but find
that the coefficient estimates of linguistic and genetic distance are unaltered in significance and
magnitude conditional on the extent of political rights. This suggests the influence of the institu-
tional environment is only part of the story, and that the degree of relatedness is a contributing
factor to the bilateral flow of book translations across countries.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2.2 describes the translation data and
details the measurement strategy for the linguistic and genetic distance data. I outline the econo-
metric model in section 2.3 and document the benchmark empirical finding. Section 2.4 tests the
robustness of the benchmark result and section 2.5 extends the analysis by disaggregating the
book translation data by idea type. Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Data
This section outlines the data used to construct the main variables of interest. See Appendix C for
more detailed variable definitions, summary statistics and data sources.
2.2.1 Measuring Language Distance
Measurement of linguistic differences is difficult because languages can differ in a variety of ways,
including vocabulary, pronunciation, grammar, syntax, phonetics and more. To overcome this
challenge I isolate variation specific to vocabulary differences with a computerized lexicostatisti-
cal approach. As a percentage estimate of cognate words in a language pair, the lexicostatistical
method measures how the passage of time diminishes the lexical similarity between two lan-
guages.4 The recent splitting of two languages from a parent language implies a large number of
shared cognates or a small linguistic distance.
The computerized lexicostatistical method was developed as part of the Automatic Similarity
Judgement Program (ASJP), a project run by linguists at the Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary
Anthropology.5 To begin a list of 40 universal words (i.e., implied meanings) are compiled for each
language to compare the lexical similarity of any language pair. Swadesh (1952) introduced this
idea of comparing a universal list of words. When a word is universal across world languages, its
implied meaning, and therefore any estimate of linguistic distance, is independent of culture and
geography.6
Each word in each language is transcribed into a standardized orthography called ASJPcode,
a phonetic ASCII alphabet consisting of 34 consonants and 7 vowels. A standardized alphabet
restricts variation across languages to phonological differences. Words are then transcribed ac-
4Two words are said to be cognate if they exist in separate languages but share a common linguistic origin. In other
words they descend from the same historical parent language.
5http://asjp.clld.org
6A recent paper by Holman et al. (2009) shows that the 40-item list employed here yields results at least as good as
those of the commonly used 100-item list propo1sed by Swadesh (1955). Specifically, the 40-item list is a refined version
of the 100-item list, deduced from rigorous testing for word stability across all languages.
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cording to pronunciation before language distances are estimated. For example, the French word
for you is vous, and is encoded using ASJPcode as vu to reflect its pronunciation.
I then take these word lists and run the Levenshtein distance algorithm to calculate the mini-
mum number of edits needed to translate a word from one language into another. To correct for
the fact that longer words demand more edits, each distance is divided by the length of the trans-
lated word. This normalization procedure yields a percentage estimate of dissimilarity. Averaging
across the 40-item list of words for each language pair yields an average lexicostatistical distance
between two languages.
Following Wichmann et al. (2010), a second normalization procedure is used to adjust for the
accidental similarity of two languages. This normalization accounts for similar ordering and fre-
quency of characters that are the result of chance and independent of a word’s meaning.
In instances where two languages have many accidental similarities in terms of ordering and
frequency of characters, the second normalization procedure can yield percentage estimates larger
than 100 percent. To account for this I divide each distance by the maximum distance, the result
of which is a measure of lexicostatistical linguistic distance measured across the unit interval. See
Appendix A for a formal definition of this lexicostatistical language distance.7
Existing studies typically use data from Fearon (2003), a measure of cladistic language dis-
tance. The cladistic measure is a ratio of shared branches between two languages on the language
tree, and distance is calculated as one minus this ratio. This measure is widespread in its use
because cladistic distance is easily computed for any language pair, since language trees exist for
virtually all known world language families (Lewis, 2009).8
The main advantange of the lexicostatistical measure is that it is a continuous measure of lin-
guistic distance and thus provides significant variation in distance estimates. The cladistic ap-
proach is a coarse measure of distance because data dispersion is limited to 15 unique values, the
maximum number of language family classifications on the Ethnologue langauge tree. Conversely
I match 72 unique lexicostatistical distances to my sample of book translations. This additional
variation gives me a distribution of distances among language pairs that would otherwise exhibit
no variation in cladistic distance. Dickens (2016a) uses this lexicostatistical measure to approx-
imate the similarity of African ethnolinguistic groups to their national leaders, and empirically
verifies the added precision it yields in estimation of ethnic favoritism over and above the cladis-
tic measure.
7A number of other economists have used the data from Dyen et al. (1992) as an estimate of lexicostatistical linguistic
distances for the Indo-European family (Desmet et al., 2005, 2009, 2011; Ku and Zussman, 2010; Spolaore and Wacziarg,
2009, 2014, 2016). But this data is restricted to 84 Indo-European languages and does not employ the computerized
approach used here. The non-computerized approach calls for a trained linguist to work with each possible cognate
one by one to make judgement of cognation among them. Such an approach relies on subjectively determined cognates,
and is extremely labour intensive, thus inhibiting the number of language comparisons possible. Greenberg (1956)
formally introduced this approach, and Dyen et al. (1992) provide a detailed discussion of the procedure.
8See Appendix A for a formal discussion of the cladistic approach.
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2.2.2 Measuring Genetic Distance
Data on cross-country genetic distance comes from Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009), who collected
their data from Cavalli-Sforza et al. (1994). To quantify genetic distance, Cavalli-Sforza et al. (1994)
collected data on population allele frequencies specific to a set of selectively neutral genes. An
allele is one of many different forms the same gene can assume, where different phenotypic traits
(observable characteristics) develop out of different allele sets. Genes were chosen that are known
to be selectively neutral to ensure genetic variation across populations is the result of genetic
drift. The random nature of drift makes genetic differences simply a function of time. Comparing
the distribution of neutral allele frequencies effectively measures the time since two populations
shared a common ancestor, so genetic distance becomes a molecular clock.9
The Fst measure of genetic distance I use is based on an index of heterozygosity – the prob-
ability that two randomly selected alleles at a given locus will be different in two populations.
An allele distribution that is identical across two populations yields an Fst measure equal to zero,
while the Fst index takes on an increasingly higher value the greater the variation in the allele
frequencies across two populations.
When constructing a measure of genetic distance at the country level it is problematic that
many countries contain multiple ethnic sub-groups. To correct for this I adopt a genetic distance
measure weighted by the population share of each sub-group in a country.10 This measures the
expected genetic distance between a randomly selected individual from each country. All reported
empirical results use this weighted measure versus one that calculates the distance between the
dominant population in each country. However, the two measures are highly correlated and the
core empirical result is robust to this alternative measure.11
2.2.3 Book Translations as Idea Flows
I use a bibliographic database on book translations from around the world as a measure of inter-
national idea flows. While book translations are not the only means to knowledge diffusion, they
are perhaps the most common form of transmitting written ideas between countries, making them
a useful and quantifiable measure of idea flows. Abramitzky and Sin (2014) also use book trans-
lations as a measure international idea flows to study the diffusion of information under different
institutional regimes.
One appealing feature of book translations is the breadth of ideas they capture. Rodrik (2014)
argues that the influence of an idea extends beyond the technical innovation of a patent citation,
9Because genes are selectively neutral they are independent of natural selection, implying that all conclusions of this
paper do not speak to a hierarchy of genetic traits and should not be interpreted this way.
10For example, suppose country 1 has i = 1, . . . , I ethnic sub-groups and country 2 has j = 1, . . . , J ethnic sub-
groups with corresponding population shares s1i and s2j . Letting dij be genetic distance between group i and j, then
the weighted Fst genetic distance between country 1 and 2 is Fwst =
∑I
i=1
∑J
j=1(dij × s1i × s2j).
11Because the Fst genetic distance data has become more common in the economics literature, I have foregone some
details in how the measure is constructed for the sake of brevity. I direct interested readers to Spolaore and Wacziarg
(2009, p. 480) for a thoughtful and detailed discussion of the data.
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and that economists should recognize a broader scope of ideas that may also influence human
behaviour more generally.
Acknowledging the power and influence of books is at the heart of my measurement strategy.
Technical ideas are not excluded from the book translation data, but unlike patent citations, these
data also capture innovative activity outside the scope of technology. Innovative ideas include
new ways of thinking about societal norms, and how individual interests are defined and pursued.
Leighton and Lo´pez (2013) argue the rules of society shape the incentive structures that we live
by, and that new ideas change these rules, which in turn provide new incentives and ultimately
an influence over human behaviour.
History is replete with examples of the power of books and the influence of their ideas. Em-
peror Qin Shi Huang famously consolidated the political philosophy of the Qin Dynasty in ancient
China, in part, with a wave of book burnings to destroy any writing that challenged his own phi-
losophy. The ceremonial practice of book burning in Nazi Germany was an attempt to rid the
country of political writings contrary to the agenda of the National Socialist party. Even more re-
cently, Ayatollah Khomeini issued a fatwa¯ demanding Salman Rushdie be put to death for writing
The Satanic Verses because it was disrespectful to the Muslim faith. The intolerance and feelings of
threat that come from ideas in books speaks to their broader influence on society, politics and our
understanding of how the world works.
The influence of books is not only apparent in controversy, but also in their capacity to dissem-
inate ideas. Israel (2009) argues that the transatlantic democratic revolutions of the late eighteenth
century have an intellectual origin rooted in the ideas of the Enlightenment, which “persuaded
much of the reading elite on either side of the Atlantic [. . .] that a general revolution in the prin-
ciple and construction of governments is necessary” (p. 39). This wave of democratic revolutions,
Israel argues, was propelled by the spread of pamphlets and books articulating these ideas. This
example also speaks to the economic importance of books in the long-run. Given the recent evi-
dence that democracy causes growth (Acemoglu et al., 2014), by extension the intellectual origin
of democracy indirectly links the historical role of books to development patterns of today.
Measuring Book Translations
Translation data was collected from the Index Translationum (IT) database, an international bib-
liographic archive of book translations hosted by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and
Cultural Organization (UNESCO). Since 1932, IT has compiled a detailed record of book trans-
lations in print form, and more recently developed an online archive containing bibliographic
information of translated books in UNESCO Member States since 1979. Legal deposit legislation
states that all publications of a book be submitted to the book repository of a country.12 Records of
book translations are then submitted to IT by the national book repository. The systematic nature
of the data collection process is a reassurance of the data’s accuracy.
12An in-depth report on legal deposit legislation was drafted by UNESCO in 2000, which provides a guideline of
how this legislation is formed. See http://archive.ifla.org/VII/s1/gnl/legaldep1.htm.
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Figure 2.2: Benchmark Sample Observations by Country (1979-2005)
I use data on 1,634,817 book translations that span 119 translating countries over the time
period 1979-2005. The panel is unbalanced because I do not observe the same translating country–
language pairs in each year. Figure 2.2 depicts the spatial distribution of observations for the
benchmark sample of translating countries.13 While the majority of these translations are into
the dominant language of the translating country, many countries translate books into more than
one language. Each bibliographic entry contains information by subject, the translating country
and year, and the original and target languages of translation.14 Table C2 lists some of the most
translated authors within a random sample of countries, including the subject in which they have
most commonly published.
Because the translation data does not report the country in which a book was originally pub-
lished, I assign a home country to each original translation language as stated in the Ethnologue.15
The benefit of this assignment rule is that it removes judgement and hence any personal bias in
the data construction. The drawback is that, in some cases, multiple countries share a common
official language so it is not clear the Ethnologue’s stated home country is always the correct one.
For example, it is unlikely that all translations originating in English were originally published in
the United Kingdom as the Ethnologue assignment rule would suggest. In section 2.4.1 I perform
two tests of this assignment rule: I drop the most problematic languages in terms of home country
assignment and alternatively construct a home language “country” as an average of country char-
acteristics weighted by population shares for each country in which an original language is found.
In either case the benchmark result remains unaltered. Given the reassurance of this resounding
evidence I proceed with the Ethnologue assignment rule as a consistent method of home country
assignment for each original language of translation.
13See Table C3 in the appendix for a complete list of observations by translating country.
14Subjects are classified according to the Universal Decimal Classification system, including [1] history, geography
and biography, [2] law, social sciences, and education, [3] literature, [4] philosophy and psychology, [5] religion and
theology, [6] natural and exact sciences, [7] applied sciences, [8] and arts, games, and sports.
15The Ethnologue is a comprehensive database cataloguing all of the world’s 7,097 known living languages.
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2.3 Methodology and Empirical Results
2.3.1 Econometric Model
Given the bilateral nature of linguistic and genetic distance, I adopt an empirical model similar
in spirit to the gravity equation. The basic theoretical gravity model implies that bilateral trade
between two countries is a function of their economic size and a variety of costs to trade, notably
geographic distance. With this in mind, I develop a similar estimation strategy that tests how
linguistic and genetic distance affect bilateral translation flows. This basic relationship can be
written as:
TRANSijlt = α0 + α1 LINGDISTijl + α2GENDISTij + α3GEODISTij
+ X′ijΓ + X
′
itΩ + X
′
jtΦ + γi + γj + γl + γt + εijlt (2.1)
where i indexes the translating country, j the original country (and language), l the target language
and t the time period.16 The dependent variable TRANS measures log translations, LINGDIST
andGENDIST measure linguistic and genetic distance, andGEODIST measures the geographic
distance in 10,000 kilometre units. Xij is a vector of bilateral time-invariant measures of geogra-
phy and colonial relations, while Xit and Xjt include time-varying measures of income, popula-
tion and political rights in country i and j. A set of fixed effects is also included in each regression,
capturing unobserved country effects, time effects and idiosyncratic target language effects. In all
regressions I estimate robust standard errors clustered at the country-pair level.
Reverse causality is not a problem here unless one believes that the amount a country translates
has an effect on the distance between two languages or the genetic make-up of those populations.
The implausibility of this comes from the fact that group differences are historically determined
long before the time period of interest to this study. To account for the possibility of an omitted
variable bias I include a rich set of covariates and fixed effects. I control for a variety of standard
measures of trade costs and a host of time-varying measures believed to influence book transla-
tions. I also find that the benchmark estimates are robust to measures of time-varying bilateral
trade and human capital. Country fixed effects absorb any unobserved country-specific factors
while time effects absorb year-specific shocks, and robustness checks confirm that unobserved,
time-invariant factors specific to bilateral country pairs do not drive the empirical findings.
2.3.2 Unconditional Benchmark Results
In this section I investigate the basic empirical relationship between book translations and three
measures of bilateral distance. In particular I investigate how linguistic and genetic distance cor-
relate with book translations in various combinations and disentangle the role of geographic dis-
tance.
16It is redundant to denote the original language since by assumption each original language is matched to an original
country as previously noted.
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics for Distance Measures
Simple Correlations
Log Linguistic Genetic Geographic
Translations Distance Distance Distance
Linguistc distance -0.11 1.00
Genetic distance -0.12 0.34 1.00
Geographic distance -0.12 0.24 0.45 1.00
Summary Statistics
Mean Std dev. Min Max
Log translations 1.23 1.59 0.00 8.98
Linguistic distance 0.86 0.12 0.18 1.00
Genetic distance 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.29
Geographic distance (10,000 km) 0.38 0.37 0.01 1.96
Note: 42,817 observations for correlations and all summary statistics.
Table 2.1 provides summary statistics for these measures. As expected, all three distance mea-
sures are positively correlated with each other. Linguistic distance exhibits a positive correlation
of 0.34 with genetic distance and 0.24 with geographic distance, and genetic and geographic dis-
tance exhibit a positive correlation of 0.45. Book translations exhibit negative correlation with each
distance measure, including -0.11, -0.12 and -0.12 with linguistic, genetic and geographic distance.
No pairwise correlation between two distance measures is very large in magnitude, and yet all ex-
hibit pairwise negative correlation with book translations, suggesting that each distance measure
may have a significant and differential effect on book translations.
Table 2.2 reports the unconditional estimates of the regression analysis. Columns (1) through
(3) indicate that all measure of distance negatively correlate with book translations when sepa-
rately estimated. The systematic negative relationship between each unconditional distance and
book translations is intuitively consistent with the interpretation of Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009).
The estimate for linguistic distance is not only statistically significant but also economically mean-
ingful: a standard deviation increase in linguistic distance implies an 18.6 percent decrease in
book translations (exp(0.12 × −1.72) − 1 = 0.186). The magnitude of this effect is greater than
that of genetic distance, where the estimate in column (2) implies a standard deviation increase in
genetic distance yields a 11.9 percent decrease in book translations (exp(0.04×−3.17)−1 = 0.119).
At the bottom of the table I provide standardized “beta” coefficients to simplify relative compar-
isons. Column (1) indicates that a one standard deviation increase in linguistic distance accounts
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Table 2.2: Unconditional Benchmark Regressions
Dependent variable: Log translations
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Linguistic distance -1.72*** -1.52***
(0.26) (0.26)
Genetic distance -3.17*** 2.87***
(1.05) (0.96)
Geographic distance -0.86*** -0.85***
(0.14) (0.15)
Translating Language FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Translating Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Original Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 42,817 42,817 42,817 42,817
Adjusted R2 0.27 0.26 0.27 0.28
Country pair clusters 2112 2112 2112 2112
Standardized Coefficients (%)
Linguistic distance −12.7 - - −11.2
Genetic distance - −8.3 - 7.5
Country-pair clustered robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
for 12.7 percent of a standard deviation decrease in log book translations, whereas column (2) in-
dicates a one standard deviation increase in genetic distance accounts for 8.3 percent of a standard
deviation decrease in log book translations.
To explore the possibility of a differential effect of these two measures further I run a horse race
regression and report the estimates in column (4). The coefficient estimate for linguistic distance
is remarkably stable in magnitude and significance. This is reassuring that linguistic distance
is not a latent measure of genetic and geographic differences, but instead an accurate measure
of summary language differences. The standardized coefficient for linguistic distance falls by 1.5
percentage points from−12.7 in column (1) to−11.2 in column (4) after controlling for both genetic
and geographic distance.
Conversely, after conditioning on both linguistic and geographic distance the correlative rela-
tionship between genetic distance and book translations becomes positive. Yet despite this change
in sign the estimate remains statistically significant at the 1 percent level. The standardized beta
coefficient implies a one standard deviation increase in genetic distance accounts for 7.5 percent
of a standard deviation increase in book translations. The sensitivity of the coefficient is also
suggestive that genetic distance does in fact capture summary population differences, including
linguistic and geographic differences.
The influence of geographic distance is also of a notable magnitude: Norway is expected to
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translate over 3 percent more books originating in neighbouring Sweden than Finland based on
geographic distance alone, all else being equal. On a global scale the influence of geographic
distance can become quite large.
Taken together, the unconditional estimates of Table 2.2 nicely summarize the earlier discus-
sion of the opposing forces of relatedness on idea flows. For book translations, linguistic distance
reflects a cost that hinders interactions between linguistically distinct populations so that on av-
erage a country can be expected to translate more books from a country that speaks a similar
language. Genetic distance has the opposite effect; a country can be expected to translate more
books written by authors of distant genealogical ancestries. Hence the trade-off between a lower
probability of book translation when two countries are linguistically distant and a diversity-driven
incentive for translation when two countries share distant ancestries.
2.3.3 Conditional Benchmark Results
When interpreting the core results of the previous section, one source of concern is that book
translations are driven by time-varying country-specific factors unaccounted for by country fixed
effects. To be sure the results of the previous section are not confounded by an omitted variable
bias, I test the robustness of the distance measures to a variety of covariates.17
Column (1) of Table 2.3 reproduces column (4) of Table 2.2 using the benchmark sample.18 In
column (2) I report estimates that include measures of log real GDP per capita and log population
for both the translating and original country. Adding these time-varying measures leaves the stan-
dardized value for linguistic distance unchanged and still maintains significance at the 1 percent
level. The estimate of genetic distance also maintains statistical significance and is unchanged in
magnitude. Similarly, adding political rights has no observable effect on the magnitude and sig-
nificance of both distances, as shown in column (3). Given that these covariates tend to change
at a slow pace this result isn’t surprising because country fixed effects absorb the majority of the
observable variation.
In column (4) I report estimates that include a measure of log bilateral trade. Bilateral trade
flows not only measure the extent of an economic partnership, but they also capture latent deter-
minants of trade such as existing communication networks or the extent of bilateral trust between
countries (Guiso et al., 2009). In this sense it is intuitive that a country pair that trades more would
also be more inclined to share ideas. Indeed, the coefficient estimate for bilateral trade indicates
an influence on book translations: a 10 percent increase in bilateral trade yields a 1.2 percentage
increase in book translations. This suggests that the extent of a bilateral trade relationship has a
small positive but significant influence on the level of book translations for a given country pair.
At the same time the standardized coefficient for linguistic distance falls 2 percentage points in
magnitude when conditioning on trade, while the standardized coefficient for genetic distance
exhibits a slight increase.
17See Appendix C for data definitions and sources.
18The benchmark sample differs because some covariates are not available for every country in each year.
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Table 2.3: Conditional Benchmark Regressions
Dependent variable: Log translations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Linguistic distance -1.55*** -1.55*** -1.54*** -1.27*** -1.24*** -1.13***
(0.28) (0.28) (0.28) (0.28) (0.28) (0.28)
Genetic distance 3.21*** 3.19*** 3.19*** 3.32*** 3.28*** 2.40**
(1.04) (1.04) (1.05) (1.03) (1.02) (1.05)
Geographic distance -0.85*** -0.85*** -0.85*** -0.57*** -0.55*** -1.37***
(0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.17) (0.46)
Log real GDP per capita -0.08 -0.07 -0.17** -0.18** -0.15**
translating country (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Log real GDP per capita 0.11** 0.11** 0.03 0.02 0.04
original country (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Log population 0.12 0.24 0.38** 0.39** 0.39**
translating country (0.18) (0.17) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18)
Log population 0.09 0.12 0.26** 0.28** 0.30**
original country (0.12) (0.12) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13)
Political rights -0.21** -0.21*** -0.21*** -0.22***
translating country (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Political rights -0.07 -0.04 -0.03 -0.04
original country (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Log bilateral trade 0.12*** 0.13*** 0.10***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
= 1 if ever in a -0.13 -0.11
colonial relationship (0.14) (0.13)
= 1 for contiguity 0.14*
(0.08)
Absolute difference in latitude -0.00
(0.00)
Absolute difference in longitude 0.01**
(0.00)
Translating Language FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Translating Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Original Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 39,275 39,275 39,275 39,275 39,275 39,275
Adjusted R2 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28
Country pair clusters 1897 1897 1897 1897 1897 1897
Standardized Coefficients (%)
Linguistic distance −11.0 −11.0 −11.0 −9.0 −8.8 −8.0
Genetic distance 8.4 8.4 8.4 8.7 8.6 6.3
Country-pair clustered robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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In column (5) I report estimates that include past and present colonial relationships between
country pairs, but this doesn’t alter the influence of linguistic or genetic distance in any substantial
way.
To the contrary, when accounting for the spatial proximity of a country pair the influence of
genetic distance falls by over 2 percentage points. The drop in magnitude of genetic distance is
in consequence of adding longitudinal difference to the set of covariates, since genetically distant
populations tend to be geographically distant as well. The positive and significant coefficient on
absolute difference in longitude in column (6) is interesting because it suggests ideas tend to flow
between geographically distant countries across similar latitudes. The presence of a north-south
friction is consistent with the historical evidence that information tends to flow across east-west
axes (Diamond, 1997; Blouin, 2014). At the same time, contiguity suggests translations are more
likely between neighbouring countries. While these two results are contradictory on the surface,
they are consistent with the idea of counterbalancing forces in idea flows that is at the heart of this
paper. The cost of translation is lower between neighbouring countries where languages tend to be
similar, and yet ideas flow between distant countries because the probability of a wider spectrum
of traits and ideas provides incentive for communication.19
Hereafter I refer to the estimates in column (6) as my benchmark estimates. Using this specifi-
cation to assess the magnitude of these estimates, first note that a standard deviation in linguistic
distance reduces the dependent variable by 0.124 log units, while a standard deviation in genetic
distance increases the dependent variable by 0.096 log units.20 This says that a standard devia-
tion increase in linguistic distance reduces book translations by 11.7 percent (exp(−0.124) − 1 =
−0.117), while a standard deviation increase in genetic distance increases book translations by
10.1 percent (exp(0.096)− 1 = 0.101).
2.4 Robustness
2.4.1 Testing the Home Country Assumption of Book Translations
A concern of the benchmark result is that the home country of a book translation is not known.
This implies that genetic distance is measured with error. As an assignment rule I use the home
country of a language as indicated in the Ethnologue database. However, this rule does not allow
for the original language of a book translation to be the same in more than one source country.
Problematic Languages
As a first test of the home country assumption I identify the most problematic languages and
purge them from my benchmark dataset. Using data from the Ethnologue I generate a list of lan-
19As further evidence of these conditional benchmark estimates, I reproduce the estimates of Table 2.3 in Table C6
using a cladistic measure of linguistic distance. The opposing forces of linguistic and genetic distance hold even when
using this alternative measure of linguistic distance.
20See Appendix Table C1 for a complete list of the benchmark sample summary statistics.
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Table 2.4: Robustness Check for Problematic Original Languages of Translation
Dependent variable: Log translations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
English Arabic French Mandarin Spanish Hindi All Six
Excluding: Language Language Language Language Language Language Language
Translations Translations Translations Translations Translations Translations Translations
Linguistic distance -1.48*** -1.10*** -1.04*** -1.14*** -1.12*** -1.13*** -1.39***
(0.25) (0.28) (0.27) (0.28) (0.28) (0.28) (0.24)
Genetic distance 2.02** 2.41** 1.96* 2.28** 2.45** 2.40** 1.44*
(0.88) (1.04) (1.03) (1.05) (1.08) (1.05) (0.81)
Geographic distance -1.43*** -1.40*** -1.14** -1.35*** -1.29*** -1.37*** -1.06***
(0.38) (0.46) (0.45) (0.48) (0.47) (0.46) (0.40)
Benchmark controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Target Language FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Target Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Original Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 34,292 38,032 36,198 38,342 37,727 39,021 27,238
Adjusted R2 0.33 0.29 0.29 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.36
Country pair clusters 1840 1833 1860 1880 1871 1892 1694
Standardized Coefficients (%)
Linguistic Distance −12.0 −7.8 −7.9 −8.1 −8.0 −8.0 −13.0
Genetic Distance 5.9 6.3 5.3 5.8 6.5 6.3 4.5
This table reports estimates on various subsamples that exclude problematic languages in terms of ambiguous home country assignment. All regressions
include the benchmark set of control variables used in column (6) of Table 2.3. Country-pair clustered robust standard errors reported in parentheses. * p <
0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
guages sorted by first-language speakers. The top five languages by number of speakers include
Mandarin (1,197 million), Spanish (414 million), English (335 million), Hindi (260 million) and
Arabic (237 million). I also use the Ethnologue to generate a list of languages sorted by the number
of countries in which the language is spoken. The top five languages by this definition include
English (99 countries), Arabic (60 countries), French (51 countries), Mandarin (33 countries) and
Spanish (31 countries). Because these languages are spoken in so many countries they are prob-
lematic in terms of assigning a single country to each language. It is no surprise these lists are
almost identical. The result is a list of six potentially problematic languages: English, Arabic,
French, Mandarin, Spanish and Hindi. As a test of home country assignment I re-estimate the
benchmark model and systematically drop all books translated from a problematic language. Ta-
ble 2.4 presents these results.
All estimates are statistically significant with the expected sign, and the majority are com-
parable to the benchmark estimate in terms of magnitude. The first estimate that stands out is
reported in column (1), where the magnitude of the linguistic distance estimate is quite sensitive
to the sample restricting English translations. This result is not surprising given that English is a
lingua franca for so many speakers of different first languages around the world. The ubiquity of
English as a global language is evident in the fact that only one out of four users of the language
are native speakers (Crystal, 2003). Consider the comparable standardized beta of −8.0 percent
for linguistic distance in the full sample. The significant increase in this standardized coefficient
to −12.0 percent suggests the negative effect of linguistic distance is quite a bit stronger when
abstracting from translations originating in English. This result is reassuring because it implies
that the benchmark specification conservatively estimates the effect of linguistic distance when no
consideration is given to the importance of English as a global lingua franca.
The other estimate that differs considerably from the benchmark estimate is reported in col-
umn (7), where I drop all translations originating in any of the six problematic languages. The
standardized coefficient for linguistic distance jumps up to −13.0 percent, while the genetic dis-
tance coefficient falls to 4.5 percent. As a test of the home country assignment this result is promis-
ing because it says that, if anything, the assumption of a home country for the most problematic
languages attenuates the benchmark linguistic distance estimate. While the coefficient for genetic
distance drops below the magnitude of the benchmark estimate, it remains robust to a 45 per-
cent loss of observations relative to the benchmark sample. This provides further evidence that a
diversity-driven incentive for idea flows exists between countries.
In the appendix I extend this test by systematically dropping every original language of a
translation with at least 100 observations in the benchmark sample. Table C7 reports these results.
In every one of these 45 additional regressions, the coefficients of interest maintain the expected
sign and statistical significance at standard levels of confidence. While the cut-off of 100 observa-
tions is arbitrary, the coefficient estimates converge to that of the benchmark estimates after the
cut-off because the sample restrictions become so small.
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Table 2.5: Conditional Benchmark Regressions with Alternative Home Country Assignment
Dependent variable: Log translations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Linguistic distance -1.63*** -1.63*** -1.63*** -1.47*** -1.48*** -1.36***
(0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.26)
Genetic distance 2.56** 2.56** 2.56** 2.51** 2.47** 1.95*
(1.04) (1.04) (1.04) (1.03) (1.04) (1.08)
Geographic distance -0.64*** -0.65*** -0.64*** -0.43*** -0.43*** -0.24
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.12) (0.35)
Economic controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Political controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Trade controls No No No Yes Yes Yes
Colonial controls No No No No Yes Yes
Geography controls No No No No No Yes
Target Language FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Original Language FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Target Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 37,690 37,690 37,690 37,690 37,690 37,690
Adjusted R2 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.30
Country-language clusters 2950 2950 2950 2950 2950 2950
Standardized Coefficients (%)
Linguistic distance −11.3 −11.3 −11.3 −10.2 −10.3 −9.4
Genetic Distance 6.4 6.4 6.4 6.3 6.2 4.9
This table reproduces the benchmark estimates using a sample with synthetic home “language” country assignment.
Controls are constructed as a weighted average of all countries in which an original language is found. As weights
I use global language population shares from the Ethnologue for each country of an original language. The set of
economic controls include log real GDP per capita and log population in both countries, political controls include
political rights in both countries, trade controls include the logged value of bilateral trade flows of the country pair, the
colonial controls indicate if a country pair has every been in a colonial relationship, and the geography controls indicate
contiguity, and a country pair’s absolute difference in latitude and longitude. Robust standard errors are clustered on
translating country–original language pairs and reported in parenthesis. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Alternative Home Country Assignment
As a second test of the home country assumption I show that the benchmark estimates are ro-
bust to an alternative assignment strategy. I construct a synthetic language home “country” as a
weighted average of all countries in which an original language is found. As weights I use global
language population shares from the Ethnologue for each country of an original language. This
approach is similar in spirit to Putterman and Weil’s (2010) migration matrix. For genetic and ge-
ographic distance I measure bilateral distance between the translating country and every country
of an original language, and construct an average measure of distance weighted by the population
share of a language in each original country.21 I construct a weighted average of bilateral trade
and the absolute difference in latitude and longitude in the same way. The weighted average of a
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bilateral indicator variable becomes a percentage measure of the indicator for all possible country
pairs of the original language, and non-bilateral measures including real GDP, population and po-
litical rights are a simple weighted average. Given the alternative structure of this data I replace
original country fixed effects in equation (2.1) with original language fixed effects, and cluster
standard errors by translating country and original language pairs instead of country pairs.
The benefit of a synthetic language home “country” over the Ethnologue home country assign-
ment is that all origin countries of a language are proportionally present in covariate calculations.
By doing so I relax the assumption of a home country for each language. The drawback is that I
cannot construct a weighted average with complete coverage of all groups because I lack country-
level data for some countries of language origin. To account for languages with particularly poor
coverage I trim the bottom 5 percent of languages according to coverage.22 The average coverage
of these trimmed languages is only 56 percent and range from 0 to 90 percent. The average cov-
erage of the remaining languages is 99 percent with a median of 100 percent. This translates to a
sample of 37,960 observations out of the benchmark sample of 39,275 observation (96 percent).
I re-run the benchmark estimates of Table 2.3 using these population-weighted covariates and
report the results in Table 2.5. These home language “country” estimates are very similar to the
benchmark estimates, though the positive effect of genetic distance drops slightly in magnitude.
The stability of the coefficient estimates indicates that the benchmark result is not a consequence
of the Ethnologue home country assignment rule. The fact that the opposing forces of linguistic
and genetic distance are borne out of these alternative assignment estimates is quite reassuring
given that the set of transformed covariates all exhibit a significant difference in means relative to
the comparable measures in the benchmark sample (Table C9). The similarity of these estimates
to the benchmark estimates ensure the Ethnologue assignment rule is a good approximation of a
book translation’s country of origin.
2.4.2 Human Capital
A country’s decision to translate might also be influenced by its level of human capital, since
educated populations are more likely to have a high demand for book translations. Using data
from Barro and Lee (2013), I measure human capital in the translating country in four ways: a
country’s average years of schooling attained, the percentage of the total population who have
completed primary schooling, secondary schooling and tertiary schooling. Because these data are
only available in 5-year intervals I supplement it with data from the Penn World Tables version
8.0. I use a yearly index of human capital per person, based on years of school (Barro and Lee,
2013) and the returns to education (Psacharopoulos, 1994). Table 2.6 reports robustness checks
using these different measures of human capital.
Column (1) includes the Penn World Table human capital index, which I match to 99 percent of
21Linguistic distance is measured between the target and original language and thus measured independently of the
home country assumption.
22The results are also robust to both stricter and weaker restrictions on coverage.
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Table 2.6: Robustness Check: Human Capital and Education
Dependent variable: Log translations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Linguistic distance -1.14*** -0.95*** -0.95*** -0.96*** -0.95*** -0.96***
(0.29) (0.31) (0.31) (0.31) (0.31) (0.31)
Genetic distance 2.38** 3.13*** 3.12*** 3.12*** 3.10*** 3.12***
(1.05) (1.18) (1.18) (1.18) (1.18) (1.18)
Geographic distance -1.38*** -1.08** -1.09** -1.09** -1.08** -1.09**
(0.46) (0.46) (0.46) (0.47) (0.47) (0.47)
Human capital index 0.13
translating country (0.14)
Average years of schooling 0.06*
translating country (0.03)
% of primary schooling -0.01* 0.00
translating country (0.00) (0.00)
% of secondary schooling 0.01** 0.01*
translating country (0.00) (0.00)
% of tertiary schooling 0.01 0.02
translating country (0.01) (0.01)
Benchmark controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Translating Language FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Translating Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Original Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 38,907 8,815 8,815 8,815 8,815 8,815
Adjusted R2 0.28 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.26
Country pair clusters 1809 1342 1342 1342 1342 1342
Standardized Coefficients (%)
Linguistic Distance −8.0 −6.8 −6.8 −6.8 −6.7 −6.8
Genetic Distance 6.2 8.1 8.1 8.0 8.0 8.0
This table tests for selection on the human capital level of a translating country. All regressions include the bench-
mark set of control variables used in column (6) of Table 2.3. Country-pair clustered robust standard errors reported
in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 2.7: Robustness Check: Unobserved Country-Pair Effects
Dependent variable: Log translations
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Linguistic distance -0.86* -0.89* -0.88* -0.88*
(0.47) (0.52) (0.52) (0.52)
Economic controls No No Yes Yes
Political controls No No Yes Yes
Trade controls No No No Yes
Translating Language FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Pair FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 42,415 38,928 38,928 38,928
Adjusted R2 0.36 0.35 0.35 0.35
Country pair clusters 1711 1551 1551 1551
Standardized Coefficients (%)
Linguistic Distance −6.3 −6.3 −6.3 −6.3
This table tests for selection on time-invariant country-pair effects. Genetic and geographic distance
are time invariant across country-pair observations and therefore not estimable in this specification.
The set of economic controls include log real GDP per capita and log population in both countries,
political controls include political rights in both countries and the trade controls include the logged
value of bilateral trade flows of the country pair. Country-pair clustered robust standard errors re-
ported in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
my benchmark sample. The translating country human capital index positively correlates to book
translations as expected, but is estimated to be no different than zero. The linguistic and genetic
distance estimates are robust to the inclusion of human capital, and quantitatively equivalent to
the benchmark estimates. Columns (2) through (6) add each original Barro-Lee measure and again
the variables of interest are unaltered. In column (3) the human capital measure is estimated with
the wrong sign, but in all other cases the expected positive sign results. Overall these results
suggest human capital cannot explain away the benchmark estimates.
2.4.3 Existing Bilateral Relationships
The most effective way to capture any relevant time-invariant feature of a country pair is to include
country pair fixed effects. The major limitation of this approach is that it is no longer possible to
explicitly estimate genetic distance because country pair variation is time-invariant and adsorbed
by the fixed effects estimator.23 Nonetheless I proceed to test the robustness of the benchmark
linguistic distance estimate.
23Although language distances are assumed to be constant over the sampled time period, country-pair fixed effects
do not absorb language distance effects because each unit of observation is indexed by country-pair, year and the target
language of translation – the latter of which isn’t constant for a country pair each year.
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Table 2.7 reports the benchmark estimate with country pair fixed effects in place of individual
country effects. Column (1) reports estimates where I forego any covariates in order to maxi-
mize the sample. Linguistic distance is estimated to be significantly different from zero with the
expected sign and with a magnitude of influence similar to the benchmark estimate. I then in-
crementally add the benchmark covariates that are not absorbed by the country-pair fixed effects.
Overall the results are similar to the benchmark, albeit a little noiser and consequently less pre-
cisely estimated. However, the robustness of the linguistic distance estimate to country-pair fixed
effects confirms that time-invariant country-pair variation cannot explain away the benchmark
estimate.
2.4.4 Check for Understated Standard Errors
Because linguistic and genetic distance are assumed to be constant over the sampled time period,
standard errors may be understated due to repeated values of each distance measure for the same
language-country pair in the panel (Bertrand et al., 2004). To test for this I regress log translations
on a set of year dummies and collapse the data by averaging over time the residual translation
variation. Similarly, all other time-variant independent variables are regressed on time dummies
and the residuals are collapsed by averaging over time. The benchmark specification is then re-
estimated using this collapsed and time-averaged data. Results are reported in table 2.8.
Linguistic and genetic distance are again estimated significantly significant and have the ex-
pected signs. The only feature of these results that is different from the benchmark estimate is the
standardized coefficient for genetic distance is greater in absolute magnitude than linguistic dis-
tance. However, the main finding of the opposing forces of linguistic and genetic distance remains
unchanged.
2.4.5 Differences in Across Country Language Structure
One additional concern is that countries are structurally different in terms of language. For exam-
ple, multilingual countries may translate more books because they are more linguistically diverse.
Similarly, the colonial legacy of language is evident in the fact that many countries still use their
colonizer’s native language as a regional lingua franca. This may influence both the number of
books translated and specific languages that are commonly translated. A shared language be-
tween two countries may also influence how much those two countries translate each other’s
writings. In this section, I investigate further sample restrictions to be sure the benchmark results
are not driven by country-level differences in language structure. Results are reported in Table
2.9, where all estimates include a full set of controls.
Column (1) reports model estimates from a subsample of unilingual countries. The estimated
coefficient for linguistic and genetic distance are consistent with the previous estimates in terms
of significance and magnitude.
Next I investigate the influence of lingua francas within a translating country. Using data
57
Table 2.8: Robustness Check for Understated Standard Errors
Dependent variable: Time averaged log translations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Linguistic distance -0.63*** -0.66*** -0.66*** -0.58*** -0.59*** -0.57***
(0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16)
Genetic distance 1.73*** 1.79*** 1.78*** 1.83*** 1.83*** 1.69***
(0.47) (0.47) (0.47) (0.47) (0.47) (0.47)
Geographic distance -0.19*** -0.21*** -0.21*** -0.11 -0.12* -0.35**
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.17)
Economic controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Political controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Trade controls No No No Yes Yes Yes
Colonial controls No No No No Yes Yes
Geography controls No No No No No Yes
Target Language FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Original Language FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Target Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 7,084 7,084 7,084 7,084 7,084 7,084
Adjusted R2 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11
Country pair clusters 1891 1891 1891 1891 1891 1891
Standardized Coefficients (%)
Linguistic Distance −7.9 −8.3 −8.2 −7.3 −7.3 −7.0
Genetic Distance 9.2 9.5 9.4 9.7 9.7 8.9
The dependent variable is the residual of regressing log translations per capita on time dummies and averaged across
time. The set of economic controls include log real GDP per capita and log population in both countries, political con-
trols include political rights in both countries, trade controls include the logged value of bilateral trade flows of the
country pair, the colonial controls include a dummy variable indicating if a country pair has ever been in a colonial
relationship, and the geography controls include a set of indicators for contiguity and a country pair’s absolute differ-
ence in latitude and longitude. Country-pair clustered robust standard errors reported in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p
< 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 2.9: Robustness Check for Differences in Across-Country Language Structure
Dependent variable: Log translations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Common Common
Lingua Language Language All
Excluding: Multilingual Franca Countries Countries Excluded
Countries Translations (official) (> 9% pop.) Countries
Linguistic distance -1.18*** -1.10*** -1.43*** -1.41*** -1.37***
(0.32) (0.28) (0.30) (0.31) (0.33)
Genetic distance 2.82** 2.43** 2.91*** 2.92*** 2.63**
(1.13) (1.07) (1.07) (1.07) (1.13)
Geographic distance -1.26*** -1.27*** -1.44*** -1.23*** -1.39***
(0.49) (0.45) (0.42) (0.42) (0.46)
Benchmark controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Translating Language FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Translating Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Original Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 32,588 37,628 34,481 33,589 28,279
Adjusted R2 0.29 0.29 0.31 0.31 0.31
Country pair clusters 1636 1840 1743 1707 1440
Standardized Coefficients (%)
Linguistic Distance −8.2 −7.8 −10.0 −9.8 −9.4
Genetic Distance 7.3 6.3 7.3 7.4 6.5
This table reports estimates from various subsamples that exclude potentially problematic countries and translations.
All regressions include the benchmark set of control variables used in column (6) of Table 2.3. Country-pair clustered
robust standard errors reported in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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from Alesina et al. (2003), I identify all target languages that are considered to be a lingua franca
in the translating country and exclude those observations from the regression. The virtue of this
approach is that a language will not always be considered a lingua franca in every country, only in
cases when it is commonly used by a significant portion of the population as a bridging language.
Column (2) reports these estimates. Once again, after dropping all books translated into a lingua
franca of the translating country, model estimates are qualitatively and quantitatively consistent
with the benchmark estimate.
In column (3) I drop all observations for country pairs that share a common official language,
and in column (4) I drop all observations with at least 9 percent of the population in both countries
speaking the same language. Again the benchmark result holds.
Column (5) is the most restrictive test, where I drop all translations including multilingual
countries, lingua franca translations and shared language countries (by either definition). The
results conform with the benchmark, albeit with a slightly larger magnitude of influence in terms
of linguistic distance. Despite this difference the same qualitative result holds.
2.5 Distance Effects by Idea Types
This section extends the analysis by investigating if the two opposing forces of relatedness exist
across different idea types. I narrow the focus to two categories of idea type: economic ideas
and cultural ideas. I define a book as having economic use value when it is scientific in nature,
including translations pertaining to the applied sciences and natural sciences. Conversely I de-
fine a book to have cultural use value when a translation pertains to the field of social science,
philosophy, history, literature, religion or the arts.24
To preserve the sample size of the benchmark estimates I construct the dependent variable
for economic book translations as ln(1 + economic translations) and the dependent variable for
cultural book translations as ln(1 + cultural translations). In other words, in instances where no
book translations of an economic idea type are observed, the dependent variable for economic
ideas equals zero where it would have otherwise taken a strictly positive value in the benchmark
estimates. The opposite is true for the measure of cultural book translations.
Table 2.10 reports estimates for each idea type. Consistent with the benchmark estimates, both
linguistic and genetic distance are significantly estimated with the expected sign irrespective of
idea type. These results suggest the opposing forces of relatedness are still at play when disaggre-
gating books by their economic and cultural use value.
More interesting is the fact that economic book translations are more responsive to genetic
differences than cultural book translations, as indicated by the standardized betas. Ashraf and
Galor (2013) establish that the positive effect of population diversity on income per capita results
from a wider spectrum of traits found amongst a diverse group, which increases the likelihood
24I also separately drop observations for each subject of translation to test the sensitivity of the benchmark estimate
to different idea types. The benchmark results are unaltered (see Appendix Table C8).
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Table 2.10: Distance Effects by Cultural and Economic Idea Types
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Cultural Book Translations Economic Book Translations
Linguistic distance -1.19*** -0.86*** -1.04*** -0.77***
(0.24) (0.24) (0.22) (0.21)
Genetic distance 2.69*** 1.93** 2.22*** 1.67**
(0.88) (0.88) (0.77) (0.73)
Geographic distance -0.73*** -1.28*** -0.60*** -0.68**
(0.13) (0.38) (0.08) (0.31)
Benchmark controls No Yes No Yes
Translating Language FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Translating Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Original Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 39,275 39,275 39,275 39,275
Adjusted R2 0.26 0.27 0.25 0.26
Country pair clusters 1897 1897 1897 1897
Standardized Coefficients (%)
Linguistic Distance −10.0 −7.3 −11.8 −8.7
Genetic Distance 8.3 6.0 9.2 7.0
This table establishes that the two opposing forces of relatedness exist across different idea types. Cultural book
translations are those from the field of philosophy, social sciences, history, literature, religion and the arts. Economic
book translations are those from the fields of natural and applied sciences. All regressions include the benchmark
set of control variables used in column (6) of Table 2.3. Country-pair clustered robust standard errors reported in
parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
of complementary traits and thus aggregate productivity. In the context of this paper, genetically
distant groups likely possess a wider spectrum of traits than similar groups, which increases the
likelihood of complementary ideas and therefore an incentive for communication exists when
groups have more to learn from each other. Hence the incentive to translate economically relevant
books is greater than culturally relevant books because the diversity-driven incentive for idea
flows is linked to aggregate productivity.
2.6 Concluding Remarks
This paper is motivated by the observation that linguistic and genetic distance can account for
contemporary cross-country income differences. One interpretation of this evidence is that these
distance measures proxy as indices of population relatedness, and that cross-country communi-
cation and adoption of ideas is more likely when two countries are closely related (Spolaore and
Wacziarg, 2009, 2013a). To test this interpretation I use data on book translations as a measure
of international idea flows. I empirically establish that idea flows exhibit a trade-off between two
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opposing forces of population relatedness: linguistic differences impose a cost on idea flows while
genetic differences provide a communication incentive. This speaks to the evidence of two oppos-
ing forces of relatedness found to exist within countries (Ashraf and Galor, 2013), and contributes
to this literature with evidence that these opposing forces of relatedness also exist between coun-
tries.
To reconcile this evidence with the interpretation of Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009) I also show
that linguistic distance reflects a stronger relationship with book translations (in absolute terms)
than genetic distance. Similarly geographic distance reflects a large and robust negative rela-
tionship with book translations. This suggests that when treating genetic distance as a summary
measure of population differences, it should reflect a negative relationship with book translations
because of the latent linguistic and geographic variation captured by unconditional genetic dis-
tance. This is indeed what I find, and that only after accounting for linguistic and geographic
distance do I observe a stable positive relationship between genetic distance and book transla-
tions.
Taken together, this paper documents the importance of cross-country relatedness in the flow
of ideas. Recognizing that the empirical evidence here speaks to book translations in only the
last few decades, I believe the core result is informative of a more general relationship between
idea flows and population differences. This empirical finding is important because it suggests
one society’s exposure and interaction with new ideas is not only determined by the pool of other
countries that share similar histories, but also the type of shared history (e.g., linguistic or bio-
logical). The importance of distinguishing between the type of shared history is evident in the
opposing relationship linguistic and genetic distance exhibit with book translations. Hence, the
benefits of a more integrated global network of idea sharing may be achieved by overcoming lin-
guistic barriers with directed education policy, and by improving incentives for the translation of
ideas across borders.
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Chapter 3
Ecology, Trade and the Geographic
Origins of Ethnolinguistic Differences
3.1 Introduction
An ethnic group is a social grouping of people that is rooted in the belief of shared ancestry.
A basic feature of an ethnic group is some form of a cultural community, often manifested in a
common language, where a sense of solidarity within the community unites its members (Fearon,
2003; Ahlerup and Olsson, 2012). Yet this cultural affinity can also form a rift between dissimilar
ethnic groups.
Ashraf and Galor (2013) provide evidence of a trade-off between the beneficial and detrimental
effects of ethnic diversity at the national level, and corroborate this evidence at the subnational
level (Ashraf et al., 2015). Ethnic diversity also explains cross-country differences in public policy
and income (Easterly and Levine, 1997; Alesina et al., 2003), institutions (La Porta et al., 1999), the
prevalence of conflict (Esteban et al., 2012) and more (see Alesina and La Ferrara (2005)). Related
to this is the effect of ethnic or genetic distance between groups on cross-country income (Spolaore
and Wacziarg, 2009), conflict (Spolaore and Wacziarg, 2016), in addition to within-country patterns
of ethnic favoritism (Dickens, 2016a), inequalities in child mortality rates (Gomes, 2014) and more
(see Spolaore and Wacziarg (2013a)). If the historical determinants of ethnic group differences are
not well understood, then their lingering effects in the present may go unnoticed or be incorrectly
attributed to other channels of influence.
In this paper, I empirically examine the geographic origins of ethnic differences, and offer
an economic interpretation as to why we observe these differences in similarity. This research is
motivated by a growing literature that aims to correctly identify the historical determinants of
group differences, and to understand the specific transmission mechanisms that account for this
historical persistence (Nunn, 2013; Spolaore and Wacziarg, 2013a). It has been shown that cultural
values and human capital skills are transmitted through migration (Putterman and Weil, 2010;
Easterly and Levine, 2012), colonialism (Nunn, 2008; Nunn and Wantchekon, 2011), institutions
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(Alesina and Giuliano, 2013) and more, but there is a scarcity of evidence that explains why ethnic
diversity and ethnic differences exist in the first place.
Michalopoulos (2012) shows that regions characterized by homogeneous land endowments
tend to be more homogeneous in ethnicity, and consequently less diverse today. The underly-
ing mechanism is that homogeneous land endowments historically gave rise to the same set of
location-specific skills among inhabitants of that region, resulting in the emergence of localized
ethnicities. Ahlerup and Olsson (2012) also study the origins of ethnic diversity, and similarly find
that isolating geographic features tend to increase ethnic diversity, but they also show that ethnic
diversity is particularly pronounced in countries where humans settled relatively early.1
Yet this scarce but growing body of evidence on the origins of ethnic diversity only speaks
to the why some regions are more diverse than others, and cannot speak to why some ethnic
groups are relatively more different than others. Hence, a subtle yet important question remains
unanswered: why are some ethnic groups more dissimilar from each other than others? This
research constitutes the first attempt to fill this gap by shedding light on the geographic origins of
ethnolinguistic distance.
I propose that trade is one factor driving this variation in ethnic distance between neighbour-
ing groups. The incentive for farmers to specialize in crop production is larger in agriculturally
diverse regions, where trade results as a necessary outcome of specialization. This proposition
speaks to the work of Bates (1983), who posits a theory of state formation in agriculturally diverse
regions. The crux of his argument is that trade was more profitable – and thus more frequent
– across ecological boundaries because of the diversity of tradable agricultural goods.2 Because
groups would historically trade by interacting and communicating with each other, the extent of
drift is mitigated by frequent interaction. Hence, the resulting inter-group trade is the channel
through which agricultural diversity mitigates cultural drift.
Implicit in Bates’ theory, is this idea that the agricultural diversity of a particular region is a
proxy for the historical gains from trade in that region. In a related paper, Fenske (2014) uses
agricultural diversity to approximate the historical gains from trade. Indeed, Bates (2010, p.21) re-
iterates this point when discussing the historical development of agrarian societies: “The diversity
of the ecosystem thus promotes diversity in production and, with it, exchange over space.”
To examine this empirically I study the geo-climatic conditions that separate neighbouring
ethnolinguistic groups. To do this I use GIS software to identify all neighbouring ethnolinguistic
groups around the world, and create a 100 km buffer zone around the border segment connecting
a neighbouring ethnolinguistic pair (i.e., a 50 km zone that follows the border in each group). I
measure the agricultural diversity of a buffer zone as the variation in potential agricultural output.
Because these border zones delineate ethnolinguistic pairs that vary in their linguistic distance, I
can empirically test the effect of agricultural diversity on cultural drift as reflected by the similarity
1In a recent manuscript, Galor et al. (2016) find that regional variations in geographic characteristics explain cross-
language variation in linguistic structures, in particular the presence of the future tense.
2In particular, Bates (1983) argues that state formation was a natural response to the uncertainty of trade in a world
without protected property rights. Fenske (2014) provides empirical evidence of this theory.
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of language between neighbouring groups.
The second part of my empirical strategy accounts for the fact that neighbouring ethnolinguis-
tic groups do not always descend from the same language family. In such instances the distance
between two languages might simply reflect a different ancestry. As a solution to this problem I
use the structure of language trees and narrow my focus to “sibling” ethnolinguistic pairs – those
that descend from the same parent language. I define these pairs to be siblings because they share
an identical ancestral history, separated only at the most recent cleavage on the Ethnologue lan-
guage tree. Narrowing the focus to sibling pairs implicitly accounts for all unobserved historical
characteristics of a language family that might plausibly affect the drift between two groups. Do-
ing so thus disentangles the effects of shared ancestry from the effect of geo-climatic characteristics
that I’m interested in.
The third part of my empirical strategy exploits the exogenous change in potential agricultural
diversity that was the result of the Columbian Exchange – the widespread exchange of crops
between the Old and New World following Columbus’ encounter of the Americas in 1492 (Nunn
and Qian, 2010). This unexpected change in the availability of agricultural goods provides a source
of historical variation in a region’s potential output and thus agricultural diversity (Galor and
O¨zak, 2016).
Consistent with my hypothesis, results indicate that greater agricultural diversity reduces the
linguistic distance between neighbouring groups. This evidence is consistent across the full sam-
ple and the sibling sample. These results are robust to the inclusion of numerous geographic,
climatic and disease environment control variables.
In addition to my main finding, I show that ruggedness and the prevalence of malaria in bor-
der regions amplify the distance between groups, whereas a lake or river within the border region
brings groups closer together. I also find that groups neighbouring across a north-south axis orien-
tation tend to be more ethnically distant, which is consistent with Blouin (2014), who empirically
verifies Diamond’s (1997) hypothesis that latitudinal differences reduced the historical flow of
information and thus communication between groups.
This research provides the first attempt to document the geographic origins of ethnolinguis-
tic distance. My main finding and contribution is the empirical evidence that variations in pre-
industrial agricultural diversity are at the root of existing cross-group variations in linguistic dif-
ferences. Although I do not have georeferenced data on the historical gains from train, the pro-
posed trade mechanism is consistent with the historical and anthropological evidence from Bates
(1983). The corollary contribution is thus an empirical verification of Bates’s (1983) theory.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 summarizes the Columbian Exchange
and the expansion of available agricultural goods. Section 3.3 presents the data and how the buffer
zones are constructed. Section 3.4 outlines the empirical model and identification strategy, and
presents the empirical results. Section 3.5 concludes.
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3.2 The Columbian Exchange
The Columbian Exchange refers to the time period following the encounter of the Americas in
1492 by Christopher Columbus. In particular the widespread exchange of crops, disease, ideas,
populations and more between the Old and New World. Nunn and Qian (2010) summarize the
existing literature on the Columbian Exchange and provide insight into less-studied areas of the
exchange.
This coming together of the continents introduced a new set of available crops for cultivation
that, in the context of this paper, provide an exogenous source of variation in potential agricultural
diversity. Both the availability of new crops and the availability of unpopulated land suitable for
agriculture in the New World had a substantial impact on the global supply of agricultural goods
(Nunn and Qian, 2010).
The natural experiment associated with the Columbian Exchange is the unexpected change in a
tract of land’s potential output following the expansion of available agricultural goods. Galor and
O¨zak (2016) use this source of variation to study the effect of agricultural returns on contemporary
time preference at the individual, regional and national level. Nunn and Qian (2011) also use time
variation coming from the Columbian Exchange with regional variation in suitability for potato
cultivation to estimate the effect of the potatoes introduction to the Old World on population and
urbanization rates.
3.3 Data
3.3.1 Linguistic Distance
As my outcome variable I use a computerized lexicostatistical measure of linguistic distance de-
veloped by the Automatic Similarity Judgement Program. This lexicostatistical measure captures
the phonological dissimilarity between two languages as an approximation of ethnic distance. See
Dickens (2016a) for a discussion of this measure and Appendix A for a formal discussion of the
estimation procedure.
Lexicostatistical distance is indispensable to this paper. Economists often use the ratio of
shared branches on a language tree as a measure of proximity between languages – known as
a cladistic distance.3 However, when analysing sibling pairs there is no variation in cladistic dis-
tance because the two languages separated at the most recent cleavage on the Ethnologue language
tree. In other words, each sibling pair share an identical number of branches on a language tree.
To the contrary, lexicostatistical distance explicitly measures dissimilarity between two languages
so there is no reason two separate sibling pairs should be identical in their distance.
Figure 3.1 makes this point clear. I’ve drawn the Ethnologue language tree for the 8 major
Eritrea languages, and coloured coded sibling ethnolinguistic pairs. Each sibling pair share 5
3See Ginsburgh and Weber (2016) for a review of this literature.
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Figure 3.1: Phylogenetic Tree of Eritrean Languages
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This figure depicts the language tree for the 8 major languages of Eritrea. Among these 8 languages there are 2 language
pairs that share a parent language on the language tree. I’ve colour coded these sibling ethnolinguistic pairs: Tigre-
Tigringa in green and Saho-Afar in blue.
out of the 6 branches – the maximum number of shared branches for two distinct languages.4
Because the ratio is always identical across sibling pairs, there is no observable variation among
these pairs. To the contrary, the lexicostatistical estimate for the Tigre-Tigringa sibling pair is
63.2 percent dissimilarity whereas the estimate for the Saho-Afar sibling pair is only 50.9 percent
dissimilarity.
3.3.2 Independent Variables
Unit of Observation: Buffer Zones
I use the Ethnologue’s (16th edition) mapping of ethnolinguistic groups to construct 100 kilometre
buffer zones that follow the length of a border segment delineating each neighbouring ethno-
linguistic pair.5 By construction these buffer zones provide a lens to examine the geography of
border regions, extending 50 kilometres in every direction from each point on the border segment
delineating a neighbouring pair. Throughout the empirical analysis, these buffer zones serve as
my unit of observation.6
Consider, as an example, the neighbouring Shona and Manyika groups in Zimbabwe. Panel
(a) of Figure 3.2 depicts the spatial distribution of these ethnolinguistic groups, and the red line
4The Ethnologue world language tree contains 15 levels, which I abstract from here for simplicity.
5I use the World Goode Homolosine projection because it is an equal-area projection that minimizes area distortion
in measurement.
6I impose two size restrictions on a valid sample observation: each ethnolinguistic group’s total area must be at
least 100 square kilometres in size and must have a population of speakers greater than 100 people. However, both
restrictions are innocuous and do not change the interpretation of the estimates in any way.
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Figure 3.2: Example: Buffer Zone Unit of Observation
represents the segment of border delineating the Shone and Manyika. I then construct a Euclidean
buffer zone that extends 50 kilometres from every point on the border, resulting in a total buffer
zone width of 100 kilometres. In effect, the buffer zone is a perimeter around the delineating
segment of border that I use to measure different geographic characteristics contained within the
enclosed region. Panel (b) exemplifies how I overlay the Shona-Manyika buffer zone onto raster
data and measure different geographic characteristics within the buffer region.
Caloric Suitability Index and Agricultural Diversity
As a measure of agricultural diversity I use variation in the Caloric Suitability Index (CSI) of each
buffer zone. Galor and O¨zak (2016) introduce this novel measure of agricultural productivity –
a standardized measure of productivity based on the agro-climatic determinants of the potential
caloric output of each 5′ × 5′ grid cell on earth.7 Data for this measure comes from the Global
Agro-Ecological Zones (GAEZ) project of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO).
Galor and O¨zak (2016) use the FAO’s estimate of potential crop yield for the 48 available crops
under low-level inputs and rain-fed agriculture to construct a composite measure of potential
output in each grid cell. To account for differences in the nutritional value of different crops, they
convert the estimated potential output for each crop to reflect its potential caloric return. They
then average across crops within each 5′ × 5′ grid cell to construct an average measure of caloric
suitability.
7http://ozak.github.io/Caloric-Suitability-Index/
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When constructing this average measure, Galor and O¨zak (2016) make an important distinc-
tion between the caloric potential of a grid cell in the pre-1500 and post-1500 period. The difference
between these two different measures reflects the change in potential caloric output that resulted
from the expansion of agricultural goods during the Columbian Exchange.
To measure agricultural diversity, I overlay a map of the constructed buffer zones onto the CSI
raster data, and calculate the standard deviation of both the pre-1500 and post-1500 CSI within
each buffer zone. I also calculate the average of the CSI within each buffer zone.
As an alternative measure of agricultural diversity, I use Ramankutty et al.’s (2002) Agricul-
tural Suitability Index (ASI) data. Similar to my calculations with the CSI data, I use the standard
deviation of the ASI within a border region as a measure of agricultural diversity. However, the
ASI is not available for the pre-1500 period, so it is not possible to exploit the expansion of agri-
cultural goods during the Columbian Exchange. See Galor and O¨zak (2015) for a more detailed
discussion of the additional advantages of the Caloric Suitability Index over Ramankutty et al.’s
(2002) Agricultural Suitability Index.
Additional Geo-Climatic and Disease Environment Data
In addition to the data on agricultural productivity, I collect a variety of other geographic and
climatic data. Data on average temperature and precipitation come from the WorldClim – Global
Climate Database. These datasets provide information on temperature and precipitation at a spa-
tial resolution of 5′ × 5′. I use these raster data in an identical way to the CSI data; I calculate both
the mean and standard deviation of the data within each buffer zone.
I use elevation data from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Adminstration (NOAA).
These data are available at a 30-arc-second resolution. In addition to measuring the level of el-
evation within each buffer zone, I calculate the standard deviation of elevation as a measure of
ruggedness (Michalopoulos, 2012; Kitamura and Lagerlof, 2016).
I also construct dummy variables for the presence of a lake and river in the buffer zone. These
data come from georeferenced maps from Natural Earth, which I intersect with my map of buffer
zones to indicate border regions with either a lake or river.
As a measure of the disease environment, I use the Malaria Ecology Index to construct a mea-
sure of the average prevalence of malaria in a buffer zone. These data come from Kiszewski et al.
(2004) and are available at a spatial resolution of 0.5◦ × 0.5◦.8
3.3.3 Does Geography Delineate Ethnolinguistic Groups?
Before proceeding to the empirical analysis, I check if there is something unique about the ge-
ography of ethnolinguistic group border regions. Michalopoulos’ (2012) principal finding is that
ethnolinguistic groups form across homogeneous geographic terrain. By extension this finding
8See Table D1 and Table D2 in the appendix for the full sample and sibling sample summary statistics.
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suggestions that group boundaries should exhibit terrain distinct from the interior of the associ-
ated group. To test for this possibility I look at differences in means for a number of geographic,
climatic and disease environment variables. Table 3.1 reports these mean differences. I find that
for in all but 2 instances there is a statistically significant difference between the interior and the
border region of each group. This suggests there is something unique about the geography of the
border regions that separate groups, an observation consistent with Michalopoulos (2012).
3.4 Empirical Strategy and Estimates
3.4.1 Identification Strategy
To overcome possible threats to identification I take a number of steps. First, in all regressions I
include continental and language family fixed effects. Doing so not only accounts for unobserved
confounding factors at the continental level, but also time-invariant family-specific unobservables
that may have influenced the historical sorting and interaction of ethnolinguistic groups.
Second, I take into account the fact that neighbouring ethnolinguistic groups do not always
descend from the same language family by narrowing my focus to sibling pairs. By construction
the sibling analysis imposes the restriction that a neighbouring pair must descend from the same
parent language and thus implicitly accounts for the entire ancestral history of a sibling pair. By
doing so I disentangle the effect of shared ancestry from the effect of agricultural diversity on the
linguistic distance between neighbouring groups.
Third, I exploit variation in potential agricultural diversity using changes in the available set
of crops for cultivation resulting from the onset of the Columbian Exchange. A threat to identi-
fication is the possibility that ethnolinguistic groups defined group borders along agriculturally
diverse regions in the pre-1500 period because of the capacity of these regions to sustain large
populations. Should this be the case then the location of group borders would be the result of
endogenous sorting of groups. Identification of agricultural diversity then rests on the assump-
tion that the change in the set of available crops resulting from the Columbian Exchange is random
and independent of all other factors in a buffer zone, conditional on the set of pre-1500 cultivatable
crops.
3.4.2 Empirical Model and Results
Define buffer zone k as the region surrounding the segment of border that separates groups i and
j. I estimate the effect of agricultural diversity in buffer zone k on the ethnolinguistic distance
between groups i and j in the following way:
LDk = β0 + β
1500
1 ADk + β
ch
1 ∆ADk + x
′
k Φ + γl + δc + k. (3.1)
The dependent variable LDk measures the linguistic distance between neighbouring ethnolin-
guistic groups i and j in buffer zone k. ADk denotes pre-1500 CSI variation (agricultural diversity)
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Table 3.1: Difference in Means: Language Pair Zone vs. Language Pair Buffer Zone
Full Sample Sibling Sample
Border Lang. Border Lang.
Buffer Pair Standard Buffer Pair Standard
Zone Zone Error Zone Zone Error
CSI (pre-1500, Avg.) 1.346 1.360 (0.004)*** 1.383 1.381 (0.007)
Change in CSI (post-1500, Avg.) -0.061 -0.063 (0.002) -0.119 -0.106 (0.004)***
CSI Variation (pre-1500, Avg.) 0.222 0.217 (0.002)** 0.266 0.185 (0.006)***
Change in CSI Variation (post-1500, Avg.) -0.063 -0.045 (0.002)*** -0.110 -0.057 (0.004)***
Elevation 0.696 0.712 (0.003)*** 0.716 0.744 (0.006)***
Ruggedness 0.299 0.263 (0.002)*** 0.337 0.249 (0.005)***
Malaria 8.038 8.156 (0.039)*** 8.800 9.034 (0.108)**
Precipitation 13.65 13.52 (0.021)*** 15.24 15.32 (0.041)*
Precipitation Variation 1.683 1.490 (0.015)*** 1.879 1.225 (0.033)***
Temperature 21.54 21.73 (0.031)*** 22.17 22.29 (0.066)*
Temperature Variation 1.552 1.414 (0.012)*** 1.734 1.272 (0.026)***
This table establishes that the mean value of these geo-climatic factors measured along the border regions delineating contiguous language pairs are
statistically distinct from the mean value of these factors throughout the total language pair area. In other words, the statistically significant difference
in means suggests there is something unique of about geo-climatic features of border regions delineating contiguous language pairs. The full sample
difference in means have a sample size of n = 6, 990 while the sibling sample refers to a sample size of n = 1, 277. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
in buffer zone k, and ∆ADk denotes the change in CSI variation (change in agricultural diversity)
following the onset of the Columbian Exchange. xk represents a vector of buffer zone geo-climatic
characteristics,9 γl is a complete set of language family fixed effects for groups i and j, and γc is a
complete set of continental fixed effects associated with the buffer zone region k.
Unconditional Estimates
Table 3.2 presents the unconditional estimates of equation (3.1). Column 1 reports estimates for
the average value of pre-1500 CSI and the change in average CSI. Neither estimate is statistically
significant. However these measures reflect the average potential productivity on a region and
not the diversity.
Column 2 reports estimates for the pre-1500 variation in CSI and the change in that variation
at the onset of the Columbian Exchange. These measures capture the agricultural diversity of a
buffer zone. Both estimates enter with the expected negative sign and are statistically significant
at the 1 percent level. This says that neighbouring groups are more similar in their language when
the region delineating those groups exhibits greater diversity in potential agricultural output.
Column 3 includes both the potential productivity measures of column 1 and the potential
diversity measures of column 2. Reassuringly, the estimates for pre-1500 CSI variation and the
change in CSI variation remain remarkably stable in magnitude and significance even when ac-
counting for the average potential productivity of a buffer zone. The estimates in column 4 include
continent fixed effects, and although the magnitude of the estimates drop, the effect remains sta-
tistically significant at the 10 percent level.
Columns 5-8 report the analogue estimates of column 1-4 using a sample of sibling pairs. The
estimates in column 5 are almost twice that of the full sample estimates in column 1. For the
change the CSI the effect is now estimated to be significant at the 5 percent level. The estimates
in column 6 are similarly much larger in magnitude with little change in the estimated standard
error. However, as column 7 makes clear, the significant effect of the change in CSI goes away
once CSI variation and the change in CSI variation are included the estimating equation.
All together the estimates of Table 3.2 suggestion two things: that ethnic groups separated
across agriculturally diverse regions are more similar in language than groups separated across
homogeneous regions, and the precision of the estimates greatly improve after accounting for the
ancestral history of an ethnolinguistic pair with the sibling-level analysis.
Conditional Estimates
Table 3.3 reports the conditional estimates of equation (3.1) on the sibling-level sample. The es-
timates are sorted in pairs, where an even-numbered column is identical to the previous odd-
9Including the pre-1500 potential crop yield and the change in that yield following the Columbian Exchange, the
malaria suitability index, elevation, ruggedness, precipitation and precipitation variation, temperature and temperature
variation, a dummy variable for the presence of a lake, a dummy variable for the presence of a river, the total area of
an ethnolinguistic pair, the latitudinal difference between group centroids, the longitudinal difference between group
centroids, the interaction of the latitude and longitudinal differences, and variation in land suitability for agriculture.
72
73
Table 3.2: Border-Level Regressions: Unconditional Caloric Suitability Index Benchmark Results
Dependent Variable: Lexicostatistical Linguistic Distance ∈ (0, 1)
Full Sample Sibling Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
CSI (pre-1500) -0.007 -0.005 -0.007 -0.017 -0.017 -0.026*
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Change in CSI (post-1500) -0.019 -0.010 0.009 -0.039** -0.007 0.004
(0.013) (0.014) (0.016) (0.017) (0.018) (0.022)
CSI Variation (pre-1500) -0.067*** -0.065*** -0.059** -0.105*** -0.103*** -0.117***
(0.023) (0.023) (0.024) (0.036) (0.036) (0.037)
Change in CSI Variation (post-1500) -0.113*** -0.105*** -0.076* -0.218*** -0.223*** -0.197***
(0.036) (0.039) (0.041) (0.049) (0.052) (0.055)
Language Family FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Continental FE No No No Yes No No No Yes
Language Cluster 1 2,713 2,713 2,713 2,713 942 942 942 942
Language Cluster 2 1,769 1,769 1,769 1,769 851 851 851 851
Observations 6,990 6,990 6,990 6,990 1,277 1,277 1,277 1,277
Adjusted R2 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.32 0.34 0.34 0.35
This table establishes the negative and statistically significant effect of the variation in caloric suitability on a language pair’s lexicostatistical linguistic distance. The
unit of observation is a 100 km buffer zone along the contiguous border segment of each language pair. Standard errors are double-clustered at the level of each
language group and are reported in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
74
Table 3.3: Border-Level Regressions: Conditional Caloric Suitability Index Benchmark Results
Dependent Variable: Lexicostatistical Linguistic Distance ∈ (0, 1)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
CSI Variation (pre-1500) -0.103*** -0.117*** -0.167*** -0.185*** -0.169*** -0.195*** -0.173*** -0.199***
(0.036) (0.037) (0.064) (0.063) (0.065) (0.064) (0.064) (0.063)
Change in CSI Variation (post-1500) -0.223*** -0.197*** -0.254*** -0.238*** -0.237*** -0.233*** -0.255*** -0.257***
(0.052) (0.055) (0.066) (0.068) (0.066) (0.069) (0.065) (0.068)
CSI (pre-1500) -0.017 -0.026* -0.016 -0.029* -0.012 -0.026* -0.017 -0.029*
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016)
Change in CSI (post-1500) -0.007 0.004 -0.011 -0.006 -0.006 -0.007 -0.005 -0.008
(0.018) (0.022) (0.019) (0.024) (0.019) (0.025) (0.019) (0.025)
Elevation 0.021 0.022 0.023 0.021 0.021 0.020
(0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
Ruggedness 0.198** 0.190** 0.193** 0.190** 0.175* 0.173*
(0.096) (0.094) (0.096) (0.095) (0.096) (0.096)
Precipitation -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Precipitation Variation 0.002 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Temperature 0.002 0.003* 0.002* 0.003** 0.003* 0.003**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Temperature Variation -0.029 -0.026 -0.029 -0.026 -0.026 -0.024
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
River -0.037*** -0.040*** -0.031*** -0.034*** -0.032*** -0.035***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Lake -0.051** -0.051** -0.051** -0.049** -0.050** -0.048**
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
Malaria 0.003*** 0.002* 0.002** 0.001 0.002* 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Area of Language Pair (km2) -0.009 -0.008 -0.010 -0.008
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Population of Language Pair -0.004 -0.005 -0.004 -0.005
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Latitude Difference 0.011** 0.007 0.011** 0.007
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006)
Longitude Difference 0.006 0.005 0.006 0.005
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Latitude × Longitude -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Land Suitability Variation 0.157** 0.138*
(0.074) (0.074)
Language Family FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Continental FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Language Cluster 1 942 942 942 942 942 942 933 933
Language Cluster 2 851 851 851 851 851 851 841 841
Observations 1,277 1,277 1,277 1,277 1,277 1,277 1,267 1,267
Adjusted R2 0.34 0.35 0.37 0.38 0.38 0.39 0.39 0.39
This table establishes the negative and statistically significant effect of the variation in caloric suitability on a language pair’s lexicostatistical linguistic distance. The
unit of observation is a 100 km buffer zone along the contiguous border segment of each language pair. Standard errors are double-clustered at the level of each
language group and are reported in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
numbered column but includes continental fixed effects. Overall it is clear that the estimates for
CSI variation and change in CSI variation are quite robust to the inclusion of additional geo-
climatic covariates, with or without continental fixed effects. In fact, adding these covariates in-
creases the magnitude of the estimates. The estimates in column 8 imply that a one standard devi-
ation increase in pre-1500 CSI variation reduced linguistic dissimilarity by 5.9 percentage points,
while a one standard deviation increase in CSI variation in the post-1500 period reduced dissimi-
larity by an additional 6.1 percentage points.
A number of other covariates yield interesting results. I find that rugged border regions tend to
amplify linguistic differences between sibling pairs. When a region possess substantial variation
in elevation, communication is more costly and contact between neighbouring groups is limited.
Thus, groups separated across rugged terrain tend to be more dissimilar in language than groups
separated across homogeneous terrain. This intensive margin result is complimentary to the ex-
tensive margin evidence of Michalopoulos (2012), who finds that the number of ethnolinguistic
groups is decreasing in a region’s terrain ruggedness.
Another interesting result is the finding that the presence of a lake or river in a border region
systematically limits the divergence of language between neighbouring groups. Lakes and rivers
were historically focal points of commercial activity, and the resulting trade in these regions is a
possible mechanism through which linguistic similarity is preserved.
To the contrary, I find greater dissimilarities between groups neighbouring across a north-
south axis orientation. This is consistent with the evidence that latitudinal differences between
groups reduced the historical flow of information and thus communication between groups (Di-
amond, 1997; Blouin, 2014). I also find that the high prevalence of malaria in a border region
increases the linguistic distance between neighbouring groups. However, both these results are
somewhat sensitive to the empirical specification, tending to fall short of statistical significant at
conventional levels when including continental fixed effects.
Recent Migrations
In this paper, I propose a hypothesis that similar groups border agriculturally diverse areas be-
cause they have always lived there and their similarity is the result of inter-group trade. However,
since the onset of the Columbian Exchange there has been considerable migration of populations
across the world that might have led to the arrival of these groups in their current location because
of a region’s agricultural diversity. It’s feasible that interconnected groups migrate to neighbour-
ing regions, in particular agriculturally diverse regions that have the capacity to support a large
number of people. Should this be true then it’s not the case that agricultural diversity has any
effect on the cultural similarity of the neighbouring groups.
To check for this I limit my sibling sample to pairs that reside in a country where a significant
proportion of its population is native to that country. Data on the ancestral composition of a
country’s contemporary population comes from Putterman and Weil (2010). Table 3.4 reports
estimates for a variety of specifications, where at least 25, 50 or 75 of the population is native to the
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Table 3.4: Border-Level Regressions: Native Population Sensitivity Analysis
Dependent Variable: Lexicostatistical Linguistic Distance ∈ (0, 1)
Sibling Sample Sibling Sample Sibling Sample
& >25% Native Pop. & >50% Native Pop. & >75% Native Pop.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CSI Variation (pre-1500) -0.121*** -0.200*** -0.121*** -0.212*** -0.132*** -0.252***
(0.037) (0.065) (0.037) (0.065) (0.039) (0.070)
Change in CSI Variation (post-1500) -0.209*** -0.248*** -0.218*** -0.269*** -0.202*** -0.281***
(0.055) (0.070) (0.055) (0.070) (0.057) (0.074)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Language Family FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Continental FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Language Cluster 1 915 915 886 886 767 767
Language Cluster 2 826 826 795 795 693 693
Observations 1,241 1,241 1,202 1,202 1,036 1,036
Adjusted R2 0.34 0.39 0.34 0.39 0.33 0.37
This table tests the sensitivity of the benchmark estimates by limiting the sibling sample to pairs that reside in a country where a significant portion of their population
is native to that country. Columns (1)-(2), (3)-(4) and (5)-(6) report estimates where at least 25, 50 and 75 percent of the population is native to the country of residence,
respectively. Control variables are identical to those in columns (5) and (6) in Table 3.3. The unit of observation is a 100 km buffer zone along the contiguous border
segment of each language pair. Standard errors are double-clustered at the level of each language group and are reported in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, ***
p < 0.01.
country of residence. In all cases the variables of interest are remarkably consistent in magnitude
and significance. These estimates relieve any concern that the estimates are a spurious outcome of
group migration.10
Overlapping and Disjoint Ethnolinguistic Groups
The Ethnologue mapping of ethnolinguistic groups poses two problems for this empirical exercise:
group territories sometimes overlap and group territories are sometimes spatially disjoint. In the
case of overlapping groups, this is problematic because a buffer zone will not be uniquely repre-
sentative of the neighbouring pair. When a group is spatially disjoint (e.g., a single ethnolinguistic
group occupies two non-adjacent regions within a country), each portion of the disjoint group will
not necessarily be adjacent to the same set of neighbouring groups.
To address these concerns, I drop overlapping groups and groups composed of (disjoint) multi-
parts from the sibling sample and re-estimate equation (3.1). Table 3.5 reports these estimates.
Whether I drop overlapping groups (columns 1 and 2), multi-part groups (columns 3 and 4) or
both (columns 5 and 6), the coefficients of interest remain statistically significant. Overall, the
estimates in Table 3.5 imply that the main result of this paper is unaffected by the Ethnologue’s
mapping of groups.11
3.5 Concluding Remarks
This study takes the economic importance of ethnolinguistic distance as given, and goes a step
deeper to explore the geographic foundation of these differences. I construct a novel georeferenced
dataset to examine the border regions of neighbouring ethnolinguistic groups, together with varia-
tion in the set of potentially cultivatable crops at the onset of the Columbian Exchange, to estimate
how agricultural diversity impacts linguistic differences between neighbouring groups. I find that
ethnic groups separated across agriculturally diverse regions are more similar in language than
groups separated across homogeneous agricultural regions.
I offer an explanation that speaks to the work of Bates (1983, 2010), who argues that trade
was historically more profitable and thus more frequent in agriculturally diverse regions. Because
groups would trade by interacting and communicating with each other, the extent to which their
two languages drift apart is mitigated by frequent interaction. Hence, the resulting inter-group
trade is the channel through which agricultural diversity mitigates ethnolinguistic differences.
What does this result add to our understanding of the link between ethnolinguistic differences
and contemporary patterns of development? It implies that other findings that have been inter-
preted as effects of ethnolinguistic distance might be rooted in geography. It also suggests that the
exogeneity of ethnolinguistic distance in regression analysis should be questioned in the absence
of the appropriate geographic control variables.
10See Table D3 in the appendix for control variable coefficient estimates.
11See Table D4 in the appendix for control variable coefficient estimates.
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Table 3.5: Border-Level Regressions: Overlapping and Multipart Polygon Sensitivity Analysis
Dependent Variable: Lexicostatistical Linguistic Distance ∈ (0, 1)
Sibling Sample Sibling Sample Sibling Sample
Excluding Excluding Excluding Overlapping
Overlapping Groups Multi-Part Groups & Multi-Part Groups
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CSI Variation (pre-1500) -0.100** -0.197*** -0.117*** -0.215** -0.136*** -0.205*
(0.041) (0.073) (0.045) (0.086) (0.050) (0.106)
Change in CSI Variation (post-1500) -0.175*** -0.221*** -0.218*** -0.262*** -0.213*** -0.244**
(0.061) (0.080) (0.071) (0.099) (0.076) (0.118)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Language Family FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Continental FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Language Cluster 1 744 744 587 587 492 492
Language Cluster 2 666 666 539 539 453 453
Observations 988 988 763 763 632 632
Adjusted R2 0.36 0.40 0.36 0.40 0.37 0.39
This table tests the sensitivity of the benchmark estimates by limiting the sibling sample to ethnolinguistic pairs that do not overlap with any other groups and
are not composed of multi-part group polygons. Control variables are identical to those in columns (5) and (6) in Table 3.3. The unit of observation is a 100 km
buffer zone along the contiguous border segment of each language pair. Standard errors are double-clustered at the level of each language group and are reported in
parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
On a more general level, these findings suggest that ethnolinguistic differences are potentially
linked to a group’s level of state centralization in history. Fenske (2014) shows that the gains
from trade resulting from agricultural diversity predicts pre-colonial state centralization, a finding
that corroborates the theory of Bates (1983). Because of the long-run persistent effects of pre-
colonial state centralization (Gennaioli and Rainer, 2007; Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2013),
an interesting area of future research would be to document the possible role of the state in the
diffusion of culture and language, and how this role interacts with the persistent effect of pre-
colonial states on comparative economic development today.
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Appendix A
Language Appendix
A.1 Computerized Lexicostatistical Linguistic Distance
The computerized approach to estimating lexicostatistical distances was developed as part of the
Automatic Similarity Judgement Program (ASJP), a project run by linguists at the Max Planck Insti-
tute for Evolutionary Anthropology. To begin a list of 40 implied meanings (i.e., words) are com-
piled for each language to compare the lexical similarity of any language pair. Swadesh (1952)
first introduced the notion of a basic list of words believed to be universal across nearly all world
languages. When a word is universal across world languages, its implied meaning, and therefore
any estimate of linguistic distance, is independent of culture and geography. From here on I refer
to this 40-word list as a Swadesh list, as it is commonly called.1
For each language the 40 words are transcribed into a standardized orthography called ASJP-
code, a phonetic ASCII alphabet consisting of 34 consonants and 7 vowels. A standardized al-
phabet restricts variation across languages to phonological differences only. Meanings are then
transcribed according to pronunciation before language distances are estimated.
I use a variant of the Levenshtein distance algorithm, which in its simplest form calculates
the minimum number of edits necessary to translate the spelling of a word from one language to
another. In particular, I use the normalized and divided Levenshtein distance estimator proposed
by Bakker et al. (2009).2 DenoteLD(αi, βi) as the raw Levenshtein distance for word i of languages
α and β. Each word i comes from the aforementioned Swadesh list. Define the length of this list
be M , so 1 ≤ i ≤ M .3 The algorithm is run to calculate LD(αi, βi) for each word in the M -word
Swadesh list across each language pair. To correct for the fact that longer words will often demand
1A recent paper by Holman et al. (2009) shows that the 40-item list employed here, deduced from rigorous testing for
word stability across all languages, yields results at least as good as those of the commonly used 100-item list proposed
by Swadesh (1955).
2I use Taraka Rama’s (2013) Python program for string distance calculations.
3Wichmann et al. (2010) point out that in some instances not every word on the 40-word list exists for a language,
but in all cases a minimum of 70 percent of the 40-word list exist.
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more edits, the distance is normalized according to word length:
LDN(αi, βi) =
LD(αi, βi)
L(αi, βi)
(A.1)
where L(αi, βi) is the length of the longer of the two spellings αi and βi of word i. LDN(αi, βi)
is the normalized Levenshtein distance, which represents a percentage estimate of dissimilarity
between languages α and β for word i. For each language pair, LDN(αi, βi) is calculated for
each word of the M -word Swadesh list. Then the average lexical distance for each language pair
is calculated by averaging across all M words for those two languages. The average distance
between two languages is then
LDN(α, β) =
1
M
M∑
i=1
LDN(αi, βi). (A.2)
A second normalization procedure is then adopted to account for phonological similarity that
is the result of coincidence. This adjustment is done to correct for accidental similarity in sound
structure of two languages that is unrelated to their historical relationship. The motivation for this
step is that no prior assumptions need to be made about historical versus chance relationship. To
implement this normalization the defined distance LDN(α, β) is divided by the global distance
between two language. To see this, first denote the global distance between languages α and β as
GD(α, β) =
1
M(M − 1)
M∑
i 6=j
LD(αi, βj), (A.3)
where GD(α, β) is the global (average) distance between two languages excluding all word com-
parisons of the same meaning. This estimates the similarity of languages α and β only in terms of
the ordering and frequency of characters, and is independent of meaning. The second normaliza-
tion procedure is then implemented by weighting equation (A.2) with equation (A.3) as follows:
LDND(α, β) =
LDN(α, β)
GD(α, β)
. (A.4)
LDND(α, β) is the final measure of linguistic distance, referred to as the normalized and di-
vided Levenshtein distance (LDND). This measure yields a percentage estimate of the language
dissimilarity between α and β. In instances where two languages have many accidental similar-
ities in terms of ordering and frequency of characters, the second normalization procedure can
yield percentage estimates larger than 100 percent by construction, so I divide LDND(α, β) by its
maximum value to normalize the measure as a continuous [0, 1] variable. In Chapter 1, I transform
this measure of lexicostatistical distance into a measure of linguistic similarity as follows:
LS(α, β) = 1− LDND(α, β). (A.5)
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A.2 Cladistic Similarity
To construct a measure cladistic similarity I calculate the number of shared branches between
language α and β on the Ethnologue language tree, denoted s(α, β). Let M be the maximum
number of tree branches between any two languages. Cladistic similarity is constructed as follows:
CS(α, β) =
(
s(α, β)
M
)δ
, (A.6)
where δ is an arbitrarily assigned weight used to discount more recent linguistic cleavages relative
to deep cleavages. This weight is arbitrary because there is no consensus on the assumed value
of the weight. Fearon (2003) argues the true function is concave and assumes a value of δ = 0.5,
which has since become the convention. Desmet et al. (2009) experiment with a range of values
between δ ∈ [0.04, 0.10], but settle on a value of δ = 0.05. In all reported estimates I assume δ = 0.5,
though the estimates are robust to alternative weighting assumptions.
One issue with calculating cladistic similarity is the asymmetrical nature of historical language
splitting. Because the number of branches varies among language families and subfamilies, the
maximum number of branches between any two languages is not constant. To overcome this
challenge I assume that all current languages are of equal distance from the proto-language at
the root of the Ethnologue language tree. I visualize this assumption in Figure A1, where I have
constructed a phylogenetic language tree for the 8 distinct languages of Eritrea. The dashed lines
represent this assumed historical relationship, so in all cases the contemporary Eritrean languages
possess an equal number of branches to the proto-language at Level 0. Although M = 6 in Figure
A1, in the Ethnologue language tree the highest number of classifications for any language is
M = 15, which I abstract from here for simplicity.
Figure A1: Phylogenetic Tree of the Eight Major Eritrean Languages
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Appendix B
Chapter 1 Appendix
B.1 Data Descriptions, Sources and Summary Statistics
B.1.1 Regional-Level Data Description and Sources
Country-language groups: Geo-referenced country-language group data comes from the World
Language Mapping System (WLMS). These data map information from each language in the Eth-
nologue to the corresponding polygon. When calculating averages within these language group
polygons, I use the Africa Albers Equal Area Conic projection.
Source: http://www.worldgeodatasets.com/language/
Linguistic similarity: I construct two measures of linguistic similarity: lexicostatistical similarity
from the Automatic Similarity Judgement Program (ASJP), and cladistic similarity using Ethno-
logue data from the WLMS. I use these to measure the similarity between each language group
and the ethnolinguistic identity of that country’s national leader. I discuss how I assign a leader’s
ethnolinguistic identity in Section 1.2.3.
Source: http://asjp.clld.org and http://www.worldgeodatasets.com/language/
Night lights: Night light intensity comes from the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program
(DMSP). My measure of night lights is calculated by averaging across pixels that fall within each
WLMS country-language group polygon for each year the night light data is available (1992-2013).
To minimize area distortions I use the Africa Albers Equal Area Conic projection. In some years
data is available for two separate satellites, and in all such cases the correlation between the two
is greater than 99% in my sample. To remove choice on the matter I use an average of both. The
dependent variable used in the benchmark analysis is ln(0.01 + average night lights).
Source: http://ngdc.noaa.gov/eog/dmsp/downloadV4composites.html
Population density: Population density is calculated by averaging across pixels that fall within
each country-language group polygon. To minimize area distortions I use the Africa Albers Equal
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Area Conic projection. Data comes from the Gridded Population of the World, which is available
in 5-year intervals: 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005, 2010. For intermediate years I assume population den-
sity is constant; e.g., the 1995 population density is assigned to years 1995-1999. Throughout the
regression analysis I use log population density.
Source: http://sedac.ciesin.columbia.edu/data/collection/gpw-v3
National leaders: I collected birthplace locations of all African leaders between 1991-2013. Names
of African leaders and years entered and exited office comes from the Archigos Database on Lead-
ers 1875-2004 (Goemans et al., 2009), which I extended to 2011 using data from Dreher et al. (2015),
and 2012-2013 using a country’s Historical Dictionary and other secondary sources.
Source: http://www.rochester.edu/college/faculty/hgoemans/data.htm
National leader birthplace coordinates: Birthplace locations are confirmed using Wikipedia, and
entered into www.latlong.com to collect latitude and longitude coordinates.
Source: http://www.latlong.net
Years in office: To calculate each leader’s current years in office and total years in office I use
the entry and exit data described above.
Source: Calculated using Stata.
Distance to leader’s birth region: Country-language group centroids calculated in ArcGIS, and
the distance between each centroid and the national leader’s birthplace coordinates is calculated
in Stata using the globdist command. Throughout the regression analysis I use log leader birth-
place distance.
Source: Calculated using ArcGIS and Stata.
Absolute difference in elevation: I collect elevation data from the National Geophysical Data
Centre (NGDC) at the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). I measure
average elevation of each partitioned language group and leader’s ethnolinguistic group. To min-
imize area distortions I use the Africa Albers Equal Area Conic projection. I use Stata to calculate
the absolute difference between the two.
Source: www.ngdc.noaa.gov/mgg/topo/globe.html
Absolute difference in ruggedness: As a measure of ruggedness I use the standard deviation
of the NGDC elevation data. I use Stata to calculate the absolute difference between the two.
Source: www.ngdc.noaa.gov/mgg/topo/globe.html
Absolute difference in precipitation: Precipitation data comes from the WorldClim – Global
Climate Database. I measure average precipitation within each partitioned language group and
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leader’s ethnolinguistic group using the Africa Albers Equal Area Conic projection. I use Stata to
calculate the absolute difference between the two.
Source: http://www.worldclim.org/current
Absolute difference in temperature: Temperature data comes from the WorldClim – Global Cli-
mate Database. I measure the average temperature within each partitioned language group and
leader’s ethnolinguistic group using the Africa Albers Equal Area Conic projection. I use Stata to
calculate the absolute difference between the two.
Source: http://www.worldclim.org/current
Absolute difference in caloric suitability index: I sourced the caloric suitability index (CSI) data
from Galor and O¨zak (2016). CSI is a measure of agricultural productivity that reflects the caloric
potential in a grid cell. It’s based on the Global Agro-Ecological Zones (GAEZ) project of the Food
and Agriculture Organization (FAO). A variety of related measures are available: in the reported
estimates I use the pre-1500 average CSI measure that includes cells with zero productivity. The
results are not sensitive to which measure I use. I measure average CSI within each partitioned
language group and leader’s ethnolinguistic group using the Africa Albers Equal Area Conic pro-
jection. I use Stata to calculate the absolute difference between the two.
Source: http://omerozak.com/csi
Oil reserve: I construct an indicator variable equal to one if an oil field is found in both the par-
titioned language group and leader’s ethnolinguistic group. Version 1.2 of the Petroleum Dataset
contains geo-referenced point data indicating the presence of on-shore oil and gas deposits from
around the world.
Source: https://www.prio.org/Data/Geographical-and-Resource-Datasets/Petroleum-Dataset/
Diamond reserve: I construct an indicator variable equal to one if a known diamond deposit
is found in both the partitioned language group and leader’s ethnolinguistic group. Version 1.2 of
the Petroleum Dataset contains geo-referenced point data indicating the presence of on-shore oil
and gas deposits from around the world.
Source: https://www.prio.org/Data/Geographical-and-Resource-Datasets/Diamond-Resources/
B.1.2 Individual-Level Data Description and Sources
Unless otherwise stated, all individual-level data comes from the Demographic and Health Sur-
veys (DHS). Source: http://dhsprogram.com/
Individual linguistic similarity: To assign an individual a home language I assign the reported
language a respondent speaks at home when this data is available (59 percent availability). For
surveys when this data isn’t available or the reported language is “other”, I map the respondent’s
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home language from their reported ethnicity. To do this I use the following assignment rule:
1. Direct match: the DHS ethnicity name is the same as an Ethnologue language name for the
respondent’s country of residence.
2. Alternative name: the unmatched DHS ethnicity is an unambiguous alternative name for a
language in the Ethnologue or Glottolog database.
3. Macrolanguage: if the ethnicity corresponds to a macrolanguage in the Ethnologue, then I
assign the most populated sub-language of that macrolanguage.
4. Population size: if the unmatched ethnicity maps to numerous languages, I choose the lan-
guage with the largest Ethnologue population.
I also cross-reference the Wikipedia page for each ethnic group to corroborate that the assigned
language maps into the reported ethnicity. Then using the same data on leaders as in the regional-
analysis, I match the lexicostatistical similarity of the respondent’s home language to the leader’s
ethnolinguistic identity.
Source: http://asjp.clld.org
Locational linguistic similarity: I project DHS cluster latitude and longitude coordinates onto
the Ethnologue language map and assign the associated language as the regional language group
to that respondent. In instances of overlapping language groups, I assign the largest group in
terms of population. Then using the same data on leaders as in the regional-analysis, I match the
lexicostatistical similarity of the respondent’s home language to the leader’s ethnolinguistic iden-
tity.
Source: http://asjp.clld.org
Wealth Index: I use the quantile DHS wealth index. The quantile index is derived from a com-
posite measure of a household’s assets (e.g., television, refrigerator, telephone, etc.) and access to
public resources (e.g., water, electricity, sanitation facility, etc.), in addition to data indicating if a
household owns agricultural land and if they employ a domestic servant. Principal component
analysis is used to construct the original index, then respondents are order by score and sorted
into quintiles. Read the DHS Comparative Report: The DHS Wealth Index for more details.
Age: Age of respondent at the time of survey.
Gender: An indicator variable equal to one if a respondent is female.
Rural: An indicator variable for rural locations.
Education: The 10 education fixed effects are from question 90.
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Religion: The 18 fixed effects for the religion of a respondent come from question 91.
Distance to the capital: I use the World Cities layer available on the ArcGIS website, which in-
cludes latitude-longitude coordinates and indicators for capital cities. I calculate language group
centroids coordinates using ArcGIS, and measure the geodesic distance between the two points in
Stata using the globdist command.
Source: http://www.arcgis.com/home/
Distance to the coast: I use the coastline shapefile from Natural Earth, calculate the nearest coast-
line from a language groups centroid using the Near tool in ArcGIS. I measure the geodesic dis-
tance between the two points in Stata using the globdist command.
Source: http://www.naturalearthdata.com/downloads/10m-physical-vectors/10m-coastline/
Distance to the border: I use country boundaries from the Digital Chart of the World (5th edition)
that’s complimentary to the Ethnologue data from the WLMS, and calculate the nearest border
from a language groups centroid using the Near tool in ArcGIS. I measure the geodesic distance
between the two points in Stata using the globdist command.
Source: http://www.worldgeodatasets.com/language/
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B.1.3 Summary Statistics and Additional Details
Table B1: Language Groups Included in Regional-Level Analysis
Sample Language Groups
Regional-Level
Analysis
Acholi, Adamawa Fulfulde, Adele, Afade, Afrikaans, Alur, Anuak,
Anufo, Anyin, Baatonum, Badyara, Baka, Bari, Bata, Bayot, Bedawiyet,
Bemba, Berta, Bissa, Boko, Bokyi, Bomwali, Borana-Arsi-Guji Oromo,
Buduma, Central Kanuri, Chadian Arabic, Chidigo, Cokwe, Daasanach,
Dan, Dazaga, Dendi, Dholuo, Diriku, Ditammari, Ejagham, Ewe, Fur,
Gbanziri, Gidar, Glavda, Gola, Gourmanchema, Gude, Gumuz, Hausa,
Herero, Holu, Jola-Fonyi, Juhoan, Jukun Takum, Jula, Kaba, Kacipo-
Balesi, Kako, Kakwa, Kalanga, Kaliko, Kaonde, Kasem, Khwe, Kikongo,
Kisikongo, Kiswahili, Komo, Konkomba, Koromfe, Kuhane, Kunama,
Kunda, Kuo, Kuranko, Kusaal, Kwangali, Kxauein, Langbashe, Lozi, Lug-
bara, Lunda, Lutos, Luvale, Maasai, Madi, Makonde, Mambwe-Lungu,
Mandinka, Mandjak, Manga Kanuri, Mann, Manyika, Masana, Mashi,
Mbandja, Mbay, Mbukushu, Mende, Monzombo, Moore, Mpiemo, Mun-
dang, Mundu, Musey, Musgu, Nalu, Naro, Ndali, Ndau, Ngangam, Ng-
baka Mabo, Ninkare, Northern Kissi, Northwest Gbaya, Nsenga, Ntcham,
Nuer, Nyakyusa-Ngonde, Nyanja, Nzakambay, Nzanyi, Nzema, Oshi-
wambo, Pana, Peve, Pokoot, Psikye, Pulaar, Pular, Runga, Rwanda, Saho,
Shona, Shuwa Arabic, Somali, Soninke, Southern Birifor, Southern Kisi,
Southern Sotho, Susu, Swati, Taabwa, Talinga-Bwisi, Tamajaq, Tedaga,
Teso, Tigrigna, Tonga, Tswana, Tumbuka, Tupuri, Vai, Venda, Wandala,
Western Maninkakan, Xhosa, Xoo, Yaka, Yaka, Yalunka, Yao, Yeyi, Za-
ghawa, Zande, Zarma, Zemba, Zulu
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Table B2: Language Groups Included in DHS Individual-Level Analysis
Sample Language Groups
Individual-Level
Analysis (Loca-
tional)
Alur, Bemba, Borana, Kaonde, Kasem, Kisi (Southern), Kissi (North-
ern), Kuhane, Kuranko, Lamba, Lugbara, Lunda, Maninkakan (Western),
Mann, Oromo (Borana-Arsi-Guji), Pular, Somali, Soninke, Susu, Taabwa,
Teso
Individual-Level
Analysis (Individ-
ual)
Afar, Amharic, Aushi, Bamanankan, Bandi, Bemba, Berta, Bissa,
Bobo Madare (Southern), Bwile, Cokwe, Dagaare (Southern), Dagbani,
Dan, Dholuo, Ekegusii, Farefare, Ganda, Gedeo, Gikuyu, Gola, Gour-
manchema, Gwere, Hadiyya, Harari, Hausa, Ila, Jola-Fonyi, Kamba,
Kambaata, Kaonde, Kigiryama, Kipsigis, Kisi (Southern), Kissi (North-
ern), Kono, Koongo, Kpelle (Guinea), Kpelle (Liberia), Krio, Kuhane,
Kunda, Kuranko, Lala-Bisa, Lamba, Lendu, Lenje, Limba (East), Lozi,
Luba-Kasai, Lugbara, Lunda, Luvale, Maasai, Madi, Mambwe-Lungu,
Mandinka, Maninkakan (Kita), Mann, Mbunda, Mende, Moore, Ngombe,
Nkoya, Nsenga, Nyanja, Oromo (Borana-Arsi-Guji), Oromo (West Cen-
tral), Oyda, Pulaar, Pular, Rendille, Samburu, Sebat Bet Gurage, Senoufo
(Mamara), Serer-Sine, Sherbro, Sidamo, Soli, Somali, Songhay (Koyra Chi-
ini), Soninke, Susu, Swahili, Taabwa, Tamasheq, Teso, Themne, Tigrigna,
Tonga, Tumbuka, Turkana, Wolaytta, Wolof
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Table B3: Leaders Included in Regional-Level Analysis
Sample Leaders
Regional-Level
Analysis
Angola: Jose´ Eduardo dos Santos; Benin: Thomas Yayi Boni, Mathieu Ke´re´kou;
Botswana: Quett Masire, Festus Mogae; Burkina Faso: Blaise Compaore´;
Cameroon: Paul Biya; Central African Republic: Ange-Fe´lix Patasse´, Andre´-
Dieudonne´ Kolingba; Chad: Idriss De´by; Congo: Pascal Lissouba, Denis Sas-
sou Nguesso; Coˆte d’Ivoire: Konan Bedie, Laurent Gbagbo, Robert Gue´ı¨, Fe´lix
Houphoue¨t-Boigny, Alassane Ouattara; DRC: Joseph Kabila, Laurent-De´sire´ Ka-
bila, Mobutu Sese Seko; Eritrea: Isaias Afewerki; Ethiopia: Hailemariam Desalegn,
Meles Zenawi; Gambia: Yahya Jammeh, Dawda Jawara; Ghana: John Evans Atta-
Mills, John Agyekum Kufuor, John Dramani Mahama, Jerry Rawlings; Guinea:
Moussa Dadis Camara, Alpha Conde´, Lansana Conte´, Se´kouba Konate´; Guinea-
Bissau: Kumba Iala´, Manuel Serifo Nhamadjo, Henrique Periera Rosa, Malam Ba-
cai Sanhe´, Joa˜o Bernardo Vieira; Kenya: Daniel arap Moi; Mwai Kibaki; Lesotho:
Elias Phisoana Ramaema, Ntsu Mokhehle, Pakalithal Mosisili, Tom Thabane;
Liberia: Gyude Bryant, Ruth Perry, Wilton G. S. Sankawulo, Ellen Johnson Sir-
leaf, Charles Taylor; Malawi: Hastings Kamuzu Banda, Joyce Banda, Bakili Muluzi,
Bungu wa Mutharika; Mali: Alpha Oumar Konare´, Amadou Toumani Toure´, Dion-
counda Traore´; Mozambique: Armando Guebuza, Joaquim Chissano; Namibia:
Sam Nujoma, Hifikepunye Pohamba; Niger: Mahamadou Issoufou, Ibrahim Bare´
Maı¨nassara, Mahamane Ousmane, Ali Saibou, Mamadou Tandja; Nigeria: Sani
Abacha, Abdulsalami Abubakar, Goodluck Jonathan, Olusegun Obasanjo, Umaru
Musa Yar’Adua; Senegal: Abdou Diouf, Macky Sall, Abdoulaye Wade; Sierra
Leone: Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, Ernest Bai Koroma, Johnny Paul Koroma, Valen-
tine Strasser; Somalia: Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed, Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, Abdiqasim
Salad Hassan, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, Ali Mahdi Muhammad; South Africa:
Frederik Willem de Klerk, Nelson Mandela, Thabo Mbeki, Jacob Zuma; Sudan:
Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir; Tanzania: Jakaya Kikwete, Benjamin Mkapa, Ali
Hassan Mwinyi; Togo: Gnassingbe´ Eyade´ma, Faure Gnassingbe´; Uganda: Yow-
eri Museveni; Zambia: Frederick Chiluba, Levy Mwanawasa, Michael Sata; Zim-
babwe: Robert Mugabe
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Table B4: Leaders Included in DHS Individual-Level Analysis
Sample Leaders
Individual-Level Burkina Faso: Blaise Compaore´
Analysis Democratic Republic of Congo: Joseph Kabila
Ethiopia: Meles Zenawi
Ghana: Jerry Rawlings; John Agyekum Kufuor
Guinea: Alpha Conde´; Lansana Conte´
Kenya: Mwai Kibaki
Liberia: Ellen Johnson Sirleaf
Mali: Alpha Oumar Konare´; Amadou Toumani Toure´
Namibia: Hifikepunye Pohamba
Senegal: Abdou Diouf; Abdoulaye Wade
Sierra Leone: Ernest Bai Koroma
Uganda: Yoweri Museveni
Zambia: Levy Mwanawasa; Michael Sata
Table B5: Countries Included in Regional- and Individual-Level Analysis
Sample Countries
Regional-Level Analy-
sis
Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African
Republic, Chad, Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo,
Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya,
Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nige-
ria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania,
Togo, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe
Individual-Level Anal-
ysis
Burkina Faso, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Ghana,
Guinea, Kenya, Liberia, Mali, Namibia, Senegal, Sierra Leone,
Uganda, Zambia
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Table B6: Summary Statistics – Regional-Level Dataset
Mean Std dev. Min Max N
Night lightst 0.123 0.387 0.000 4.540 6,610
ln(0.01 + night lightst) -3.487 1.427 -4.605 1.515 6,610
ln(0.01 + night lightst−1) -3.507 1.415 -4.605 1.515 6,315√
night lightst 0.187 0.297 0.000 2.131 6,610
ln(night lightst) -3.370 2.049 -10.60 1.513 4,069
Lexicostatistical similarityt−1 0.193 0.230 0.000 1.000 6,610
Cladistic similarityt−1 0.409 0.330 0.000 1.000 6,610
Coethnicityt−1 0.047 0.212 0.000 1.000 6,610
Non-coethnic cladistic similarityt−1 0.362 0.313 0.000 0.966 6,610
Non-coethnic lexicostatistical similarityt−1 0.146 0.148 0.000 0.960 6,610
Lexicostatistical similarityt+1 0.194 0.230 0.000 1.00 6228
Current years in officet−1 11.44 8.680 1.000 38.00 6,610
Total years in officet−1 18.50 10.19 1.000 38.00 6,610
Log distance (km) to leader’s groupt−1 5.844 1.485 0.000 7.419 6,610
Log population densityt 2.886 1.529 -2.169 6.116 6,610
Absolute difference in elevationt 250.5 296.1 0.000 2,021 6,610
Absolute difference in ruggednesst 101.5 105.5 0.000 542.4 6,610
Absolute difference in precipitationt 30.20 28.90 0.00 230.7 6,610
Absolute difference in mean temperaturet 16.81 17.09 0.000 120.2 6,610
Absolute difference in caloric suitability indext 298.0 310.1 0.000 1711 6,610
Oil reserve in both leader and language groupt 0.018 0.131 0.000 1.000 6,610
Diamond mine in both leader and language groupt 0.079 0.269 0.000 1.000 6,610
Absolute difference in malaria suitabilityt 4.951 5.635 0.000 29.30 5,111
Absolute difference in land suitabilityt 0.178 0.184 0 0.777 5111
Democracyt−1 0.435 4.877 -9.000 9.000 6,573
Language group population share 0.045 0.113 0 0.851 6610
Distance (km) to capital city 559.7 397.7 26.58 1922 6,610
Distance (km) to the coast 677.9 408.4 10.52 1743 6,610
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Table B7: Summary Statistics – DHS Individual-Level Dataset
Mean Std Dev. Min Max N
Wealth index 2.974 1.468 1.000 5.000 56,455
Locational similarity 0.350 0.380 0.025 1.000 56,455
Individual similarity 0.363 0.387 0.021 1.000 56,455
Age 29.36 10.51 15.00 78.00 56,455
Female indicator 0.663 0.473 0.000 1.000 56,455
Rural indicator 0.635 0.482 0.000 1.000 56,455
Education 4.721 1.520 1.000 6.000 56,455
Religion 4.912 2.032 1.000 8.000 56,455
Log distance to the coast (km) 6.059 0.910 1.654 7.238 56,455
Log distance to the border (km) 4.948 0.887 0.920 6.801 56,455
Log distance to the capital (km) 5.676 0.727 2.070 7.548 56,455
Table B8: Summary Statistics – Power Sharing Dataset
Mean Std dev. Min Max N
Share of cabinet positionst 0.056 0.078 0.000 0.471 2,539
Share of top cabinet positionst 0.057 0.108 0.000 0.643 2,539
Share of low cabinet positionst 0.055 0.078 0.000 0.450 2,539
Coethnicityt 0.077 0.266 0.000 1.000 2,539
Lexicostatistical similarityt 0.196 0.267 0.000 1.000 2,539
Non-coethnic lexicostatistical similarityt 0.114 0.122 0.000 0.659 2,539
Ethnic group population sharet 0.057 0.065 0.005 0.390 2,539
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B.2 Mapping Ethnicity to Language
There is mostly agreement between ethnographers that language is a suitable marker of ethnicity
in Africa (Batibo, 2005; Desmet et al., 2015). The challenge of mapping ethnicity to language is
that, in some instances, a single ethnic group speaks many languages. In such instances it’s not
obvious what language is the appropriate language to match to a leader’s ethnicity. As a solution
to this problem I use the following three-step assignment rule to construct a mapping between
ethnicity and language in Africa.
Step 1: For each ethnic group, I refer to the Ethnologue list of languages for the country to which
they belong. If a language name is identical to the ethnic name then I assign the correspond-
ing language to that ethnicity.
Step 2: If there is no language name identical to the ethnicity then I check the alternate names for a
language. If an ethnic name matches an alternate language name, I assign the corresponding
language to that ethnicity.
Step 3: If a set of potential language matches still exist, I assign the largest language group (in terms
of population) to the ethnic group.
103
B.3 Supplementary Materials
This section presents results referenced but not presented in the main body of the paper.
B.3.1 Various Fixed Effects Specifications
Table B9 reports 27 different estimates: 9 versions of equation (1.1) for each of the 3 linguistic
similarity measures. Columns 1-3 report between-group estimates with country-year fixed effects,
the estimates in columns 4-6 add country-language fixed effects, and columns 7-9 report estimates
for the triple-difference estimator. For each set of three regressions I report estimates (i) without
any covariates, (ii) estimates that only control for log population density and the logged geodesic
distance between each partitioned group and the corresponding leader’s group, and (iii) the full
set of covariates I outlined in Section 1.3.
Consistent with my hypothesis of ethnolinguistic favoritism, all 27 coefficients are positive
and the majority are statistically significant. In all cases my preferred measure of lexicostatistical
similarity is significant with the exception of column 4, where lexicostatistical similarity has a re-
ported p-value of 0.127. However, in this instance, the estimator lacks language-year fixed effects
and thus does not exploit the counterfactual comparison of the same language group on the other
side of the border.
Indeed, the addition of language-year fixed effects in 7-9 adds considerable precision to the
estimates relative to columns 4-6. The allowance of a within-group estimator that comes from
having a panel of partitioned language groups substantially improves my ability to identify eth-
nolinguistic favoritism.
I also provide estimates for cladistic similarity and coethnicity to see how these alternative
measures compare to lexicostatistical similarity. For my benchmark estimates both coefficients are
positive and statistically significant, albeit only at the 10 percent level. Not only does the esti-
mated coefficient monotonically increase in the measured continuity of linguistic similarity, but
lexicostatistical similarity is also more precisely estimated than both alternative measures. This
suggests that the observable variation among non-coethnic groups assists in identifying patterns
of ethnic favoritism in Africa.
B.3.2 Additional Controls
In this section I reproduce the benchmark estimates with two additional control variables: the
Malaria Ecology Index (Kiszewski et al., 2004) and the Agricultural Suitability Index (Ramankutty
et al., 2002). The trouble with these data is that in a number of instances a single raster cell covers
an area larger than a country-language group partition because these data are only available at a
spatial resolution of 0.5◦ × 0.5◦ (approximately 111 km × 111 km). These partitions are dropped
from group average calculations, resulting in a sample 61.5 percent of the benchmark sample size.
Table B10 reports these subsample estimates that include the additional control variables. For
each of the three measures of similarity I report estimates that include the absolute difference in the
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Malaria Ecology Index, the absolute difference in the Agricultural Suitability Index and estimates
that include both measures, in addition to benchmark set of controls. The results are unchanged
by including these controls.
B.3.3 Measurement Error
When an unambiguous assignment of a leader’s ethnolinguistic identity cannot be made, I as-
sign the group with the largest population among the set of potential matches. The finding that
favoritism exists among groups that are not coethnic to the leader might be driven by the mea-
surement error introduced by this approach.
In this section I report estimates on a subsample of my benchmark dataset that excludes the
4 leaders I could not unambiguously match.1 Table B11 reports these results. Overall little is
changed from my benchmark estimates, with the exception that coethnicity is no longer signif-
icant at standard levels of confidence. However, lexicostatistical similarity is roust to these ex-
cluded leaders, and most importantly, column (4) of Table B11 makes clear that the significance of
non-coethnic similarity is not a consequence of the possible measurement error introduced when
assigning an ethnolinguistic identity to the aforementioned leaders.
B.3.4 Balanced Panel
In this section I test the robustness of the benchmark estimates using a balanced panel of country-
language groups between 1992 and 2013. My benchmark panel was unbalanced because of miss-
ing data on language lists used to estimate lexciostatistical similarity. This is problematic if these
lists are missing for non-random reasons (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005). To check this I limit the
analysis to a balanced sample of 84 language groups partitioned across 23 countries. Table B12
reports these estimates.
In all 27 reported regressions the measure of linguistic similarity takes the expected positive
sign positive. For my preferred measure of lexicostatistical similarity the coefficients are statis-
tically significant in all but one regression. The magnitudes of the estimates are also relatively
similar to my benchmark estimates. To the contrary cladistic similarity seems to be quite sensitive
to this subsample and in only significant in a single instance. The coethnic results are similar to
those in Table 1.3.
B.3.5 Weighted Regressions
In this section I test for heteroskedasticity in my benchmark estimates by weighting regressions
by the Ethnologue population of each language group. The idea is that the measure of night light
intensity is an average within each country-language group, and it is likely to have more variance
in places where the population is small (Solon et al., 2015). Table B13 reports these estimates.
1Mobutu Sese Seko (DRC), Joseph Kabila (DRC), Laurent-Desire Kabila (DRC) and Goodluck Jonathan (Nigeria).
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The lexicostatistical estimates are less sensitive to weighting than the cladistic and coethnic
estimates. While a few lexicostatistical estimates lose their significance in columns (4)-(6), these
estimates do not exploit language-year fixed effects, and hence are not identified off the exogenous
within-group variation. In my benchmark specification in column (9), the effect of lexicostatistical
similarity is significant at the 5 percent level and very similar to the benchmark estimate in terms
of magnitude.
B.3.6 Alternative Night Light Transformations
The log transformation used throughout the regional analysis is without a doubt arbitrary. The use
of this transformation has become the convention when using these night lights data so I follow
the literature in my chose to add 0.01 to the log transformation. Nonetheless, I experiment with
two alternative transformations in Table B14.
In columns (1)-(3) I report estimates where the dependent variable is defined as the square
root of the raw night lights data. In columns (4)-(6) I log the night lights data without adding a
constant. The latter results in a substantial loss of observations due to the fact that 40 percent of
the observations exhibit zero night light activity. Because I must observe a partitioned group on
both sides of the border for any year, I lose nearly 60 percent of my benchmark sample using this
log transformation.
I find that the lexicostatistical estimate is robust to both transformations, while the cladistic is
only robust to the square root transformation. Coethnicity remains positive but loses its statistical
significance is both instances.
B.3.7 DHS Additional Tables
Table B17 reports 15 estimates: 5 separate specifications for both locational and individual similar-
ity, and the same five specifications for the joint similarity estimates. In all specifications I adjust
standard errors for clustering in country-wave-locational-language areas.
The top panel reports estimates for locational similarity. In column (1) the coefficient takes
the expected positive sign, but is insignificant because the standard error is estimated to be quite
large. However, in this specification I do not account for any individual characteristics, including
whether a respondent lives in a rural location. Young (2013) shows that the urban-rural income
gap accounts for 40 percent of mean country inequality in a sample of 65 DHS countries. In
column (2) I report an estimate that includes a rural indicator variable. Indeed, the inclusion
of this indicator substantially improves the precision of estimation, where locational similarity
is now significant at the 1 percent level. In column (3) I add a set of individual controls.2 The
magnitude of locational similarity increases slightly and maintains its strong significant effect on
individual wealth. In Table B17 I add each individual control variable one at a time. While I
2The set of individual controls include age, age squared, a female indicator, a rural indicator, a capital city indicator,
5 education fixed effects and 7 religion fixed effects. See Appendix B for variable definitions.
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account for capital city effects with an indicator variable, I also account for additional spatial
effects in columns (4) and (5) by separately adding the geodesic distance to the nearest coast and
border.3
The middle panel of Table B15 reports estimates for individual similarity. While all coefficients
take the expected positive sign, only a single estimate of individual similarity is statistically signif-
icant. When I do not control for any covariates the effect of individual similarity is very precisely
estimated. To the contrary, the effect goes away once I account for respondents living in rural
locations. The same is true when including the full set of controls.
Next I jointly estimate both channels using the aforementioned variation among individuals
non-native to the region in which they reside. The results are consistent with the rest of the table
and reported in the bottom panel of Table B15. In column (1) the estimate for individual similarity
outperforms locational similarity when no individual characteristics are accounted for, however
the reverse is true in columns (2)-(5) as covariates are incrementally added – in particular the rural
indicator.
To show that the locational mechanism is not only driven by the coethnic effect, I separately
estimate locational coethnicity and non-coethnic locational similarity. I do this in the same way I
did in the regional-level analysis: I define non-coethnic locational similarity as (1− coethnicity)×
locational similarity. Table B16 reports these estimates. While non-coethnic locational similarity
is estimated to be no different than zero in the most basic regression, once again after the base-
line set of controls are added both the coethnic and non-coethnic effect are positive and strongly
significant. Using the more conservative estimates of column (5), this suggests that the average
level of non-coethnic locational similarity (0.164) yields an increase of 0.094 (= 0.164 × 0.573) in
the wealth index – roughly one fourth the coethnic effect.
Finally, I also report the DHS estimates for locational similarity and include each baseline
covariate one at a time. The idea here is to highlight the relative importance of controlling for the
urban-rural inequality gap when using the DHS wealth index (Young, 2013). Table B17 reports
these estimates.
Indeed I find that the precision of the locational similarity estimate is substantially improved
by including an indicator variable for respondents living in rural regions. While many of the
other covariates are themselves positive, no other variable have such a large confounding effect
on locational similarity in its absence.
3I include distances separately because language areas tend to be fairly small, so location clusters in a partition are
usually very close together and distance measures are highly collinear.
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B.3.8 Coalition Building
Data
I use data from Francois et al. (2015) on the share of an ethnic group’s representation in the govern-
ing coalition for 15 African countries.4 These data are available at a yearly interval until 2004 for
the ethnic groups listed in Alesina et al. (2003) and Fearon (2003). Because the unit of observation
is an ethnic group, I assign an Ethnologue language group to each ethnicity using the assignment
strategy outlined in Appendix B.5 I measure the lexicostatistical similarity of these groups to the
ethnolinguistic identity of the national leader between 1992 and 2004 using the leader data de-
scribed in Section 1.2.3. In each country a residual ethnic categorization named Other is assigned
to capture all groups outside of a country’s major ethnic groups. Because Others lack a single
ethnolinguistic identity, I assign Other groups a value of zero percent similarity to their leader.
Results
I report estimates of equation (1.2) in Table B18. Column 1 replicates the main estimate of Fran-
cois et al. (2015) on the subset of data that I observe lexicostatistical similarity. The coefficient
for coethnicity takes the expected positive sign, implying there is a 9 percent increase in the
leader’s group share of the governing coalition over and above the ministerial appointments
made in accordance with the leader’s group size. The magnitude of this coefficient is slightly
smaller than the comparable coefficient in Francois et al.’s (2015) Table III. This suggests that,
if anything, this subsample biases the coefficient downward. Column 2 corroborates this re-
sult using lexicostatistical similarity in place of coethnicity. In column 3, I separate the effect
of coethnicity from lexicostatistical similarity using the same approach I used in Section 1.4; i.e.,
non-coethnic similarity = (1 − coethnicity) × lexicostatistical similarity. The reported estimates
in column 3 confirm that linguistic similarity predicts a group’s representation in the governing
coalition even among non-coethnic groups.
In columns 4-6 I explore the allocation of top positions in the governing coalition, and in
columns 7-9 the allocation of positions outside of the top.6 In all cases the variables of interest are
positive and statistically significant. The most notable observation in this table is remarkable con-
sistency in the magnitude of non-coethnic similarity across specifications. Related groups outside
of the leader’s ethnic group benefit from receiving positions both low and high in the hierarchy of
government.7
4Benin, Cameroon, Cote dIvoire, Democratic Republic of Congo, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Nigeria, Republic
of Congo, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Togo, Kenya, and Uganda.
5For 87.5 percent of the 264 ethnic groups not listed as “Other”, the name of the ethnic group unambiguously
corresponds to an Ethnologue name or alternative name in the country in which the group resides. Only 12.5 percent
of groups require I use population as a tie breaker when multiple languages can be mapped to an ethnicity. 51 of the
assigned languages do not possess an ASJP language list and thus are dropped from the analysis.
6Top positions include the president and deputies, as well as ministers of defence, budget, commerce, finance,
treasury, economy, agriculture, justice, and state/foreign affairs.
7The estimates for group size are statistically significant in all instances. The estimates are also comparable in
magnitude to those in Table 3 of Francois et al. (2015), and similarity show evidence of concavity in group size.
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Table B9: Benchmark Regressions Using Various Combinations of Fixed Effects
Dependent Variable: yc,l,t = ln(0.01 + nightLightsc,l,t)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Lexicostatistical similarityt−1 1.292*** 0.806*** 0.936*** 0.115 0.200** 0.213** 0.244** 0.297** 0.305***
(0.255) (0.306) (0.318) (0.075) (0.087) (0.088) (0.112) (0.120) (0.116)
Adjusted R2 0.342 0.428 0.452 0.921 0.921 0.922 0.925 0.925 0.926
Cladistic similarityt−1 0.835*** 0.488** 0.446** 0.044 0.065 0.058 0.221** 0.219** 0.185*
(0.199) (0.205) (0.203) (0.064) (0.066) (0.068) (0.104) (0.102) (0.103)
Adjusted R2 0.331 0.428 0.449 0.921 0.921 0.921 0.925 0.925 0.925
Coethnict−1 1.058*** 0.386 0.648** 0.092 0.193** 0.202** 0.130 0.139 0.168*
(0.244) (0.325) (0.314) (0.064) (0.084) (0.082) (0.099) (0.098) (0.094)
Adjusted R2 0.332 0.423 0.447 0.921 0.921 0.922 0.925 0.925 0.925
Geographic controls No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes
Distance & population density No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Language-year fixed effects No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes
Country-language fixed effects No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clusters 355 355 355 355 355 355 355 355 355
Countries 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35
Language groups 163 163 163 163 163 163 163 163 163
Observations 6,610 6,610 6,610 6,610 6,610 6,610 6,610 6,610 6,610
This table reports benchmark estimates associating each measure of linguistic similarity with night light luminosity for the years t = 1992 − 2013. Average night
light luminosity is measured in language group l of country c in year t, and linguistic similarity measures the similarity between each language group and the
ethnolinguistic identity of country c’s leader in year t − 1. Lexicostatistical similarity is a continuous measure of a language pair’s phonological similarity and is
measured on the unit interval. Cladistic similarity is a discrete measure of similarity representing a language pair’s ratio of shared branches on the Ethnologue
language tree. Coethnic is binary measure of linguistic similarity that takes a value of 1 when language group l is also the ethnolinguistic identity of country c’s
leader. Distance & population density measure the log distance between each country-language group and the leader’s ethnolinguistic group, and the log population
density of a country-language group, respectively. The geographic controls include the absolute difference in elevation, ruggedness, precipitation, temperature and
the caloric suitability index between leader and country-language group regions, in addition to two dummy variables indicating if either region contains diamond
and oil deposits. Standard errors are clustered at the country-language group level and are reported in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table B10: Robustness Check: Benchmark Regressions with Additional Control Variables
Dependent Variable: yc,l,t = ln(0.01 +NightLightsc,l,t)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Lexicostatistical similarityt−1 0.384*** 0.368*** 0.380***
(0.120) (0.122) (0.120)
Cladistic similarityt−1 0.255** 0.242** 0.256**
(0.114) (0.111) (0.111)
Coethnict−1 0.271** 0.257** 0.269**
(0.108) (0.109) (0.109)
Malaria control Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes
Land suitability control No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Distance & population density Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-language fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Language-year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clusters 228 228 228 228 228 228 228 228 228
Countries 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33
Language groups 105 105 105 105 105 105 105 105 105
Adjusted R2 0.950 0.949 0.950 0.949 0.949 0.949 0.949 0.949 0.949
Observations 4,065 4,065 4,065 4,065 4,065 4,065 4,065 4,065 4,065
This table reports estimates associating each measure of linguistic similarity with night light luminosity for the years t = 1992−2013. Average night light luminosity
is measured in language group l of country c in year t, and linguistic similarity measures the similarity between each language group and the ethnolinguistic identity
of country c’s leader in year t − 1. Lexicostatistical similarity is a continuous measure of a language pair’s phonological similarity and is measured on the unit
interval. Cladistic similarity is a discrete measure of similarity representing a language pair’s ratio of shared branches on the Ethnologue language tree. Coethnic is
binary measure of linguistic similarity that takes a value of 1 when language group l is also the ethnolinguistic identity of country c’s leader. Distance & population
density measure the log distance between each country-language group and the leader’s ethnolinguistic group, and the log population density of a country-language
group, respectively. The geographic controls include the absolute difference in elevation, ruggedness, precipitation, temperature and the caloric suitability index
between leader and country-language group regions, in addition to two dummy variables indicating if either region contains diamond and oil deposits. The malaria
controls measures the absolute difference in the Malaria Ecology Index between leader and country-language groups, while the land suitability control measures the
absolute difference in Ramankutty et al.’s (2002) Agricultural Suitability Index. Standard errors are clustered at the country-language group level and are reported
in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table B11: Robustness Check: Excluding Leaders with Ambiguous Ethnolinguistic Identities
Dependent Variable: yc,l,t = ln(0.01 +NightLightsc,l,t)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Lexicostatistical similarityt−1 0.278**
(0.116)
Cladistic similarityt−1 0.199*
(0.108)
Coethnicityt−1 0.145 0.229** 0.218*
(0.095) (0.104) (0.112)
Non-coethnic lexicostatistical similarityt−1 0.480**
(0.237)
Non-coethnic cladistic similarityt−1 0.185
(0.130)
Geographic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Distance & population density Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Language-year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-language fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clusters 314 314 314 314 314
Countries 34 34 34 34 34
Language groups 144 144 144 144 144
Adjusted R2 0.922 0.922 0.922 0.922 0.922
Observations 5,745 5,745 5,745 5,745 5,745
This table reports estimates from a subsample that excludes all ambiguous leadership assignments. Because these problematic assignments introduce measurement
error, excluding them from the analysis ensures that the results are not a consequence of measurement. Average night light intensity is measured in language group
l of country c in year t, and Lexicostatistical similarity is a continuous measure of language group l’s phonological similarity to the national leader and is measured
on the unit interval. The same log transformation of the dependent variable is used for the lagged value of night lights, i.e., ln(0.01 +NightLightsc,l,t−1). All control
variables are described in Table 1.3. Standard errors are clustered at the country-language group level and are reported in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p
< 0.01.
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Table B12: Robustness Check: Benchmark Regressions on a Balanced Panel
Dependent Variable: yc,l,t = ln(0.01 + nightLightsc,l,t)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Lexicostatistical similarityt−1 0.500** 0.563** 0.542***
(0.200) (0.222) (0.206)
Cladistic similarityt−1 0.491** 0.460* 0.407*
(0.231) (0.238) (0.238)
Coethnict−1 0.328 0.337 0.338*
(0.198) (0.209) (0.185)
Baseline controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Language-year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-language fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clusters 177 177 177 177 177 177 177 177 177
Countries 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23
Language groups 84 84 84 84 84 84 84 84 84
Adjusted R2 0.921 0.921 0.921 0.921 0.920 0.921 0.920 0.920 0.921
Observations 3,894 3,894 3,894 3,894 3,894 3,894 3,894 3,894 3,894
This table reproduces benchmark estimates on a balanced subset of the panel dataset. Average night light luminosity is measured in language group l of country
c in year t, and linguistic similarity measures the similarity between each language group and the ethnolinguistic identity of country c’s leader in year t − 1.
Lexicostatistical similarity is a continuous measure of a language pair’s phonological similarity and is measured on the unit interval. Cladistic similarity is a discrete
measure of similarity representing a language pair’s ratio of shared branches on the Ethnologue language tree. Coethnic is binary measure of linguistic similarity
that takes a value of 1 when language group l is also the ethnolinguistic identity of country c’s leader. All control variables are described in Table 1.3. Standard errors
are clustered at the country-language group level and are reported in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table B13: Robustness Check: Benchmark Regressions Weighted by Language Group Population
Dependent Variable: yc,l,t = ln(0.01 + nightLightsc,l,t)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Lexicostatistical similarityt−1 0.231** 0.329** 0.308**
(0.105) (0.141) (0.124)
Cladistic similarityt−1 0.202* 0.213** 0.190*
(0.103) (0.108) (0.107)
Coethnict−1 0.161* 0.234** 0.260***
(0.090) (0.095) (0.094)
Baseline controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Language-year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-language fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clusters 355 355 355 355 355 355 355 355 355
Countries 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35
Language groups 163 163 163 163 163 163 163 163 163
Adjusted R2 0.990 0.990 0.990 0.990 0.990 0.990 0.990 0.990 0.990
Observations 6,610 6,610 6,610 6,610 6,610 6,610 6,610 6,610 6,610
This table reports the benchmark estimates weighted by Ethnologue language group population. Average night light luminosity is measured in language group l of
country c in year t, and linguistic similarity measures the similarity between each language group and the ethnolinguistic identity of country c’s leader in year t− 1.
Lexicostatistical similarity is a continuous measure of a language pair’s phonological similarity and is measured on the unit interval. Cladistic similarity is a discrete
measure of similarity representing a language pair’s ratio of shared branches on the Ethnologue language tree. Coethnic is binary measure of linguistic similarity
that takes a value of 1 when language group l is also the ethnolinguistic identity of country c’s leader. All control variables are described in Table 1.3. Standard errors
are clustered at the country-language group level and are reported in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
114
Table B14: Robustness Check: Benchmark Regressions with Alternative Dependent Variables
√
NightLightsc,l,t ln(NightLightsc,l,t)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Lexicostatistical similarityt−1 0.038** 0.396**
(0.018) (0.191)
Cladistic similarityt−1 0.029* 0.189
(0.016) (0.163)
Coethnict−1 0.012 0.258*
(0.014) (0.138)
Geographic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Distance & population density Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Language-year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-language fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clusters 355 355 355 214 214 214
Countries 35 35 35 33 33 33
Language groups 164 164 164 98 98 98
Adjusted R2 0.952 0.952 0.952 0.935 0.935 0.935
Observations 6,610 6,610 6,610 2,921 2,921 2,921
This table tests the robustness of the dependent variable using two alternative transformations: a square root of the raw night lights data (
√
NightLights
c,l,t
) and
the natural log of the raw night lights data without a constant term (ln(NightLightsc,l,t)). Average night light luminosity is measured in language group l of
country c in year t, and linguistic similarity measures the similarity between each language group and the ethnolinguistic identity of country c’s leader in year t− 1.
Lexicostatistical similarity is a continuous measure of a language pair’s phonological similarity and is measured on the unit interval. Cladistic similarity is a discrete
measure of similarity representing a language pair’s ratio of shared branches on the Ethnologue language tree. Coethnic is binary measure of linguistic similarity
that takes a value of 1 when language group l is also the ethnolinguistic identity of country c’s leader. All control variables are described in Table 1.3. Standard errors
are clustered at the country-language group level and are reported in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table B15: Individual-Level Regressions: Locational and Individual Similarity
Dependent Variable: DHS Wealth Index
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Locational similarityt−1 0.594 0.463*** 0.479*** 0.643*** 0.365**
(0.613) (0.152) (0.119) (0.153) (0.140)
Adjusted R2 0.312 0.574 0.603 0.603 0.604
Individual similarityt−1 1.260*** 0.123 0.211 0.228 0.219
(0.359) (0.220) (0.219) (0.219) (0.215)
Adjusted R2 0.313 0.574 0.602 0.603 0.604
Locational similarityt−1 0.592 0.463*** 0.479*** 0.643*** 0.364**
(0.613) (0.153) (0.119) (0.153) (0.140)
Individual similarityt−1 1.259*** 0.122 0.211 0.230 0.218
(0.359) (0.220) (0.219) (0.219) (0.215)
Adjusted R2 0.313 0.574 0.603 0.603 0.604
Rural indicator No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual controls No No Yes Yes Yes
Distance to border No No No Yes No
Distance to coast No No No No Yes
Country-wave fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Locational language-wave fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual language-wave fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clusters 88 88 88 88 88
Countries 13 13 13 13 13
Language groups 20 20 20 20 20
Observations 56,455 56,455 56,455 56,455 56,455
This table provides estimates for two channels: the effect of individual and locational similarity on the DHS wealth index. The unit of observation is an individual.
The rural indicator is equal to 1 if a respondent lives in a rural location. The individual set of control variables include age, age squared, a gender indicator variable,
an indicator for respondents living in the capital city, 5 education fixed effects and 7 religion fixed effects. Distance to the coast and border are in kilometers. Standard
errors are in parentheses and adjusted for clustering at the country-language-wave level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Table B16: Individual-Level Regressions: Locational and Individual Similarity
Dependent Variable: DHS Wealth Index
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Locational coethnicityt−1 0.838* 0.485*** 0.437*** 0.324** 0.601***
(0.430) (0.139) (0.116) (0.134) (0.160)
Non-coethnic locational similarityt−1 -0.692 0.348* 0.697*** 0.573*** 0.854***
(0.556) (0.205) (0.148) (0.167) (0.173)
Rural indicator No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual controls No No Yes Yes Yes
Distance to coast No No No Yes No
Distance to border No No No No Yes
Country-wave fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Locational language-wave fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual language-wave fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clusters 88 88 88 88 88
Countries 13 13 13 13 13
Language groups 20 20 20 20 20
Adjusted R2 0.314 0.574 0.603 0.604 0.603
Observations 56,455 56,455 56,455 56,455 56,455
This table reports estimates that test for favoritism outside of coethnic language partitions. The unit of observation is
an individual. The rural indicator is equal to 1 if a respondent lives in a rural location. The individual set of control
variables include age, age squared, a gender indicator variable and an indicator for respondents living in the capital
city. Distance to the coast and border are in kilometers. Standard errors are in parentheses and adjusted for clustering
at the country-language-wave level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table B17: Individual-Level Regressions: Baseline Covariates
Dependent Variable: DHS Wealth Index
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Locational similarityt−1 0.585 0.594 0.463*** 0.636 0.490 1.024* 0.518 0.608 0.479***
(0.604) (0.613) (0.152) (0.398) (0.637) (0.592) (0.587) (0.399) (0.119)
Age -0.021*** -0.008
(0.005) (0.006)
Age squared 0.000*** 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Female indicator -0.010 0.112***
(0.013) (0.013)
Rural indicator -1.846*** -1.606***
(0.072) (0.079)
Capital city indicator 1.502*** 0.238***
(0.053) (0.053)
Distance to the coast -0.001
(0.000)
Distance to the border -0.001*
(0.001)
Religion FE No No No No No No Yes No Yes
Education FE No No No No No No No Yes Yes
Country-wave FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Location-language-wave FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual-language-wave FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clusters 88 88 88 88 88 88 88 88 88
Countries 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13
Language groups 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
Adjusted R2 0.316 0.312 0.574 0.342 0.314 0.317 0.317 0.416 0.603
Observations 56,455 56,455 56,455 56,455 56,455 56,455 56,455 56,455 56,455
This table establishes the impact of each baseline covariate used in Section 1.5. The unit of observation is an individual. Standard errors are in parentheses and
adjusted for clustering at the country-language-wave level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table B18: Ethnic Favoritism and Coalition Power Sharing
Share of cabinet positions Share of top cabinet positions Share of low cabinet positions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Coethnicityt 0.093*** 0.100*** 0.179*** 0.185*** 0.050*** 0.057***
(0.012) (0.013) (0.019) (0.020) (0.013) (0.014)
Lexicostatistical similarityt 0.095*** 0.172*** 0.057***
(0.013) (0.021) (0.013)
Non-coethnic similarityt 0.047** 0.047* 0.048**
(0.018) (0.022) (0.019)
Group size controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Countries 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15
Ethnic groups 187 187 187 187 187 187 187 187 187
Adjusted R2 0.665 0.664 0.668 0.539 0.521 0.541 0.544 0.549 0.548
Observations 2,539 2,539 2,539 2,539 2,539 2,539 2,539 2,539 2,539
This table establishes that linguistic similarity predicts an ethnic group’s share in the governing coalition of a country. The unit of observation is an ethnic group.
The dependent variable in columns (1)-(3) is the share of cabinet positions of an ethnic group in the governing coalition, whereas in columns (4)-(6) and (7)-(9) the
dependent variable measures the cabinet share of top positions and low positions. The group size controls include a time-invariant measure of an ethnic group’s
share of the national population and its polynomial. Standard errors are in parentheses and adjusted for clustering at the country level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p
< 0.01.
Appendix C
Chapter 2 Appendix
C.1 Variable Definitions, Summary Statistics and Data Sources
C.1.1 Data and Sources
Book translations: The total number of translated books in a country for a given year. The data
used here is from the time period 1979-2005, and comes from the Index Translationum, an online
bibliographic archive hosted by UNESCO.
Source: http://www.unesco.org/culture/xtrans/
Lexicostatistical linguistic distance: This computerized lexicostatistical linguistic distance mea-
sures the phonetic similarity between two languages. See Appendix A for a formal discussion of
how this data is estimated. I source the language lists used to estimate linguistic distance from
the Automated Similarity Judgement Program (ASJP) to estimate language distances (Wichmann
et al., 2013).
Source: http://asjp.clld.org/
Cladistic linguistic distance: I construct the cladistic measure according to the details above in
Appendix A. I use the Ethnologue language tree, sourced from World Language Mapping System.
Source: http://www.worldgeodatasets.com/language/
Genetic distance: An index of heterozygosity, the probability that two randomly selected alle-
les at a given locus will be different in two populations. Genetic distance is used as a proxy for
the degree of common ancestry between two populations. This data was originally constructed
by Cavalli-Sforza et al. (1994), and was sourced from Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009).
Source: http://www.anderson.ucla.edu/faculty_pages/romain.wacziarg/downloads/genetic_
distance.zip
Geographic distance: Geodesic distance between the most populated cities in a country pair,
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measured per 100 kilometres. This data comes from a data set compiled by researchers at Centre
d’Etudes Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales (CEPII).
Source: http://www.cepii.fr/cepii/en/welcome.asp
Real GDP: Purchasing power parity converted expenditure-side real GDP at chained purchas-
ing power parity rates (in mil. 2005 US dollars) from the Penn World Tables version 8.0.
Source: http://www.rug.nl/research/ggdc/data/pwt/pwt-8.0
Population: Total population in thousands from the Penn World Tables version 8.0.
Source: http://www.rug.nl/research/ggdc/data/pwt/pwt-8.0
Political rights: Freedom House Political Rights Index with an original range of 1 through 7,
normalized as a 0-1 variable.
Source: http://www.freedomhouse.org/report-types/freedom-world#.U1f1lV5bTwI
Colonial history indicator: Colonial history data was sources from the CEPII. I use an dummy
variable indicating if a country pair has ever been in a colonial relationship.
Source: http://www.cepii.fr/cepii/en/welcome.asp
Other geography data: All other geography data was also sourced from the CEPII. Measure of
latitude and longitude differences were constructed using individual country measures and tak-
ing the absolute value of the difference between each for a country pair. A dummy variable was
also collected indicating contiguity of a country pair.
Source: http://www.cepii.fr/cepii/en/welcome.asp
Shared common language indicators: Indicator variables specifying (i) if country pairs share a
common language and (ii) if at least 9 percent of the population in both countries speak the same
language were also sourced from the CEPII.
Source: http://www.cepii.fr/cepii/en/welcome.asp
Bilateral trade shares: Measures the logged average value of bilateral trade for a country pair
in constant US dollars. To construct this variable I average imports from i to j and imports from
j to i in current US dollars, deflate this value by the American CPI for all urban consumers (1982-
1984 = 100; taken from http://www.bls.gov/data/#prices), and take the log of this averaged
value. The trade data was sourced from Barbieri et al. (2009).
Source: http://www.correlatesofwar.org/COW2%20Data/Trade/Trade.html
Human capital: The cross-country 5-year panel of education attainment for the total population
aged 15 and over is from Barro and Lee (2013). Measures used include (i) the average years of
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schooling attained, (ii) the percentage of complete primary schooling attained, (iii) the percentage
of complete secondary schooling attained, and (iv) the percentage of complete tertiary schooling
attained.
Source: http://www.barrolee.com
Human capital index: The index of human capital per person is based on years of schooling
(Barro and Lee, 2013) and returns to education (Psacharopoulos, 1994), and is sourced from the
Penn World Tables version 8.0.
Source: http://www.rug.nl/research/ggdc/data/pwt/pwt-8.0
C.1.2 Summary Statistics
Table C1: Benchmark Sample Summary Statistics
Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Log book translations 1.26 1.61 0.00 8.98 39,275
Log economic book translations 0.42 1.01 0.00 7.70 39,275
Log cultural book translations 1.59 1.36 0.00 8.85 39,275
Linguistic distance 0.86 0.11 0.27 1.00 39,275
Linguistic distance (cladistic) 0.96 0.08 0.26 1.00 39,275
Genetic distance 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.29 39,275
Geographic distance (10,000 km) 0.39 0.38 0.01 1.96 39,275
Log real GDP translating country 12.75 1.68 6.17 16.37 39,275
Log real GDP original country 12.97 1.41 5.56 16.26 39,275
Log real GDP original country (weighted) 13.22 1.56 7.12 16.22 37,976
Log population translating country 3.19 1.62 -1.86 7.16 39,275
Log population original country 3.47 1.51 -1.88 7.16 39,275
Log population original country (weighted) 4.13 1.84 -1.86 8.08 37,976
Political rights translating country 0.13 0.24 0.00 0.86 39,275
Political rights original country 0.17 0.28 0.00 0.86 39,275
Political rights original country (weighted) 0.17 0.26 0.00 0.86 37,976
Log bilateral trade 5.88 2.37 -5.91 11.66 39,275
Log bilateral trade (weighted) 5.97 2.31 -5.87 11.66 37,549
= 1 if ever in colonial relationship 0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00 39,275
= 1 if ever in colonial relationship (weighted) 0.08 0.23 0.00 1.00 35,737
= 1 if contiguous 0.13 0.33 0.00 1.00 39,275
= 1 if contiguous (weighted) 0.11 0.30 0.00 1.00 35,737
Absolute difference in latitude 14.94 17.76 0.00 104.2 39,275
Absolute difference in latitude (weighted) 16.14 18.39 0.00 104.2 37,976
Absolute difference in longitude 41.23 44.06 0.07 238.92 39,275
Absolute difference in longitude (weighted) 46.25 46.44 0.02 248.73 37,976
Human capital index translating country 2.60 0.45 1.08 3.54 38,908
Average years of schooling translating country 8.40 2.23 0.62 12.75 8,903
% of primary schooling translating country 22.58 11.76 0.69 55.63 8,903
% of secondary schooling translating country 21.39 13.92 0.48 69.75 8,903
% of tertiary schooling translating country 8.10 4.73 0.14 26.36 8,903
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Table C2: Commonly Translated Authors by Country
China USA
Author Subject Author Subject
Leo Tolstoy Literature Rudolf Steiner Religion
Dale Carnegie Philosophy Plato Philosophy
Maxim Gorky Literature Anton Chekhov Literature
Brazil Cuba
Author Subject Author Subject
Allan Kardec Philosophy Fidel Castro Social Science
Joseph Murphy Religion Jose Marti Literature
Agatha Christie Literature Jose Saramago Literature
Bangladesh Saudi Arabia
Author Subject Author Subject
Syed Abul A’ala Maududi Religion Ved Parkash Literature
Krishna Chandar Literature Phil Hailstone Science
Muhammad Shafi Deobandi Religion Abd Al-Aziz Al-Fawzan Religion
Argentina Ethiopia
Author Subject Author Subject
Jose´ Trigueirinho Netto Philosophy Vladimir Lenin Social Science
Sigmund Freud Psychology William Shakespeare Literature
Ramacharaka Religion Karl Marx Social Science
Romania Italy
Author Subject Author Subject
Nicolae Ceaus¸escu Social Science William Shakespeare Literature
Ellen Gould White Religion Fyodor Dostoyevsky Literature
Karl Marx Social Science Augustine of Hippo Religion
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Table C3: Language Pair Observations by Translating Country for the Benchmark Sample (1979-2005)
Country N Country N Country N Country N Country N
Germany 2,330 Brazil 515 Kuwait 159 Mauritius 37 Malawi 8
Spain 2,188 Estonia 442 Argentina 143 Dem. Rep. of Congo 36 Namibia 8
France 2,054 Slovak Republic 426 Indonesia 143 Benin 35 Angola 7
United States 2,007 Greece 424 Sri Lanka 130 Madagascar 34 Botswana 7
India 1,569 Portugal 409 Armenia 127 Luxembourg 32 Panama 6
Switzerland 1,569 Serbia 405 Pakistan 116 Burkina Faso 29 South Africa 6
Sweden 1,275 Lithuania 395 Iran 115 Uruguay 29 Cent. African Rep. 5
Denmark 1,205 Turkey 373 Mongolia 114 Ethiopia 28 Senegal 5
United Kingdom 1,193 Israel 347 Tunisia 105 Malta 28 Swaziland 5
Canada 1,140 Belarus 335 Ukraine 100 Nigeria 27 Cape Verde 4
Belgium 1,073 Croatia 331 Morocco 87 Azerbaijan 26 Ecuador 4
Netherlands 1,008 Slovenia 325 Peru 87 Zimbabwe 26 Mali 4
Finland 986 Iceland 304 Philippines 77 Oman 24 Congo 3
Norway 931 Macedonia 294 Kazakhstan 73 Lebanon 23 El Salvador 3
Japan 884 Albania 292 Cyprus 72 Costa Rica 22 Niger 3
Hungary 870 New Zealand 290 Thailand 72 Cote d’Ivoire 21 Saint Lucia 3
Italy 861 South Korea 282 Iraq 68 Venezuela 15 Kenya 2
Poland 828 Moldova 258 Ireland 64 Nepal 14 Mauritania 2
Russia 802 Mexico 251 Singapore 59 Guatemala 13 Trinidad and Tobago 2
Austria 784 Egypt 229 Bangladesh 55 Qatar 12
Romania 712 Cameroon 185 Jordon 55 Suriname 12
Bulgaria 666 Colombia 185 Chad 53 Kyrgyz Republic 11
Australia 593 Syria 179 Ghana 51 Togo 11
China 539 Latvia 173 Malaysia 51 Mozambique 10
Czech Republic 516 Chile 172 Saudi Arabia 45 Bolivia 8
This table describes the spatial distribution of the benchmark sample (1979-2005). The unit of observation is country-year-language-pair for 119 translating
countries, totalling 39,275 observations in the benchmark sample.
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Table C4: Observations by Translating Language for the Benchmark Sample (1979-2005)
Translating Translating Translating Translating Translating Translating Translating
Language N Language N Language N Language N Language N Language N Language N
English 5,538 Latvian 213 Tagalog 33 Waama 11 Mari 7 Hdi 5 Biali 3
German 3,099 Urdu 208 Irish 30 Aragonese 10 Morisyen 7 Jula 5 Fijian 3
French 3,054 Latin 175 Northern Saami 29 Bissa 10 Pitjantjatjara 7 Kabiye 5 Igbo 3
Spanish 2,297 Mongolian (Halh) 175 Maltese 28 Kera 10 Somrai 7 Karachay-Balkar 5 Kabardian 3
Dutch 1,370 Malayalam 169 Maori 28 Koonzime 10 Tuva 7 Karelian 5 Moksha 3
Italian 1,242 Persian (Iranian) 168 Western Frisian 26 Lamnso 10 Arabic (Chadian) 6 Kekchi 5 St. Lucian Creole 3
Russian 1,057 Galacian 167 Kalaallisut 26 Yoruba 10 Blaan, Sarangani 6 Kenga 5 Sranan 3
Portuguese 1,014 Idonesian 163 Occitan 25 Hausa 9 Bosnian 6 Kituba 5 Suri 3
Swedish 1,005 Tamil 151 Tatar 25 Kom 9 Chuvash 6 Koorete 5 Udmurt 3
Arabic 968 Armenian 150 Georgian 24 Kuo 9 Corsican 6 Koromfe 5 Veps 3
Japanese 934 Ukrainian 142 Kasem 24 Ladino 9 Fon 6 Manobo, Cotabato 5 Aramaic 2
Hungarian 926 Belarusan 126 Uzbek 21 Northern Ndebele 9 Haitian 6 Naro 5 Buriat 2
Norwegian 891 Sinhala 117 Samoan 20 Niuean 9 Kabyle 6 Ngangam 5 Chukchi 2
Polish 870 Vietnamese 111 Sanskrit 20 Ossetian 9 Kalagan 6 Carpathian Romani 5 Coptic 2
Romanian 794 Esperanto 109 Central Tibetan 20 Plautdietsch 9 Limbum 6 Syriac 5 Cornish 2
Danish 793 Kazakh 109 Kako 19 Chichewa 8 Luba-Lulua 6 Turkmen 5 Dargwa 2
Finnish 753 Assamese 106 Tongan 18 Chipewyan 8 Mampruli 6 Vengo 5 Even 2
Bulgarian 683 Oriya 93 Amharic 16 Daba 8 Mapun 6 Warlpiri 5 Frisian 2
Czech 602 Breton 85 Luxembourgeois 16 Dangaleat 8 Nafaanra 6 Aghem 4 Guadeloupean Creole 2
Catalan 488 Marathi 84 Tigrigna 16 Gaelic 8 Nepali 6 Aja 4 Guarani 2
Greek 488 Kannada 77 Tokelauan 16 Hawaiian 8 Noone 6 Bamanankan 4 Jingpho 2
Mandarin 455 Gujarati 76 Cree 15 Khmer 8 Ojibwa 6 Old Church Slavic 4 Kara-Kalpak 2
Turkish 437 Faroese 75 Kyrgyz 15 Konkomba 8 Roviana 6 Djeebbana 4 Maithili 2
Albanian 369 Thai 75 Mofu-Gudur 15 Lao 8 Sisaala, Tumulung 6 Hmong 4 Navajo 2
Estonian 359 Telugu 73 Rarotongan 15 Lingala 8 Swati 6 Komi-Zyrian 4 Ndonga 2
Hebrew 356 Uyghur 69 Scots 15 Mundani 8 Tboli 6 Kongo 4 Nogai 2
Lithuanian 356 Inuktitut 65 Swahili 15 Nateni 8 Yakut 6 Kriol 4 Reunion Creole 2
Croatian 352 Welsh 60 Tajiki 15 Newari 8 Zulgo-Gemzek 6 Mukulu 4 Southern Saami 2
Korean 330 Malay 56 Swabian 14 Parkwa 8 Akoose 5 Balkan Romani 4 Southern Sotho 2
Slovene 321 Serbo-Croatian 49 Kankanaey 13 Yamba 8 Anyin 5 Macedo Romanian 4 Tahitian 2
Slovak 314 German (Swiss) 45 Farefare 12 Afrikaans 7 Bafut 5 Inari Saami 4 Tai Hongjin 2
Serbian 309 Kurdish 44 Tikar 12 Bashkir 7 Chumburung 5 Lule Saami 4 Tamazight 2
Icelandic 296 Panjabi 43 Gude 11 Fuliiru 7 Dakota 5 Sokoro 4 Tok Pisin 2
Macedonian 240 Asturian 42 Karang 11 Gbaya-Bossangoa 7 Dan 5 Tswana 4
Bengali 234 Azerbaijani 37 Ngbaka 11 Kalinga 7 Gagauz 5 Wolof 4
Hindi 230 Yiddish 37 Shona 11 Kenyang 7 Gikyode 5 Adyghe 3
Basque 213 Malagasy 33 Somali 11 Mambila 7 Hanga 5 Avar 3
This table reports the benchmark sample by translating language (1979-2005). The unit of observation is country-year-language-pair for 119 translating countries, totalling 39,275
observations in the benchmark sample.
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Table C5: Observations by Original Language for the Benchmark Sample (1979-2005)
Original Original Original Original Original Original
Language N Language N Language N Language N Language N Language N
English 4,958 Korean 282 Mongolian (Halh) 59 Ladino 17 Friulian 6 Shona 4
French 3,066 Albanian 264 Malay 54 Lao 17 Guarani 6 Abkhazian 3
German 2,770 Hindi 254 Telugu 54 Uzbek 17 Lingala 6 Asturian 3
Greek 2,349 Croatian 252 Galacian 52 Zulu 17 Yucatan Maya 6 Chechen 3
Spanish 1,544 Vietnamese 204 Quiche 51 Bamanankan 16 Huautla Mazatec 6 Chukchi 3
Dutch 1,255 Slovene 195 Marathi 50 Geez 16 Southern Sotho 6 Erzya 3
Arabic 1,241 Pali 186 Belarusan 49 Maltese 16 Udmurt 6 Northern Frisian 3
Swedish 1,214 Slovak 176 Inuktitut 45 Avestan 14 Cree 5 Ganda 3
Russian 1,115 Estonian 163 Malayalam 43 Dakota 14 Hopi 5 Hmong 3
Danish 1,066 Indonesian 160 Amharic 42 Oriya 14 Igbo 5 Kabardian-Cherkess 3
Portuguese 1,063 Syriac 155 Swahili 41 Tagalog 14 Kalaallisut 5 Kongo 3
Japanese 1,053 Panjabi 139 Nepali 40 Javanese 13 Komi-Zyrian 5 Maori 3
Hebrew 1,009 Irish 138 Faroese 39 Turkmen 13 Manchu 5 St. Lucian Creole 3
Polish 991 Arabic (Egyptian) 136 Breton 35 Western Frisian 11 Moksha 5 Zarma 3
Mandarin 933 Ukrainian 130 Gaelic 34 Gikuyu 11 Morisyen 5 Arabic (Moroccan) 2
Norwegian 902 Aramaic 127 Gujarati 33 Tajiki 11 Plautdietsch 5 Avar 2
Hungarian 776 Afrikaans 126 Azerbaijani 29 Wolof 11 Lule Saami 5 Chagatai 2
Persian (Iranian) 655 Lithuanian 115 Old Church Slavic 24 Carib 10 Sranan 5 Fang 2
Finnish 640 Coptic 110 Northern Saami 24 Uyghur 9 Cornish 4 Kalmyk 2
Romanian 599 Thai 109 Kazakh 23 Cheyenne 8 Corsican 4 Khanty 2
Turkish 571 Latvian 104 Tamazight 22 Evenki 8 Duala 4 Koryak 2
Sanskrit 519 Armenian 92 Kyrgyz 21 Hausa 8 Komi-Permyak 4 Lak 2
Bengali 493 Tamil 88 Sorbian 21 Sinte Romani 8 Luxembourgeois 4 Mansi 2
Czech 490 Kurdish 85 German (Swiss) 20 Tatar 8 Mari 4 Mapudungun 2
Bulgarian 399 Occitan 83 Scots 20 Assamese 7 Moore 4 North Ndebele 2
Tibetan 388 Welsh 82 Tamasheq 19 Chuvash 7 Navajo 4 Ossetian 2
Yiddish 378 Basque 78 Kannada 18 Kashmiri 7 Nenets 4 Rwanda 2
Icelandic 368 Macedonian 74 Malagasy 18 Vlax Romani 7 Ojibwa 4 Seraiki 2
Urdu 334 Esperanto 68 Sinhala 18 Akan 6 Carpathian Romani 4 Tuva 2
Catalan 327 Georgian 59 Yoruba 18 Ewe 6 Macedo Romanian 4
This table reports the benchmark sample by translating language (1979-2005). The unit of observation is country-year-language-pair for 119 translating
countries, totalling 39,275 observations in the benchmark sample.
C.2 Supplementary Materials
C.2.1 Alternative Measure of Linguistic Distance
In this section I reproduce the table of benchmark estimates using a cladistic measure of linguistic
distance. I construct this measure of cladistic distance as outlined in Appendix A, which is mea-
sured as one minus the ratio of shared branches on the Ethnologue language tree. I assume the
weighting scheme of Fearon (2003), where the ratio of shared tree branches is square rooted to dis-
count more recent linguistic cleavages relative to deep cleavages. Because the number of branches
varies among language familes and subfamilies, the maximum number of branches between any
two languages is not constant. To overcome this obstacle I assume that all current languages are of
equal distance from the proto-language at the root of the Ethnologue language tree. This assump-
tion is equivalent to the assumption Desmet et al. (2012) use when constructing cladistic distances
(see Figure A1).
Table C6 reports the benchmark estimates using this alternative measure. The two oppos-
ing forces of relatedness are borne out of this alternative data and estimated to be significantly
different than zero. The effect of the cladistic measure of linguistic distance is smaller than the
comparable lexicostatistical measure used in the benchmark estimate. This finding is consistent
with the evidence in Dickens (2016a), where the added variation of the lexicostatistical measure
yields added percision in estimation. Nonetheless, the basic finding of this paper is robust to
alternative measures of linguistic distance.
C.2.2 Further Test of the Home Country Assumption
In this section I extend the analysis of section 2.4.1 and systematically dropping every original
language of a translation with at least 100 observations in the benchmark sample. The idea here
is to ensure that the benchmark results cannot be explained away by any one original language
due to the ambiguity of the home country assignment rule. Table C7 reports these estimates and
shows no evidence that any one language can explain away the benchmark result.
C.2.3 Dominant Book Subject?
A potential concern is that the interplay between linguistic and genetic distance observed in the
benchmark estimate is the result of a strong statistical association with one field of study in the
aggregate translation data. Regression analysis using total translations as the dependent variable
may hide the fact that certain idea types are strongly influenced by distance while others are not.
If so, then excluding book translations from the dependent variable that belong to some outlier
subject would yield estimates of linguistic and genetic distance substantially different from the
baseline.
To test this I re-estimate the preferred specification and drop all translations belonging to each
subject area one at a time. The results are presented in Table C8. Coefficient estimates should
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be interpreted relative to the benchmark estimate; i.e., small deviations from the benchmark esti-
mate imply the excluded subject of translation is not influential over and above the average effect,
whereas large deviations indicate subject areas that are particularly influential in the benchmark
result.
The first observation about Table C8 is that no one subject area is driving the core result of this
study – the standardized coefficient for linguistic distance range from −7.8 to −8.5 percent, and
from 5.6 to 7.2 percent for genetic distance. It is reassuring that the benchmark estimate of −8.0
percent for linguistic distance and 6.3 percent for genetic distance tend towards the lower bound of
this range of coefficients. Second, both genetic and linguistic distance are precisely estimated in all
regressions at standard levels of confidence. These two observations suggest the baseline results
of section 2.3.3 cannot be explained by a single outlier subject that is particularly responsive to
either linguistic or genetic distance.
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Table C6: Conditional Benchmark Regressions with Cladistic Linguistic Distance
Dependent variable: Log translations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Linguistic distance (cladistic) -1.77*** -1.76*** -1.76*** -1.41*** -1.41*** -1.31***
(0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.28) (0.28) (0.29)
Genetic distance 2.89*** 2.87*** 2.87*** 3.05*** 3.03*** 2.16**
(1.01) (1.01) (1.01) (1.01) (1.00) (1.02)
Geographic distance -0.89*** -0.89*** -0.89*** -0.60*** -0.57*** -1.35***
(0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.17) (0.45)
Economic controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Political controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Trade controls No No No Yes Yes Yes
Colonial controls No No No No Yes Yes
Geography controls No No No No No Yes
Target Language FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Original Language FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Target Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 39,275 39,275 39,275 39,275 39,275 39,275
Adjusted R2 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.28 0.28 0.28
Country pair clusters 1897 1897 1897 1897 1897 1897
Standardized Coefficients (%)
Linguistic Distance −8.7 −8.7 −8.7 −7.0 −7.0 −6.5
Genetic Distance 7.6 7.5 7.5 8.0 7.9 5.7
This table re-produces the benchmark estimates of Table 2.3 using a cladistic measure of linguistic distance. The set
of economic controls include log real GDP per capita and log population in both countries, political controls include
political rights in both countries, trade controls include the logged value of bilateral trade flows of the country pair, the
colonial controls include a dummy variable indicating if a country pair has ever been in a colonial relationship, and the
geography controls include a set of indicators for contiguity and a country pair’s absolute difference in latitude and
longitude. Country-pair clustered robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table C7: Sensitivity Analysis: Further Test of Home Country Assignment
Language Linguistic Genetic
Dropped Distance Distance N
German -1.29*** 2.15** 36,498
(0.28) (1.04)
Greek -1.12*** 2.77** 36,920
(0.28) (1.10)
Dutch -1.03*** 2.42** 38,020
(0.28) (1.06)
Swedish -1.06*** 2.36** 38,060
(0.29) (1.06)
Russian -1.11*** 2.27** 38,158
(0.29) (1.06)
Danish -1.08*** 2.44** 38,205
(0.29) (1.06)
Portuguese -1.12*** 2.54** 38,211
(0.29) (1.08)
Japanese -1.10*** 2.08** 38,221
(0.28) (1.02)
Hebrew -1.14*** 2.39** 38,261
(0.28) (1.06)
Polish -1.15*** 2.60** 38,284
(0.29) (1.06)
Norwegian -1.05*** 2.44** 38,373
(0.29) (1.06)
Hungarian -1.14*** 2.40** 38,499
(0.28) (1.16)
Persian (Iranian) -1.11*** 2.41** 38,620
(0.28) (1.04)
Finnish -1.11*** 3.03*** 38,634
(0.28) (1.07)
Romanian -1.17*** 2.46** 38,675
(0.29) (1.05)
Turkish -1.12*** 2.29** 38,704
(0.28) (1.05)
Sanskrit -1.13*** 2.40** 38,756
(0.28) (1.04)
Bengali -1.10*** 2.27** 38,782
(0.29) (1.05)
Czech -1.11*** 2.39** 38,785
(0.29) (1.05)
Bulgarian -1.13*** 2.39** 38,876
(0.29) (1.05)
Tibetan -1.13*** 2.27** 38,887
(0.28) (1.07)
Yiddish -1.12*** 2.41** 38,897
(0.29) (1.05)
Icelandic -1.11*** 2.44** 38,907
(0.29) (1.05)
Language Linguistic Genetic
Dropped Distance Distance N
Urdu -1.11*** 2.37** 38,941
(0.29) (1.05)
Catalan -1.13*** 2.43** 38,948
(0.29) (1.06)
Korean -1.12*** 2.63** 38,993
(0.28) (1.09)
Albanian -1.12*** 2.37** 39,011
(0.29) (1.05)
Croatian -1.13*** 2.38** 39,023
(0.29) (1.05)
Vietnamese -1.13*** 2.44** 39,071
(0.29) (1.05)
Slovene -1.15*** 2.41** 39,080
(0.29) (1.05)
Pali -1.13*** 2.39** 39,089
(0.28) (1.05)
Slovak -1.12*** 2.40** 39,099
(0.29) (1.05)
Estonian -1.12*** 2.48** 39,112
(0.28) (1.06)
Indonesian -1.13*** 2.37** 39,115
(0.28) (1.05)
Syriac -1.12*** 2.38** 39,120
(0.28) (1.05)
Panjabi -1.12*** 2.38** 39,136
(0.28) (1.05)
Irish -1.13*** 2.41** 39,137
(0.28) (1.05)
Arabic (Egyptian) -1.13*** 2.40** 39,139
(0.28) (1.05)
Ukrainian -1.15*** 2.45** 39,145
(0.28) (1.05)
Aramaic -1.12*** 2.41** 39,148
(0.28) (1.05)
Afrikaans -1.11*** 2.46** 39,149
(0.28) (1.05)
Lithuanian -1.12*** 2.41** 39,160
(0.28) (1.06)
Coptic -1.13*** 2.40** 39,165
(0.28) (1.05)
Thai -1.13*** 2.35** 39,166
(0.28) (1.05)
Latvian -1.13*** 2.41** 39,171
(0.28) (1.05)
This table tests the assignment of the home country of a language by systematically dropping each original language of a book
translation with a 100 or more observations. The robustness of the results to this test suggests the benchmark result is not driven by
the assumption of the original country of a translation. All regressions include the benchmark set of control variables used in column
(6) of Table 2.3. All regressions also include individual country, year and target language fixed effects. Country-pair clustered robust
standard errors reported in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table C8: Robustness Check for Dominant Subject of Translation
Dependent variable: Log translations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Social Applied Natural
Excluding: Arts History Literature Philosophy Religion Science Science Science
Linguistic distance -1.09*** -1.13*** -1.12*** -1.11*** -1.08*** -1.18*** -1.13*** -1.11***
(0.28) (0.28) (0.34) (0.28) (0.28) (0.28) (0.27) (0.28)
Genetic distance 2.33** 2.48** 2.47* 2.13** 2.39** 2.78*** 2.43** 2.47**
(1.07) (1.03) (1.29) (1.04) (1.09) (1.03) (1.02) (1.06)
Geographic distance -1.34*** -1.32*** -1.54*** -1.42*** -1.36*** -1.44*** -1.33*** -1.33***
(0.45) (0.46) (0.53) (0.45) (0.46) (0.45) (0.45) (0.45)
Benchmark controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Target Language FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Original Language FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Target Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 38,405 37,661 26,488 38,610 35,471 37,717 38,374 38,987
Adjusted R2 0.29 0.30 0.31 0.29 0.30 0.30 0.29 0.28
Country pair clusters 1887 1873 1505 1885 1805 1852 1884 1893
Standardized Coefficients (%)
Linguistic Distance −7.8 −8.1 −8.2 −8.0 −7.8 −8.5 −8.2 −8.0
Genetic Distance 6.1 6.5 6.6 5.6 6.2 7.2 6.4 6.5
This table reports estimates on various subsamples that exclude each subject classification in the data one by one. All regressions include the
benchmark set of control variables used in column (6) of Table 2.3. Country-pair clustered robust standard errors reported in parentheses. * p <
0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Table C9: Ethnologue Home Country vs. Synthetic Language Country Assignment
Ethnologue
Home Country
Synthetic
Language
Country
Mean Mean Difference Observations
Genetic distance 0.041 0.045 -0.004*** 35,732
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Geographic distance 0.390 0.455 -0.066*** 35,737
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Log real GDP 12.989 13.222 -0.233*** 37,976
(0.007) (0.008) (0.003)
Log population 3.457 4.133 -0.675*** 37,976
(0.008) (0.009) (0.007)
Political rights 0.163 0.171 -0.008*** 37,976
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
Log bilateral trade 5.932 5.972 -0.041*** 37,549
(0.012) (0.012) (0.003)
Colonial relationship 0.093 0.075 0.017*** 35,737
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Contiguity 0.116 0.112 0.004*** 35,737
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Abs. difference in latitude 14.751 16.142 -1.391*** 37,976
(0.091) (0.094) (0.054)
Abs. difference in longitude 40.893 46.247 -5.354*** 37,976
(0.226) (0.238) (0.095)
This table establishes the mean difference in covariates between the alternate home country assignment rules of a
book translation.
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Appendix D
Chapter 3 Appendix
D.1 Data Description and Sources
Ethnolinguistic groups: Georeferenced group data comes from the World Language Mapping
System (WLMS). These data map information from each ethnolinguistic group in the Ethnologue
to the corresponding polygon. When constructing buffer zones are group borders, I use Goode’s
homolosine map projection.
Source: http://www.worldgeodatasets.com/language/
Caloric suitability index: I sourced the caloric suitability index (CSI) data from Galor and O¨zak
(2016). CSI is a measure of agricultural productivity that reflects the caloric potential in a grid
cell. It’s based on the Global Agro-Ecological Zones (GAEZ) project of the Food and Agriculture
Organization (FAO). A variety of related measures are available: in the reported estimates I use
both the pre-1500 and post-1500 average CSI measure that includes cells with zero productivity. I
measure average CSI within each buffer zone using Goode’s homolosine map projection to mini-
mize area distortions. I use Stata to calculate the the post-1500 change in CSI .
Source: http://omerozak.com/csi
Agricultural suitability index: I sourced the agricultural suitability index (ASI) data from Ra-
mankutty et al. (2002). ASI is an index of the suitability of land for agriculture, which measures
the fraction of each 0.5× 0.5 grid cell that is suitable for agriculture. I measure average ASI within
each buffer zone using Goode’s homolosine map projection to minimize area distortions.
Source: https://goo.gl/pPNxLVi
Absolute difference in elevation: I collect elevation data from the National Geophysical Data
Centre (NGDC) at the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). I measure av-
erage elevation of each buffer zone using Goode’s homolosine map projection.
Source: www.ngdc.noaa.gov/mgg/topo/globe.html
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Ruggedness: As a measure of ruggedness I use the standard deviation of the NGDC elevation
data. I use Goode’s homolosine map projection.
Source: www.ngdc.noaa.gov/mgg/topo/globe.html
Precipitation: Precipitation data comes from the WorldClim – Global Climate Database. I mea-
sure average precipitation within each buffer zone using Goode’s homolosine map projection to
minimize area distortions.
Source: http://www.worldclim.org/current
Temperature: Temperature data comes from the WorldClim – Global Climate Database. I mea-
sure the average temperature within each buffer zone using Goode’s homolosine map projection
to minimize area distortions.
Source: http://www.worldclim.org/current
Malaria Ecology Index: I sourced the Malaria Ecology Index data from Kiszewski et al. (2004).
The index measures the prevalence of malaria for each 0.5 × 0.5 grid cell on earth. I construct a
measure of the average prevalence of malaria with each buffer zone using Goode’s homolosine
map projection.
Source: https://sites.google.com/site/gordoncmccord//datasets
Lakes and Rivers: Georeferenced data on lakes and rivers from around the world come from
Natural Earth. I use the Equidistant Cylindrical projection in ArcGIS, and identify buffer zones
that intersect with a river or lake. I use Stata to construct two indicator variables: one indicator
when a lake intersect the buffer zone and another when a river intersects the buffer zone.
Source: http://www.naturalearthdata.com/downloads/10m-physical-vectors/
Area of language pair: Total area of neighbouring ethnolinguistic group polygons, measured in
kilometres squared.
Source: Calculated using ArcGIS.
Population of language pair: Ethnolinguistic group population comes from the WLMS Ethno-
logue database. Population of language pair is the sum of both groups population.
Source: Calculated using Stata.
Latitude and Longitude difference: Latitude and longitude coordinates for an ethnolinguistic
group correspond to the group’s centroid. Differences are calculated by taking the absolute differ-
ence of a neighbouring pair centroids.
Source: Calculated using ArcGIS and Stata.
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D.2 Supplementary Material
Table D1 reports summary statistics for the full sample dataset and Table D2 reports summary
statistics for the sibling sample dataset. Table D3 is a replication of Table 3.4, but includes the
coefficient estimates for all control variables. Similarly, Table D4 is a replication of Table 3.5 that
includes all coefficient estimates.
Table D1: Summary Statistics – Full Sample
Mean Std dev. Min Max N
Linguistic distance 0.727 0.180 0.003 0.945 6,990
CSI variation (pre-1500) 0.222 0.265 0.000 1.616 6,990
Change in CSI variation (post-1500) -0.063 0.181 -0.977 0.321 6,990
CSI (pre-1500) 1.346 0.706 0.000 4.939 6,990
Change in CSI (post-1500) -0.061 0.572 -2.136 1.361 6,990
Malaria 8.238 8.923 0.000 36.29 6,990
Ruggedness 0.299 0.292 0.000 1.934 6,990
Elevation 0.696 0.662 -0.022 4.929 6,990
Precipitation 13.65 7.964 0.000 50.67 6,990
Precipitation variation 1.683 1.846 0.000 19.65 6,990
Temperature 21.54 6.917 -12.29 29.49 6,990
Temperature variation 1.552 1.502 0.000 10.09 6,990
River 0.612 0.487 0.000 1.000 6,990
Lake 0.096 0.295 0.000 1.000 6,990
Area of language pair (km2) 10.05 2.384 5.353 16.00 6,990
Population of language pair 13.00 3.18 5.298 20.64 6,990
Latitude difference 1.505 2.515 0.000 30.34 6,990
Longitude difference 2.151 7.201 0.000 340.3 6,990
Land suitability variation 0.091 0.077 0.000 0.469 6,966
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Table D2: Summary Statistics – Sibling Sample
Mean Std dev. Min Max N
Linguistic distance 0.514 0.175 0.003 0.913 1,277
CSI variation (pre-1500) 0.266 0.298 0.000 1.373 1,277
Change in CSI variation (post-1500) -0.11 0.239 -0.977 0.220 1,277
CSI (pre-1500) 1.383 0.702 0.000 4.598 1,277
Change in CSI (post-1500) -0.119 0.643 -2.064 1.335 1,277
Malaria 8.822 8.847 0.000 35.62 1,277
Ruggedness 0.337 0.311 0.000 1.897 1,277
Elevation 0.716 0.662 0.000 4.929 1,277
Precipitation 15.24 8.306 0.000 48.68 1,277
Precipitation variation 1.879 1.841 0.000 16.69 1,277
Temperature 22.17 5.902 -6.977 29.21 1,277
Temperature variation 1.734 1.596 0.000 9.981 1,277
River 0.524 0.500 0.000 1.000 1,277
Lake 0.081 0.272 0.000 1.000 1,277
Area of language pair (km2) 8.694 1.892 5.376 15.97 1,277
Population of language pair 11.33 2.664 5.298 20.64 1,277
Latitude difference 0.642 1.12 0.000 15.23 1,277
Longitude difference 0.734 2.261 0.000 51.60 1,277
Land suitability variation 0.082 0.073 0.000 0.434 1,267
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Table D3: Robustness Check: Native Population Sensitivity Analysis
Dependent Variable: Lexicostatistical Linguistic Distance ∈ (0, 1)
& >25% & >50% & >75%
Native Pop. Native Pop. Native Pop.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CSI Variation (pre-1500) -0.121*** -0.200*** -0.121*** -0.212*** -0.132*** -0.252***
(0.037) (0.065) (0.037) (0.065) (0.039) (0.070)
Change in CSI Variation (post-1500) -0.209*** -0.248*** -0.218*** -0.269*** -0.202*** -0.281***
(0.055) (0.070) (0.055) (0.070) (0.057) (0.074)
CSI (pre-1500) -0.025 -0.023 -0.023 -0.014 -0.008 -0.008
(0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017)
Change in CSI (post-1500) -0.001 -0.012 -0.004 -0.016 0.001 -0.008
(0.024) (0.026) (0.023) (0.026) (0.024) (0.027)
Malaria 0.001 0.002 0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Ruggedness 0.195** 0.188* 0.185
(0.096) (0.097) (0.128)
Elevation 0.023 0.025 0.030
(0.019) (0.019) (0.021)
Precipitation -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Precipitation Variation 0.003 0.004 0.008
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
Temperature 0.003** 0.003** 0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Temperature Variation -0.028 -0.026 -0.027
(0.018) (0.018) (0.023)
River -0.036*** -0.035*** -0.045***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.013)
Lake -0.054** -0.056** -0.057**
(0.022) (0.022) (0.027)
Area of Language Pair (km2) -0.009 -0.009 -0.005
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
Population of Language Pair -0.004 -0.003 -0.005
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Latitude Difference 0.007 0.007 0.005
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Longitude Difference 0.005 0.004 0.002
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Latitude × Longitude -0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Language Family FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Continental FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Language Cluster 1 915 915 886 886 767 767
Language Cluster 2 826 826 795 795 693 693
Observations 1,241 1,241 1,202 1,202 1,036 1,036
Adjusted R2 0.34 0.39 0.34 0.39 0.33 0.37
This table tests the sensitivity of the benchmark estimates by limiting the sibling sample to pairs that reside in a country
where a significant portion of their population is native to that country. Columns (1)-(2), (3)-(4) and (5)-(6) report
estimates where at least 25, 50 and 75 percent of the population is native to the country of residence, respectively. The
unit of observation is a 100 km buffer zone along the contiguous border segment of each language pair. Standard errors
are double-clustered at the level of each language group and are reported in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p
< 0.01.
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Table D4: Robustness Check: Overlapping and Multi-Part Polygon Sensitivity Analysis
Dependent Variable: Lexicostatistical Linguistic Distance ∈ (0, 1)
Excluding Excluding Excluding Overlapping
Overlapping Groups Multi-Part Groups & Multi-Part Groups
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CSI Variation (pre-1500) -0.100** -0.197*** -0.117*** -0.215** -0.136*** -0.205*
(0.041) (0.073) (0.045) (0.086) (0.050) (0.106)
Change in CSI Variation (post-1500) -0.175*** -0.221*** -0.218*** -0.262*** -0.213*** -0.244**
(0.061) (0.080) (0.071) (0.099) (0.076) (0.118)
CSI (pre-1500) -0.022 -0.023 -0.034 -0.036* -0.024 -0.027
(0.019) (0.020) (0.021) (0.022) (0.027) (0.030)
Change in CSI (post-1500) -0.000 -0.018 -0.011 -0.019 -0.009 -0.019
(0.027) (0.030) (0.033) (0.036) (0.038) (0.041)
Malaria 0.002 0.001 0.002
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Ruggedness 0.184* 0.163 0.150
(0.108) (0.116) (0.123)
Elevation 0.020 0.039 0.041
(0.024) (0.024) (0.042)
Precipitation -0.003* -0.001 -0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Precipitation Variation 0.006 0.000 0.001
(0.006) (0.007) (0.008)
Temperature 0.003 0.007** 0.008
(0.002) (0.003) (0.006)
Temperature Variation -0.023 -0.015 -0.015
(0.020) (0.022) (0.024)
River -0.032** -0.014 -0.013
(0.013) (0.015) (0.017)
Lake -0.041 -0.027 -0.023
(0.025) (0.030) (0.036)
Area of Language Pair (km2) -0.003 -0.003 -0.005
(0.007) (0.010) (0.012)
Population of Language Pair -0.008 -0.009 -0.004
(0.005) (0.007) (0.008)
Latitude Difference -0.003 -0.027 -0.014
(0.008) (0.023) (0.033)
Longitude Difference 0.003 -0.021 -0.027
(0.004) (0.023) (0.036)
Latitude × Longitude 0.000 0.012 0.015
(0.000) (0.010) (0.023)
Language Family FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Continental FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Language Cluster 1 744 744 587 587 492 492
Language Cluster 2 666 666 539 539 453 453
Observations 988 988 763 763 632 632
Adjusted R2 0.36 0.40 0.36 0.40 0.37 0.39
This table tests the sensitivity of the benchmark estimates by limiting the sibling sample to ethnolinguistic pairs that
do not overlap with any other groups and are not composed of multi-part group polygons. The unit of observation is
a 100 km buffer zone along the contiguous border segment of each language pair. Standard errors are double-clustered
at the level of each language group and are reported in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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